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Abstract 
 
This thesis adopts a new operational method to measure and investigate the 
relationship among cost efficiency, market competition and profitability in major Asian 
economies by using an unbalanced panel data sample of 278 commercial banks 
during the financial upheaval period of 2005-2012 before and after the global financial 
crisis.   
 
Firstly, we estimate the cost efficiency by employing different stochastic frontier 
analysis (SFA) models, which include the equity capital to indicate loss-absorbing 
capacity and risk preference and cross-country differences to be additional 
environmental variables. It is generally agreed that cross-country differences 
influence the frontier technology in the international comparison of banks’ 
performance. In this case, we implement the international comparison under SFA 
models with and without incorporating these cross-country heterogeneities. And the 
empirical results suggest that cross-country differences are significant sources to 
measure banks’ cost efficiency and evaluate banks’ performance. 
 
Secondly, we measure the market competition by investigating a range of approaches:  
the traditional Structure-Conduct-Performance approach, Lerner index, and new 
empirical industrial organization Panzar-Rosse approach. And we find that the 
SCP-Lerner approach may fail to identify the strength of competition and may not 
always unambiguously distinguish between the market power and the efficiency 
explanations of market concentration.  
 
Finally, following the approach of Boone, we measure the intensity of competition in 
two ways: the profit elasticity and the relative profit difference (calculated by cost 
efficiency score and shadow return on equity capital). Then we implement a quadratic 
quantile regression to compute the integral areas and standard errors for the Boone 
visual test and Wald test to reflect the relative intensity of competition for different 
competitive regimes over time. Our findings show that competition of banking 
industries become more intense in 9 Asian economies in the wake of the financial 
crisis and that two advanced economies (Singapore and Taiwan Province of China) 
and two remarkable emerging economies (China and India) play the significantly 
leading role in this intensifying competition process.  
 
Key words: Cost efficiency, Stochastic Frontier Approach, Shadow return on equity, 
Intensity of competition, Boone indicator, Cross-country comparisons 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction and motivation 
 
Dramatic change has happened in the financial industry around the world over 
the last two decades since there are some radical reforms in financial 
circumstances and financial policies. During this period, liberalization 
happened due to the financial prosperity and financial crisis initiated from 
subprime loan crisis. And the level of competition in banking industry has 
significant implications for banking efficiency, economic growth and financial 
stability. In the wake of ups and downs of the financial system, the competition 
policies have been changed all the time. Therefore, the relationship between 
banking efficiency and market competition triggers more and more interest of 
governments and policymakers all over the world. 
 
To keep pace with these financial revolutions and structural change, a large 
number of efficiency studies appear in the literature with an attempt to assess 
the effect of government policy such as deregulation, privatization and 
mergers on banks’ overall performance and provide further policy implications. 
It is noticed that the focal point of the majority of banking studies is on the 
developed countries like US and European countries and very few empirical 
studies pay attention to emerging markets and developing countries. However, 
	 2
many emerging economies have undergone a number of financial upheavals 
before this global financial crisis of 2007-2008 and they are found to react and 
recover sooner than the developed economies. In a result, there are 
considerable lessons can be learned from the emerging economies (Duygun 
et al., 2015). To fill the literature gap, we use an unbalanced panel data set of 
banks in five emerging economies (China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Thailand) and four advanced economies (HK SAR, Korea, Singapore and 
Taiwan Province of China) during the financial shock period of 2005-2012 
based on the classification of the emerging economies and advanced 
economies by IMF (International Monetary Fund) to investigate the impact of 
market competition on banking efficiency. These nine sampling banking 
industries are chosen as they have some common characteristics. For the one 
hand, the characteristics of development, competition, reforms and crises are 
vital important to the objectives of our research. These nine countries and 
regions are neighboring financial markets and economies in Asia and all of 
them have experienced extraordinary changes from the financial liberalization 
in 1980s to a severe Asian financial crisis in 1997 and again gone through the 
financial 2008 Global financial crisis from the rapid growth of financial 
globalization. To concentrate on these banking industries could help us to have 
a deep understanding of the impact of the financial crisis on the banking 
efficiency. For the other hand, the structure of banking system particularly 
banking concentration and market power plays a significant role in considering 
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cross-country heterogeneities. The assets of Top 10 commercial banks take up 
the majority of the total assets in these nine sampling banking systems. 
 
Moreover, it is well known that banks with inadequate equity capital are more 
vulnerable to financial crisis since equity capital is a primary loss absorbing 
capacity for bad loans of financial system. Thus banking system 
recapitalization and the deleveraging of banks are paramount important to 
policymakers in the upheaval period of financial crisis. And it is necessary to 
measure the cost of changes in the equity capital regulatory requirements 
when modeling the cost minimizing behaviour of banking systems. However, 
there are rarely empirical studies on the role of equity capital constraints even 
though this idea is widely agreed in the theoretical literature. This thesis 
attempts to fill the gap and measure the cost of changes in the regulatory 
capital constraints and the impact on the efficiency and profitability of banking 
industries. Specifically, we try to measure the shadow price of equity capital 
and estimate the shadow return on equity by including the equity capital 
constraints into the cost function. 
 
Furthermore, in the numerous empirical studies of measuring banking 
efficiency with different estimation techniques, there is no consensus on how 
to distinguish inefficiency from heterogeneity in stochastic frontier analysis. As 
suggested by Weyman-Jones (2016), “statistically there is no such thing as 
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‘inefficiency’ or ‘heterogeneity’, there are only random variables with probability 
distributions. Therefore, ‘inefficiency’ or ‘heterogeneity’ are interpretative 
concepts imposed on particular decompositions of regression residuals”, we 
employ five different panel data stochastic frontier analysis models including 
time-invariant and time-varying methods (i.e. Fixed effect model, Pitt and Lee 
Random effect model, Battese and Coelli Random model, the Greene’s ‘true’ 
fixed effect model and the Greene’s ‘true’ random effect model) to check the 
consistency of empirical results and the robustness of these models. 
 
What’s more, there is a massive volume of literature on banking efficiency that 
investigates a number of aspects in measuring efficiency including the 
comparison of estimation techniques, the determinates of efficiency such as 
bank size, ownership, corporate governance, mergers and acquisitions, 
foreign banks entry, regulation reform and liberalization. However, there is 
insufficient amount of empirical studies on the relationship between the 
cross-country heterogeneities and banking efficiency in Asia. In our analysis, 
we aim to incorporate cross-country differences across nine Asian banking 
countries and regions into cost function to measure the levels of banking 
efficiency. 
 
Last but not least, market competition is a very prevalent subject in banking 
industry and we attempt to introduce the developments of measures of market 
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competition in the literature from the traditional models based on 
Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) approach and Lerner index to the 
modern model of Boone with two measures: the profit elasticity and the relative 
profit difference. In our analysis, we estimate the shadow price of equity capital 
as the measure of efficiency and the shadow return on equity capital as the 
measure of profitability from the panel data stochastic frontier analysis model 
with incorporating the regulatory capital constraints, then we can get the 
relative profit difference (the difference between the profitability of the typical 
bank relative to the profit of the most efficient bank compared with the 
difference between the efficiency of the typical bank relative to the most 
efficient bank) which measures the intensity of competition. And we attempt to 
investigate the impact of financial crisis in shifting profits and market share in 
the direction of more efficient banks based on Boone’s test and compare the 
strength of competition of individual banking industry. 
 
Therefore, this thesis aims to measure and evaluate the relationship between 
efficiency and competition in nine Asian Banking sector using an unbalanced 
panel data set consisting 278 banks over the period from 2005 to 2012. 
 
1.2 The aims of this Research 
 
The main objective of this thesis is to find out the relationship between banking 
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efficiency and market competition in the nine Asian banking industries during 
the financial upheaval period of 2005-2012 before and after the global financial 
crisis of 2007-2008. In particular, this study attempts to tackle the following 
issues: 
 
1. Measure the cost efficiency of nine Asian banking sectors and check the 
consistency of the measurements by applying five panel data stochastic 
frontier analysis models including three classical models (fixed effect model, 
Pitt and Lee fixed effect model, Battese and Coelli random effect model) 
and two Greene’s ‘true’ models (Greene’s ‘true’ fixed effect model and 
Greene’s ‘true’ random effect model). 
2. Analyse the key determinants of banking efficiency across countries by 
incorporating cross-country heterogeneities. 
3. Investigate the choice of the functional forms among intermediation 
approach, production approach and dual approach for inputs and outputs 
specifications. The key difference of these three approaches is due to the 
role of total deposits. We examine the theoretical and statistical properties 
such as monotonicity and concavity condition of each cost functional form 
to test their robustness. 
4. Assess the effect of bank size on the level of cost efficiency. 
5. Examine the role of equity capital on banking efficiency, economies of scale 
and shadow return on equity. 
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6. Evaluate the strength of market competition of individual banking system 
by employing the traditional structure conduct performance (SCP) 
approach, Lerner index and the new empirical industrial organization 
(NEIO) Panzar-Rosse (PR) approach.  
7. Examine the impact of efficiency on shifting profits and market share in the 
direction of more competitive banks when financial shocks occurred (i.e. 
the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 in our case) by two measures: the 
profit elasticity and the relative profit difference, which are derived by 
Boone in a series of papers. 
 
1.3 The Structure of this Thesis 
 
The whole thesis is organized into seven chapters as follows:  
 
Chapter 2 Literature review of banking efficiency 
 
Firstly, this chapter introduces the theoretical framework associated with 
efficiency, in which efficiency is measured by economies of scale and 
economies of scope; technical, allocative and overall efficiency; cost and profit 
efficiency from different perspectives.  
 
Secondly, the second chapter turns to explain methodologies in measuring 
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efficiency with respect to the choice of functional forms from Cobb-Douglas 
functional form, translog functional form or Fourier flexible functional form; and 
the estimation methods. We provide a brief summary of non-parametric 
approach (mainly on Data Envelopment Analysis, DEA) and parametric 
approach (mainly on panel data Stochastic Frontier Analysis models, SFA).  
 
Thirdly, this chapter comprehensively discusses the variables for estimating 
banking efficiency. We address the specifications of inputs and outputs 
variables under value-added approach and other three different approaches 
(intermediation approach, production approach and dual approach), in which 
total deposits play different roles. Additionally, we elaborate the importance of 
control variables, for instance, risk preference factors, loan quality control 
variables and environmental variables. 
 
Finally, this chapter provides a detailed literature review on empirical banking 
efficiency studies and particularly summarises empirical findings on 
cross-country comparisons and the determinants of banking efficiency. And 
regarding to the empirical evidence, cross-country heterogeneities, bank size, 
ownership, equity capital, non-performing loan ratio and market structure are 
significantly important to banking efficiency and performance. 
 
Chapter 3 Cost efficiency analysis of banking systems in 9 Asian 
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countries and regions 
 
In the third chapter of our analysis, we investigate the levels of banking 
efficiency in the 9 Asian countries and regions and check the consistency of 
our empirical results by adopting five different panel data stochastic frontier 
models. 
 
Secondly, the chapter compares the estimates and tests the properties of 
three different cost functional forms for specifying the inputs and outputs 
variables in the framework of intermediation approach, production approach 
and dual approach, which concentrate on different roles of total deposits.  
 
Thirdly, this chapter examines the key determinants of banking efficiency from 
the perspectives of cross-country heterogeneities, bank size, economies of 
scale and the role of equity capital. 
 
Chapter 4 Market competition analysis in Asian banking industries: an 
application of the traditional modeling approaches 
 
This chapter firstly introduces two mostly applied hypotheses in explaining the 
relationship between market structure and profitability: the traditional SCP 
approach and the efficiency hypothesis. Then measures the market structure 
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of banking sectors by using concentration ratios such as ܥܴଷ  and the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). Moreover, this chapter tests the traditional 
SCP approach and efficiency hypothesis by employing fixed effect model and 
random model and analyse the advantages and disadvantages of SCP 
approach. Furthermore, we introduced Lerner index as a proxy of market 
power, which is estimated by the mark-up of price over marginal costs, to 
measure the degree of market competition. A higher value of Lerner index 
suggests low level of competition. However, as a very simple measure of 
market competition, Lerner index only considers the marginal cost side of the 
measurement and the interaction of demand and marginal costs is likely to be 
important in assessing competition so that these drawbacks of Lerner index 
are very apparent. Consequently, alternative approaches to competition 
measurement have been suggested to the modeling for addressing theses 
drawbacks, which does motivate us to adopt other approaches such as the 
new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) Panzar-Rosse approach in 
chapter 5 and Boone indicator in chapter 6. 
 
Chapter 5 Market Competition in Asian Banking Industries: an 
application of the new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) 
Panzar-Rosse approach  
 
To tackle the shortcomings of structural approach (SCP and Lerner approach), 
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the fifth chapter examines market structure, measures the intensity of market 
competition and investigates the impact of concentration on competition in 
nine Asian banking industries by implementing competition test and 
equilibrium test in the framework of Panzar-Rosse approach. 
 
Chapter 6 Market competition analysis in Asian banking industries: an 
application of Boone indicator 
 
This chapter examines the reallocation effect of competition on the profitability 
of efficient banks and investigates the role of efficiency in shifting profits and 
the market share towards more competitive banks when the global financial 
crisis occurred. In this thesis, we estimate the intensity of market competition 
under the approach proposed by Boone and two measures of the strength of 
competition are the profit elasticity and the relative profit difference. To 
implement the theoretical Boone’s test, Duygun et al. (2015) introduces a 
polynomial quantile regression. With reference to their methodology, we adopt 
a quadratic quantile regression to carry out the Boone’s sign test and Wald test 
to compare the intensity of competition of 9 Asian banking industries during the 
upheaval period before and after the global financial crisis (i.e. 2005-2008 and 
2009-2012) and compare the strength of competition of a banking sector with 
the intensity of competition of the remaining economies in our sample. 
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Chapter 7 Conclusion  
   
This chapter summarises the main findings of our research, outlines the major 
contributions of this thesis to date and proposes some suggestions for the 
directions of future research. 
 
  
	 13
Chapter 2 Literature Review of Banking Efficiency 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The main objective of this chapter is to introduce the theoretical framework of 
efficiency, measurement of efficiency, estimation techniques and review the 
existing empirical studies from the perspectives including efficiency 
measurement, methodologies, cross-country comparisons, and the 
determinants of efficiency.  
 
Section 2.2 briefly explains and discusses different concepts of efficiency from 
different views of point: economies of scale and economies of scope; technical, 
allocative and overall efficiency (the components of efficiency); and cost 
efficiency and profit efficiency (cost function and production function). 
 
In section 2.3, firstly, we briefly introduce the most widely used functional forms 
in the empirical studies: the Cobb-Douglas functional form, the translog 
functional form and the Fourier flexible form. Then we provide a brief review of 
the main frontier techniques applied to measure efficiency. Generally, there are 
two categories of frontier techniques: non-parametric approaches and 
parametric approaches. Non-parametric approaches refer to the data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) and free disposal hull (FDH) approach. And 
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parametric approaches refer to the stochastic frontier approach (SFA), 
distribution free approach (DFA) and thick frontier approach (TFA). Moreover, 
we discuss the main differences between the non-parametric and parametric 
approaches. Furthermore, under the framework of panel data stochastic 
frontier approach, we briefly illustrate the models based on time-invariant 
efficiency and time-varying efficiency, respectively.  
 
Section 2.4 describes the issues on variables selection. Firstly, we explain the 
specification of outputs and inputs by applying four different approaches 
(intermediation approach, production approach, dual approach and 
value-added approach) with respect to the role of deposits. Secondly, we 
discuss the control variables for risk preference and loan quality such as 
non-performing loan, loan loss provisions, and equity capital. Finally, we 
demonstrate the country-specific environmental variables reflecting market 
structure, regulation, macroeconomic conditions and geographical 
characteristics, which may influence banking efficiency. 
 
Section 2.5 reviews previous empirical studies of banking efficiency on 
methodologies of the estimation, the cross-country comparisons and the 
determinants of efficiency. In our survey of the previous cross-country studies, 
we place great emphasis on empirical studies of banking efficiency in the 
transition and developing economies that would shed light on our own 
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research motivation, that is, compare the different cost efficiency levels in 
Asian banking industry. In addition, we review a number of empirical studies 
that may explain the variations in the banking efficiency and evaluate the effect 
of bank size, ownership, equity capital, non-performing loan and market 
structure on banking efficiency, which trigger our research interest of 
investigating the relationship between banking efficiency and market structure. 
 
2.2 Different Concepts of Efficiency 
 
Measuring efficiency of banks is of research interest and policy relevance from 
different dimensions and efficiency scores associated with different concepts 
of efficiency and different measurement techniques vary widely in previous 
empirical studies. In this section, we attempt to introduce a couple of efficiency 
concepts commonly adopted and then discuss the different methodologies of 
efficiency measurement in the next section. 
 
Early researches of bank performance mainly focused on the investigation of 
scale and scope efficiencies employing a cost function, in which scholars 
implicitly assumed that all banks operated at almost identical efficiency levels. 
In particular, according to Berger et al. (1999), who have completed a very 
extensive literature review over 250 the relevant researches on evaluating 
causes, consequences and implications of financial institutions to suggest a 
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relatively flat U-shaped average cost curve and observe higher efficiency 
levels for medium-sized banks than either large or small banks. Therefore, the 
analysis of scale efficiency in the banking system has many important 
empirical implications, such as regulatory authorities and bank managers may 
consider and approve merger and acquisition in the light of the presence of 
scale economies, and the relevance between market structure and 
competition may be evaluated based on the economies of scale.  
 
However, the modern empirical researches on bank performance have paid 
more and more attention to frontier efficiency or X-efficiency, which measured 
inefficiency as the deviation from the “best” practice firms operating efficient 
frontier. And given by the thorough survey of Berger and Humphrey (1997) 
who reviewed 130 studies, X-efficiency has been employed in analyzing the 
financial institutions from 21 countries, nonetheless, there is no consensus 
view among the academics on the concept of efficiency, estimation techniques 
of efficiency measurement and determinants of efficiency estimate. 
 
2.2.1 Economies of Scale and Economies of Scope 
 
2.2.1.1 Economies of Scale 
 
Economies of scale (or returns to scale) are traditionally known as the rate at 
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which output changes as all factor quantities are varied. And as suggested by 
Molyneux et al. (1996), economies of scale are used to evaluate whether firms 
with similar production and managerial technologies are operating at an 
optimal size. Concretely speaking, firms are called to be economies of scale or 
increasing returns to scale if production costs of enterprises increase 
proportionately less than a proportionate increase in their outputs given a 
certain mix of outputs. That is, economies of scale present once the long-run 
average production costs fall as outputs rise. On the contrary, diseconomies of 
scale (or decreasing returns to scale) occur when a proportionate increase in 
firms’ outputs would lead to a higher proportionate increase in their production 
costs, i.e., the average unit costs of production increase beyond a certain level 
of output. Additionally, constant returns to scale only exist when the increase 
proportion of production costs is equal to the proportionate increase in outputs. 
 
Economies of scale are based on the shape of the average cost curves, which 
are demonstrated in Figure 2.1. The figure shows a series of short-run average 
cost (SAC) curves and short-run marginal cost (SMC) curves of different firms 
at different level output, the long-run average cost (LAC) curve and the 
long-run marginal cost (LMC) curve. The average cost curve suggests the 
average cost per unit of output at different levels of output. And the marginal 
cost is the additional cost required to produce one more unit of output, which is 
approximately as the rate of change in average cost. According to Humphrey 
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(1990), scale economies are measured as the slope of an average cost curve 
suggesting how costs change with output. The downward-sloping LAC curve 
indicates economies of scale, in Figure 2.1, the LMC curve lies below the LAC 
curve where the average production costs decline as outputs rises; And it is 
noted that a firm at the point M is said be minimum efficient scale (MES) to 
show constant returns to scale by producing the output level ܳெ with the 
lowest average cost; Beyond the point M, the slope of LAC curve becomes 
upward suggesting that the firm experiences diseconomies of scale since the 
average costs of production increase as outputs increase. Specially, for a 
single product firm, economies of scale can be calculated as  
SE = 	ெ஼஺஼ ൌ
డ்஼ డொ⁄
்஼ ொ⁄ ,                
(2.1) 
which is simplified as the elasticity of cost with respect to output. It finds that if 
SE<1, economies of scale or increasing returns to scale happen; if SE=1, 
constant returns to scale occur; if SE>1, the firm experiences diseconomies of 
scale or decreasing returns to scale. 
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Figure 2.1 Economies of Scale and the Average and Marginal Cost Curves 
 
Note: LAC: Long-run average cost curve; LMC: Long-run marginal curve; SAC: Short-run average 
cost curve; SMC: Short-run marginal cost curve. 
 
2.2.1.2 Economies of Scope 
 
Economies of scope occur if a single firm can jointly produce two or more 
products with a lower cost than being produced separately in their independent 
production. For the banking industry, if economies of scope exist, it is possible 
to save total costs through the joint production of financial services. While 
diseconomies of scope arise if joint production is more costly than independent 
production. In order to facilitate the interpretation of the concept of economies 
of scope, we assume that a firm produces two outputs: ݕଵ and ݕଶ. If the firm 
produces these two outputs separately, the cost functions of individual output 
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are: C(ݕଵ,	0) and C(0, ݕଶ). If the two outputs are produced jointly, the joint 
production cost is C(ݕଵ, ݕଶ). There are economies of scope if the production 
cost of two jointly produced outputs is less than the combined cost of 
independently producing the same number of individual output, that is, C(ݕଵ, ݕଶ) 
< C(ݕଵ,	0) + C(0, ݕଶ). Conversely, it implies diseconomies of scale if C(ݕଵ, ݕଶ) > 
C(ݕଵ,	0) + C(0, ݕଶ). Therefore, for a single firm producing two outputs, the 
degree of economies of scope can be measured as follows: 
SCOPE=஼ሺ௬భ,଴ሻା	஼ሺ଴,௬మሻି஼ሺ௬భ,௬మሻ஼ሺ௬భ,௬మሻ                                        (2.2) 
where C denotes the production cost of output. If SCOPE > 0, economies of 
scope exist; and if SCOPE < 0, it indicates diseconomies of scope. Since the 
diversity of financial products and financial services in the banking sector, 
economies of scope are an essential part of analyzing the bank efficiency. 
However, it is not easy to estimate the measure of economies of scope 
because it is difficult to retrieve the precise and reliable data of the cost of each 
product. In this case, our research will not evaluate economies of scope in 
Asian banking industries. 
 
2.2.2 Technical, Allocative and Overall Efficiency 
 
As a pioneer of frontier analysis, Farrell has a profound influence on the 
modern research of efficiency analysis. And in 1957, Farrell proposed a 
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method to decompose the overall efficiency based on the “technical efficiency” 
measure (Koopmans, 1951) and Debreu’s coefficient of resource utilization 
(Debreu, 1951). According to Koopmans (1951), a firm is technically efficient if 
it can produce more amount of outputs with the same level of inputs or it can 
use less amount of inputs to produce the same level of output. Besides, 
Debreu (1951) firstly introduced the measure of technical efficiency as the 
coefficient of resource utilization. Thus, in the seminar paper of Farrell (1957), 
the overall efficiency is decomposed into two components, technical efficiency 
and allocative efficiency. Technical efficiency is defined as the ability with 
which a given set of inputs is used to produce an output. And a firm is said to 
be technically efficient if it can produce the maximum output from a given set of 
inputs or produce a given level of output with minimum quantity of inputs, e.g. 
labour, technology and capital. Allocative efficiency refers to a firm’s capacity 
to utilize the mix inputs in optimal proportions given their prevailing prices. 
The decomposition of overall efficiency can be illustrated in Figure 2.2. Farrell 
(1957) explained his idea by using a simple example in which a firm is 
considered to produce a single output (Y) with two inputs ( ଵܺ and ܺଶ). And if 
the isoquant of the benchmark efficient firm is known, the efficiency of each 
firm can be measured by comparing the corresponding observed cost of the 
firm and optimum cost of the benchmark efficient firm given to the constraints 
on quantities and prices. In Figure 2.2, the unit isoquant is represented by ܵܵᇱ, 
which plots the minimum combinations of the two required inputs ( ଵܺ ܻ⁄ , ܺଶ ܻ⁄ ) 
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to produce a unit of output. And every combination along this isoquant ܵܵᇱ is 
regarded as technically efficient such as the point Q and ܳᇱ, whereas any 
point above or to the right of ܵܵᇱ is considered as technical inefficient firm 
since it can control the consumption of inputs without cutting down the quantity 
of output. ܣܣᇱ is the isocost line, the slop of the unit isoquant curve ܵܵᇱ which 
equals the ratio of two input prices, to measure the minimum cost to ensure 
unit output production. It is noticed that the line RQ represents the production 
cost savings that occurs at both allocatively and technically efficient point ܳᇱ, 
instead of the allocatively inefficient point Q (technically efficient).  We label P 
to represent a firm producing a unit output with two inputs under constant 
returns to scale in the diagram. And the firm P is said to be technically 
inefficient since it can produce the same quantity of output with less inputs as 
long as moving from P to Q and to be allocatively inefficient as long as it is 
moved from Q to	ܳᇱ	 to produce the same output with a lower cost level by 
adjusting inputs level until the ratio of marginal products equals the ratio of 
input prices. Therefore, the technical efficiency (TE) of the firm P is measured 
by the ratio of ܱܳ ܱܲ⁄  and the allocaltive efficiency (AE) of the firm P is 
measured by the ratio of ܱܴ ܱܳ⁄ . In addition, if the firm P is productively 
efficient, both technically and allocatively efficient, the costs of being efficient 
should be the ratio of ܱܴ ܱܲ⁄ . And the ratio is called overall efficiency by 
Farrell, and which is measured by the product of both technical efficiency and 
allocative efficiency as follows:  
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OE= TE*AE=(ܱܳ ܱܲ⁄ ሻ*(ܱܴ ܱܳ⁄ ሻ=	ܱܴ ܱܲ⁄                             (2.3) 
 
Therefore, economic efficiency is a broad concept, which requires firms to be 
both technically efficient and allocatively efficient. And it finds that it is possible 
that some firms are technically efficient but cost inefficient, which depends on 
the abilities of managers to control the cost of labour and capital, to utilize 
appropriate production technologies and to establish reasonable price polices. 
Moreover, given the scale efficiency mentioned as well in the section 2.2.1, 
efficiency is a quite multifaceted concept with essentially different meanings, 
on which researchers can choose their analysis perspectives and they may 
have significantly different efficiency scores even employing the same 
approach. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Farrell (1957)’s Measure of Technical and Allocative Efficiency 
 
S	
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2.2.3 Cost Efficiency and Profit Efficiency 
 
It is known that a technically efficient firm may be allocatively inefficient since it 
fails to allocate their inputs in a minimizing manner at given prices of inputs. 
And cost inefficiency may arise as the failure of this firm to minimize production 
expenditures. Furthermore, even though some firms are cost efficient, however, 
not all of them are profit efficient due to misallocation of outputs in a 
revenue-maximizing way given the outputs prices, the result of which is failing 
to maximize the profits of producers. And as one of the main objectives of 
efficiency studies is to evaluate the ability of banks’ managers to optimize the 
production process by reasonably utilizing resources of inputs and outputs to 
achieve cost minimization and maximization. Moreover, nowadays 
researchers have placed great emphasis on X-efficiency (cost efficiency and 
profit efficiency) instead of studying scale economies, scope economies and 
scale efficiency.  
 
X-efficiency was initially proposed by Leibenstein (1966) and is usually called 
as managerial efficiency or overall technical efficiency as well. Generally, 
X-efficiency derived from the cost function is known as cost efficiency, which 
measures how close a bank’s cost is to that of the best practice firm for 
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producing the same outputs under the same conditions. Since the best 
practice firm sets the benchmark of the minimum cost in the sample, cost 
inefficiency can be considered as the distance from the efficiency frontier 
which raising the firm’s cost over the minimum cost level. The estimated cost 
function is regressing the total cost as a function of outputs, prices of inputs, 
environmental variables, random noise term and inefficiency, which is written 
in log terms as: 
lnܥ௜௧ ൌ ݈݂݊ሺݕ,ݓ, ݖሻ ൅ ߭௜௧ ൅ ߤ௜௧                                       (2.4) 
where ܥ௜௧ is total cost; y is the vector of outputs; w is the vector of inputs 
prices; z is the vector of environmental variables that may impact bank’s 
performance; ߭௜௧  represents the random noise possibly including 
measurement error, sampling error and some unknown and unpredictable 
errors; and ߤ௜௧ denotes cost inefficiency. Cost efficiency is measured as the 
ratio of the minimum costs spent by the best practice firm relatively to the 
actual costs spent by the observed firm at the same output level and 
environmental conditions.  
Cost efficiency=
஼መ೘೔೙
஼መ೔ =
ఓෝ೘೔೙
ఓෝ೔                               (2.5) 
where ܿ̂௠௜௡ is the predicted minimum costs spent by the best practice firm; 
ܿ̂௜  is the estimated actual costs of each observed firm; ̂ߤ௠௜௡  is the 
minimum of inefficiency in the sample and ̂ߤ௜ is the estimated actual cost 
inefficiency of the observed firm. The value of cost efficiency is theoretically 
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falls between 0 and 1, and equals unity for the observed firm is the best 
practice firm in the sample. If a cost efficiency ratio of 0.9 indicates that the firm 
is 10% less inefficient in terms of costs compared to the best practice firm 
under the exactly same conditions.  
 
Similarly, X-efficiency can be derived from profit function and known as profit 
efficiency, which measures the extent of a firm to obtain the maximum profit. 
After reviewing the recent literature, there are two kinds of profit efficiency 
measures. One is the standard profit efficiency and the other is the alternative 
profit efficiency. 
 
Standard profit efficiency measures how close a firm to make a maximum 
profit given a certain level of inputs prices and outputs prices. And the standard 
profit function can be written in log terms in the following 
lnሺߨ௜௧ ൅ ߠሻ ൌ ݈݂݊ሺ݌, ݓ, ݖሻ ൅ ߭௜௧ െ ߤ௜௧                                 (2.6) 
where ߨ௜௧ is the profits of firms measured by revenues minus costs; ߠ is a 
constant to ensure the natural log of profits to be positive; p is the vector of 
outputs prices; w is the vector of inputs prices; ߭௜௧ and ߤ௜௧ are the random 
noise term and inefficiency, respectively. Standard profit efficiency is measured 
as the ratio of actual profits of the observed firm relatively to the possible 
maximum profits secured by the best practice firm in the sample. 
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Standard profit efficiency= గෝ೔గෝ೘ೌೣ                           (2.7) 
where ߨො௜ is the estimated actual profits of each specific firm and ߨො௠௔௫ is 
the estimated maximum profits earned by the best practice firm in the sample. 
For example, if standard profit efficiency ratio is 0.75, it suggests that the firm 
is losing 25% of profits due to the excessive production costs or the failure of 
achieving sufficient revenues. 
 
The alternative profit efficiency measures how close a firm is a firm to generate 
maximum profit at a given outputs level rather than outputs prices which is 
certain variable in measuring standard profit efficiency. The alternative profit 
function is written in log terms as follows 
lnሺߨ௜௧ ൅ ߠሻ ൌ ݈݂݊ሺݕ,ݓ, ݖሻ ൅ ߭௜௧ െ ߤ௜௧                                 (2.8) 
 
It is noticed that the dependent variable in the alternative profit function is the 
same as that in the standard profit function. While the independent variables 
used in the alternative profit function are the same as those in the cost function. 
The alternative profit efficiency is measured as the ratio of actual profits of the 
observed firm to the possible maximum profits made by the best practice firm 
as well. The difference between the alternative profit function and the standard 
profit function is using outputs y to replace the outputs prices p.  
 
	 28
According to the argument of Berger and Mester (1997), the alternative profit 
model is more appropriate to apply for the empirical cases where market 
power may be present since it permits imperfect competition, that is, firms can 
be price makers. However, the prerequisite of the standard profit model is 
perfect competition, which makes firms only be price takers. More specifically, 
if a market is not completely competitive, firms may have the market power to 
set the prices to sell all the outputs. Optimization of the benchmark firm can be 
realized through raising revenue margin by improving service quality or saving 
operating costs with a lower quality of services. In this sense, given allowing 
varying level of output with fixed prices, the alternative profit efficiency can be 
used as a robustness test for standard profit efficiency. Additionally, in practice, 
the alternative profit efficiency will be definitely more suitable than standard 
profit efficiency if lack of information on outputs prices, or not reliable source of 
information, or mistakenly measuring outputs prices. 
 
As suggested by Berger and Mester (1997), profit efficiency provides a more 
effective measure than cost efficiency in evaluating the overall performance of 
the banks. The most convincing reason is that cost efficiency is based on the 
economic objective of cost minimization requiring the managers to place the 
emphasis on reduction of operating costs while the core of profit efficiency is to 
measure the ability of profit maximization which needs managers pay attention 
to both of increasing revenue margin and lowering cost margin. And there is a 
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chance that a firm is more profit efficient through making positive marginal 
profit but relatively less cost efficient because of high cost margin. For example, 
providing high quality services will earn much more additional revenue than 
the additional cost caused by these high quality services. Then the positive 
revenue to cost margin will result in more profit efficiency while these 
additional cost is measured as cost inefficiency. Moreover, cost efficiency only 
accounts for errors on input side, however, profit efficiency considers errors not 
only on input side but also output side. Furthermore, cost efficiency lies 
between zero and unity, whereas profit efficiency may be negative. Therefore, 
profit efficiency is a more appropriate measure of examining the banks’ 
performance than cost efficiency.  
 
In conclusion, there are extensive empirical studies to adopt cost efficiency or 
profit efficiency (see Table 2.1 and Table 2.2). It should be noted that no matter 
either cost efficiency or profit efficiency is chosen by researchers, both of them 
bear the limitation that efficiency is a relatively measure by comparing the 
observations with the best practice firm in the sample. And this called best 
practice firm itself might not be efficient when compared to other firms out of 
the sample. In this thesis, we employ cost efficiency to measure banking 
efficiency since in the sample period (year 2005-2012) commercial banks in 
Asia have paid more attention on cost minimization instead of profit 
maximization. It is quite difficult for banks to earn massive profit due to the 
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global financial crisis. And we find that it is not easy to obtain reliable and 
precise data on output prices. Thus, we investigate the relationship between 
banking performance, efficiency and competition from cost perspective. 
 
2.3 Methodology 
 
2.3.1 Choice of Functional Form in Efficiency Measurement 
 
It is the primary subject to specify the functional form when measuring 
efficiency by using parametric frontier techniques such as measuring cost 
efficiency by utilizing stochastic cost frontier, measuring profit efficiency by 
adopting stochastic profit frontier, measuring technical efficiency by employing 
stochastic production frontier, etc. However, it is different to determine the 
exact form of the cost or production function in most industries, especially in 
the services sector. As banks is well known to provide services for depositors 
and investors to obtain profits, the exact functional form for estimating 
efficiency is hard to figure out. Therefore, we have to utilize some 
approximation to the cost or production function as more flexible functional 
forms developed in the previous efficiency literature for examining the 
relationship between the dependent variables and explanatory variables to 
estimate efficiency. 
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2.3.1.1 Cobb-Douglas Functional Form 
 
Cobb-Douglas functional form, a first-order flexible functional form of 
production function, which was proposed by Cobb and Douglas in 1928, is 
widely used in the existing literature to estimate the relationship between 
inputs and outputs. Generally, the Cobb-Douglas form of the cost function is as 
following 
ܥ௜௧=ߙ∏ ݕ௝௜௧ఉೕ௃௝ୀଵ ∏ ݓ௠௜௧ఋ೘ெ௠ୀଵ                                        (2.9) 
And by taking logarithms on both sides of the function, the general model of 
the Cobb-Douglas cost form is turned to 
lnܥ௜௧=	ߙ ൅ ∑ ߚ௝௝௝ୀଵ ݈݊ݕ௝௜௧ ൅ ∑ ߜ௠ெ௠ୀଵ ݈݊ݓ௠௜௧                            
(2.10) 
where ܥ௜௧ is total costs for i-th bank at t time, ݕ௝௜௧ is the j-th output of i-th bank 
at t time, ݓ௠௜௧ is the price of the m-th input of i-th bank at t time, and ߚ௝ and 
ߜ௠ are parameters to be estimated as the cost elasticities of the outputs and 
inputs. The main assumption of the Cobb-Douglas cost function is to satisfy 
the linear homogeneity restriction, that is, the Cobb-Douglas cost function is 
homogeneous of degree one in input prices, only if ∑ ߜ௠ெ௠ୀଵ ൌ 1.  This 
restriction suggests that a proportional increase of all inputs prices leads to the 
equal proportional increase of total costs.  
 
The Cobb-Douglas cost function is simple to examine the relationship and the 
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estimation results are easy to explain, which is agreed by Christopoulos and 
Tsionas (2001). They adopted the Cobb-Douglas function as a simplified 
model to demonstrate the stochastic cost frontier with control for 
heteroscedasticity. However, as a first-order approximation of cost or 
production function, it causes the most serious shortcoming of the 
Cobb-Douglas function, only representing a constant value for elasticity of 
scale. Therefore, it makes sense that Kuenzle (2005) pointed out that it is not 
possible to evaluate whether different firms exhibit different values for scale 
economies by using the Cobb-Douglas function. Therefore, to address this 
issue, more and more researchers prefer to use more flexible functional forms 
like translog functional form which is a second-order flexible approximation of 
function. 
 
2.3.1.2 Translog Functional Form 
 
There are several functional forms developed based on the previously popular 
Cobb-Douglas function, and the translog functional form initiated by 
Christensen et al. (1973) is one of the most significant developments for 
econometric frontier techniques. More specifically, Christensen et al. (1973) 
developed the translog functional form by using a second-order Taylor 
expansion as a local approximation to some unknown true underlying function. 
After Murray and White (1983) first introduced this translog functional form to 
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estimate economies of scale for the banking sector, it has become one of the 
most prevailing functional forms and is the most widely used in the empirical 
studies on banking efficiency. And the translog functional form can make up 
the main shortcoming of the Cobb-Douglas functional form by permitting 
varying returns to scale and estimating the U-shaped average cost curve. In 
general, the translog cost function envelops the specification of the 
Cobb-Douglas functional form and it can be specified as  
l݊ܥ௜௧ 	ൌ ߙ ൅ ∑ ߚ௝௝௝ୀଵ ݈݊ݕ௝௜௧ ൅ ∑ ߜ௠ெ௠ୀଵ ݈݊ݓ௠௜௧ ൅
ଵ
ଶ∑ ∑ ߚ௝௞
௝
௞ୀଵ ݈݊ݕ௝௜௧݈݊ݕ௞௜௧ ൅௃௃ୀଵ ଵଶ∑ ∑ ߜ௠௡ெ௡ୀଵ ݈݊ݓ௠௜௧݈݊ݓ௡௜௧ெ௠ୀଵ ൅
∑ ∑ ߛ௝௠ெ௠ୀଵ ݈݊ݕ௜௧݈݊ݓ௠௜௧௃௝ୀଵ ൅ ߭௜௧ ൅ ߤ௜௧                             （2.11） 
where ܥ௜௧ is total costs for i-th bank at t time, and i-th bank is supposed to use 
M inputs at fixed prices ݓ௠௜௧ to produce J outputs ݕ௝௜௧, and ߚ௝ and ௠ are 
parameters to be estimated as the cost elasticities of the outputs and inputs. 
The translog functional form has to impose few restrictions on the parameters 
of function equation to satisfy the homogeneity condition and symmetry 
condition due to the requirement of the duality theorem, that is, the translog 
functional form should be linearly homogeneous in inputs prices: ∑ ߜ௠ெ௠ୀଵ =1, 
∑ ߜ௠௡ெ௠ୀଵ =0, and ∑ ߛ௝௠௃௝ୀଵ =0; and the second-order parameters are symmetric: 
ߚ௝௞=௞௝, ߜ௠௡=ߜ௡௠, and ߛ௝௠=ߛ௠௝. 
 
From our survey of the existing literature (Table 2.1 and Table 2.2), the majority 
of empirical studies employ this flexible functional form, the translog functional 
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form, to measure the banking efficiency with respect to no matter scale and 
scope economies, cost and profit efficiency or technical, allocative and overall 
efficiency for different banking markets. Although the translog functional form 
is extensively adopted in the existing literature on banking efficiency due to all 
the advantages of being flexible form, it still has some nonnegligible limitations 
that leading some scholars to adopt other more flexible functional forms. As 
argued by Berger and Mester (1997), the translog functional form only 
imposes a symmetric U-shape on the average cost curve, it may not fit the 
data perfectly when it is far removed from the mean in terms of output size.  
 
And it is well known that the translog function is a local approximation to some 
unknown true underlying function, it is possible that the translog function 
results in misspecification when the global behavior of function significantly 
differ from the local behavior. To solve the problem of poor approximation of 
the true underlying function, researchers began to use another more flexible 
functional form, the Fourier flexible function form, which was proposed by 
Gallant (1981,1982) and first adopted to the analysis of cost efficiency in the 
banking industry by Mitchell and Onvural (1996) and Berger et al. (1997). The 
Fourier flexible functional form includes a liner combination of sine and cosine 
function, the so-called “Fourier series”, to fit the function well across the entire 
range of data. Therefore, the Fourier flexible functional form provides a flexible 
and global approximation to the unknown true underlying cost or profit function. 
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There is empirical evidence in my literature survey (Table 2.1), that is, a few 
researchers believe that the Fourier flexible functional form is superior to the 
translog functional form in the estimation of banking efficiency (McAllister and 
McManus, 1993; Mitchell and Onvural, 1996; Berger et al. 1997; Berger and 
DeYoung, 1997).  
 
Despite all the advantages of Fourier flexible functional form approach, there is 
still a considerable amount of literature employing the translog functional form 
approach. The first reason is that researchers are able to compare their 
empirical results with others since they following the same approach adopted 
by the most of the empirical studies on banking efficiency. Additionally, the 
Fourier-flexible functional form has its own limitations. The Fourier flexible 
functional from requires much more degrees of freedom so that there have to 
be a vast number of observations available in the empirical studies. However, 
in reality, most samples’ sizes are limited. Moreover, the flexibility of the 
Fourier flexible functional form triggers a few problems such as whether the 
terms included in the estimation are appropriate and sufficient (Wheelock and 
Wilson, 1999) and it is difficult to interpret the estimated coefficients. 
Furthermore, according to Altunbaş and Chakravarty (2001), the predictive 
ability of the Fourier flexible functional form is worse than the translog 
functional form. The last but no least, the improvement obtained by applying 
the Fourier flexible functional form approach is insignificant from a perspective 
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of econometric with reference to Berger and Mester (1997). Therefore, in order 
to be consistent with most of researchers on the banking efficiency, we apply 
the translog functional form approach rather than Fourier flexible functional 
form approach to my analysis. 
 
2.3.2 Estimation Methods 
 
In this thesis a range of estimation methods are used, all of which are very well 
known in the literature, therefore only a summary overview needs to be 
presented here. In particular since two important topics in this research 
concern efficiency measurement and panel data, the description of the 
estimation methods summarises these in particular. Key references are 
Greene (2007) and Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000). In part the econometric 
estimation develops procedures and computing codes used in previous 
Loughborough University School of Business and Economics PhD theses, 
particularly Liao (2005), Shen (2010) and Zhang (2012).  
 
The basic structure of the estimation problem is 
ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ܠ′௜௧઺ ൅ ߝ௜௧ 
The sample potentially runs from ݅ ൌ 1… ܫ and ݐ ൌ 1…ܶ. In cross section 
models ܶ ൌ 1 and in time series models ܫ ൌ 1. In much of the literature on 
banking competition in particular, a simple assumption of independent and 
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identically distributed (iid) random errors with zero mean and constant 
variance is assumed, i.e. the classical OLS assumption which ensures 
consistent and efficient estimation. This assumption is unable to allow for 
efficiency measurement. To address the problem of measuring efficiency, 
additional assumptions are made. The main idea is that there is an efficient 
frontier of performance, and inefficiency arises when banks are not on the 
frontier of performance but some way above it in the case of cost analysis (or 
some way below the frontier if production function analysis is used). The 
distance to the frontier makes up a part of (or in some procedures all of) the 
term ߝ௜௧. The literature on efficiency measurement distinguishes among the 
categories: non-parametric versus parametric, deterministic versus stochastic, 
time-invariant versus time-varying.  
 
Briefly these can be described this way：  
 
Non-parametric frontier: In this case, widely known as data envelopment 
analysis, there is no attempt to model or estimate parameters ሺߙ, ઺ሻ. Instead, 
a simple correspondence between the variables ሺݕ௜௧, ܠ௜௧ሻ is measured by 
mathematical programming to minimise a linear (or in some cases quadratic) 
function of the distances ߝ௜௧. This is also a deterministic approach since the 
term ߝ௜௧ is treated as a measurable distance instead of as a random error. 
Statistical properties can be developed by bootstrapping procedures which to 
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allow for sampling error in the data selection. The approach derives from 
pioneering work by Farrell (1957) but this went largely unnoticed until the 
modern linear programming formulation was developed by Charnes et al. 
(1978) who derived the constant returns to scale version popularly known as 
the CCR model and Banker et al. (1984) who developed the variable returns to 
scale version know as the BCC model. In much of the early literature on 
banking efficiency this data envelopment analysis was the preferred 
methodology, see the survey by Berger et al. (1997), Coelli et al. (1999), 
Cooper et al. (2000) and Thanassoulis (2001). And this is still a widely used 
approach to efficiency and productivity measurement, especially in the 
banking industry, from the literature survey in Table 2.1 and 2.2, the 
researchers who have recently adopted DEA in measuring efficiency include 
Berg et al. (1993), Drake and Howcroft (1994), Favero and Papi (1995), Haag 
and Jaska (1995), Sherman and Ladino (1995), Wheelock and Wilson (1995), 
Resti (1997), Avkiran (1999), Isik and Hassan (2002,2003), Lozano-Vivas et al. 
(2002), Casu and Molynex (2003), Tsionas et al. (2003), Chen et al. (2005), 
Sherman and Rupert (2006), Havrylchyk (2006), Pasiouras (2006), Matthews 
et al. (2007), Ariff and Can (2008), Pasiouras (2008), Gardener et al. (2011), 
Hon et al. (2011), Fethi et al. (2011), etc. 
 
DEA is the most well known non-parametric approach, which is a 
mathematical technique to measure efficiency by programming the 
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development of production frontiers relative to these developed frontiers. And 
the DEA frontier is constructed as a piecewise linear combination of all the 
best-practice decision making units (DMUs), yielding a convex production 
possibility set. The units that lie on the frontier are the efficient ones and others 
are inefficient ones so that the inefficiency of each unit can be calculated. That 
is, the core of this technique is to identify a frontier envelopment surface for all 
the DMUs in order to effectively discriminate between efficient and inefficient 
DMUs. 
 
DEA has a great number of advantages. It does not require any assumption on 
the distribution of inefficiency and it does not require a specific functional form, 
either. Particularly, it works greatly in most studies even with small samples. 
However, no approach is perfect, DEA has its own limitations. And majority of 
its drawbacks are resulted from the assumptions of the non-parametric frontier 
approach. It assumes data to be free of sampling error, no measurement error 
produced in constructing the frontier, and no inaccuracies caused by the 
differences in recognition and measurement of inputs and outputs from the 
perspectives of accounting and economic. That is, the fatal shortcoming of 
DEA is that the influences of random error are not taken into account. Since 
any of above errors may appear, these random errors are considered as 
inefficiency under the DEA approach. Therefore, the measurement of 
efficiency may mislead the empirical results.   
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Parametric frontier. In this case the basic model is fitted by regression 
analysis under differing assumptions about the error term. The purpose is to 
estimate the parameters ሺߙ, ઺ሻ that define the frontier, and by treating the 
errors ߝ௜௧ as random variables with known probability distribution, a measure 
of inefficiency for each observation can be identified from that observation’s 
regression residual. As the analysis in previous sections of this chapter shows, 
an essential first step is to define the assumed shape of the frontier parametric 
function, (Cobb-Douglas, translog and so on), then to make appropriate 
assumptions about the probability density functions that generate the data and 
the residuals. There are two major classes of parametric frontier model: 
deterministic frontier analysis and stochastic frontier analysis.  
 
Deterministic frontier analysis is also known as Modified (or Corrected) 
Least Squares (MOLS/COLS) which is similar to ‘thick frontier estimation’. In 
MOLS/COLS the error term is assumed to be one-sided: 
ߝ௜௧ ≡ ݑ௜௧ ൒ 0 
In this form it represents only inefficiency and there is no idiosyncratic error 
term to represent measurement, sampling or specification error. In early 
regression based efficiency studies this methodology was a popular research 
tool, again see Berger (1997). Strictly a specific assumption about the 
probability density function of the one-sided error term should be made explicit, 
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but this is often omitted. A standard assumption is that the inefficiency error 
term is a normal distribution truncated at zero. The normal distribution before 
truncation may have a zero or non-zero mean, e.g.   
ݑ௜௧~|ܰሺ0, ߪ௨ଶሻ| ≡ ܰାሺ0, ߪ௨ଶሻ 
The main idea here is that, due to normal market and industry pressures, large 
values of inefficiency should be expected to have a low probability of occurring, 
while very small or even zero values of inefficiency are likely to define the 
model of the distribution. 
The expected value of this truncated normal density function is positive by 
definition 
ܧሺݑ௜௧ሻ ൌ ቀඥ2 ߨ⁄ ቁߪ௨ ൐ 0 
Therefore OLS estimation is no longer feasible and the usual approach is to 
adjust the OLS residuals ݁௜௧ to generate the frontier using an estimator of the 
mean inefficiency, ܧ෠ሺݑ௜௧ሻ, e.g. the largest residual min௜௧ ݁௜௧  or the standard 
deviation of the residuals. 
The individual inefficiency of each observation is calculated as the following 
COLS procedure: 
݁௜௧ െ min௜௧ ݁௜௧ 
Most modern efficiency and productivity analysis uses stochastic frontier 
analysis developed originally by Aigner et al. (1977) in the same year as the 
development of the CCR-data envelopment analysis. Since then there have 
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been multiple extensions. In stochastic frontier analysis the frontier is itself 
assumed to be stochastic so that the error term has two components, one to 
measure the idiosyncratic stochastic element of the frontier and one to 
measure inefficiency. 
ߝ௜௧ ≡ ݒ௜௧ ൅ ݑ௜௧ 
A different probability density function must be assumed for each component 
in order to identify them. Usually the idiosyncratic component is assumed to 
have a classical normal distribution: 
ݒ௜௧~ܰሺ0, ߪ௩ଶሻ 
The combined error distribution can then be written as a known skewed normal 
distribution ݂ሺߝ௜௧ሻ ൌ ݂ሺݒ௜௧ ൅ ݑ௜௧ሻ. Estimation must then take account of the 
properties of this skewed normal distribution. Multiple extensions to this model 
have been applied in the banking literature, and a small selection is 
summarised here.  
In cross section models, ܶ ൌ 1, emphasis has been on maximum likelihood 
estimation, MLE, which sets the log likelihood function in terms of the key 
parameters of the frontier and the skewed normal composed error distribution: 
ln ܮሺߙ, ઺, ߪ௨ଶ, ߪ௩ଶ|ܠ௜௧ሻ ൌ෍ln݂ሺݒ௜௧ ൅ ݑ௜௧ሻ
௜,௧
 
This can be re-parameterised using the standard likelihood function theorem 
as 
ln ܮሺߙ, ઺, ߪ௨ଶ, ߪ௩ଶ|ܠ௜௧ሻ ߪଶ ൌ ln ܮሺߙ, ઺, ߣ, ߪଶ|ܠ௜௧ሻ ൌ ln ܮሺߙ, ઺, ߛ, ߪଶ|ܠ௜௧ሻ 
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where  
ߣ ൌ ߪ௨ ߪ௩⁄ ; ߛ ൌ ߪ௨ଶ ߪଶ⁄ ; ߪଶ ൌ ߪ௨ଶ ൅ ߪ௩ଶ 
Estimation proceeds by numerical maximisation of any of these forms of this 
log-likelihood function. Individual inefficiency scores for each observation are 
calculated from the conditional density function of the inefficiency component 
given the size of each total residual, Jondrow et al. (1982): 
ݑො௜௧ ൌ ܧሺݑ௜௧|݁௜௧ሻ 
In panel data models, this procedure can also be used but Schmidt and 
Sickles (1984) suggested an alternative approach based on the one-way 
composed error panel structure. The error components are based on 
time-invariant inefficiency 
ݑ௜௧ ൌ ݑ௜			∀ݐ 
while time-varying idiosyncratic error. While Pitt and Lee (1981) used MLE for 
this model, Schmidt and Sickles used Feasible Generalised Least Squares for 
Random Effects or Fixed Effects estimation treating the standard one-way 
random or fixed effect as the inefficiency and the time-varying error as the 
idiosyncratic component. Individual inefficiency scores are calculated using the 
MOLS-type procedure with the fixed or random effects. 
 
The model can be extended to time-varying inefficiency by specifying how 
the inefficiency density function shifts over time, for example as suggested by 
Battese and Coelli (1992) who added an extra parameter ߟ  to the 
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log-likelihood function.  
ݑ௜௧ ൌ ݑ௜ ቀ݁ݔ݌൫െߟሺݐ െ ܶሻ൯ቁ 
This brief summary of the efficiency and productivity analysis covers the 
estimation methods used in the thesis. In addition standard OLS, and panel 
data procedures are used in the competition chapters. 
 
2.4 Variables 
 
The precision and accuracy of efficiency estimates highly depend on the 
choice of variables and the reliability of data used in the regression model.  
We will discuss the definition and measurement of banks’ output and input and 
the selection of variables in the following sections.  
 
2.4.1 Outputs and Inputs Prices Specifications 
We find that the definition and measurement of banks’ output and input are 
different with the different functions in empirical studies. In particular, there is 
no consensus concerning the specific definition of what banks produce and 
how to measure the products of banks. Given the different roles of deposits, 
there are four approaches widely adopted in the existing studies on banking 
efficiency to specify output and input: intermediation approach, production 
approach, dual approach and value added approach. 
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2.4.1.1 Intermediation Approach 
 
In the literature survey of empirical studies on banking efficiency (Table 2.1 
and Table 2.2), intermediation approach, which is introduced by Sealey and 
Lindley (1977), is widely utilized (Kaparaikis et al. 1994; Allen and Rai, 1996; 
Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1996; Lang and Welzel, 1996; Mester, 1996; Berger and 
DeYoung, 1997; Berger et al., 1997; Berger and Mester, 1997; Chang et al., 
1998; Avkiran, 1999; Altunbaş et al., 2000; Huang, 2000; Mertens and Urga, 
2001; Altunbaş et al., 2001; Christopoulos and Tsianos, 2001; Carbo et al., 
2002; Casu and Girardone, 2002; Christopoulos et al., 2002; Cuesta and Orea, 
2002; Kwan, 2002; Nikiel and Opiela, 2002; Vander Vennet, 2002; Tsionas et 
al., 2003; Weill, 2003; Casu and Girardone, 2004; Girardone et al., 2004; 
Sturm and Williams, 2004; Weill, 2004; Matthews et al., 2006; Kumbhakar and 
Wang, 2007; Perera et al., 2007; Ariff anf Can, 2008; Pasiouras, 2008; Kosak 
et al., 2009; Shen et al. 2009; Abdul-Majid et al., 2011; Fethi et al., 2011; 
Gardener et al., 2011; Duygun et al., 2015; etc.). 
 
In the framework of the intermediation approach, banks are considered as 
financial intermediaries between borrowers and depositors rather than 
producers who providing loans and deposits services. In this case, the values 
of loans and investments are appropriate to be the measures of banks’ outputs, 
	 46
whereas deposits and costs involving in the production process are included 
by the measure of banks’ inputs such as capital and labour. Additionally, it is 
well known that funds play a vital role in conducting as financial intermediaries. 
Therefore, both the operating costs and interest expense constitute the 
measure of the total costs. 
 
With the respect to the output specification, three variables are commonly 
used as outputs of banks are as follows: total loans including all kinds of loans 
(such as short-term-, medium- and long-term loans, domestic loans, foreign 
loans, trade bills and bills discounted and other loans); other earning assets 
containing trading securities and bond, short- and long-term investment, and 
other investment; off-balance sheet income (non-interest income) including 
fees, commissions and other operating income. By contrast, from the 
viewpoint of Kaparaikis et al. (1994), Mester (1996), Kwan and Eisenbeis 
(1996), Lang and Welzel (1996), Berger and DeYoung (1997), Berger and 
Mester (1997), Chang et al. (1998), and Kwan (2002), the quality of loans 
should be paid more attention so that they disaggregated total loans into 
different loan lines, for instance, commercial loans, consumer loans, real state 
loans, short- and long-term loans, and other loans. 
 
Regarding the input specification, labour, deposits and physical capital are 
normally treated as inputs of the banks’ production progress, thus price of 
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labour, price of funds and price of physical capital are used as inputs prices. 
2.4.1.2 Production Approach 
 
Production approach is an emerging and widely employed method for banking 
efficiency, in which banks are treated as firms that use labour and capital to 
provide services for deposit and loan account holders. In other words, banks 
process transactions and documents for their customers so that the number of 
operated transactions, the amount of loans and deposit account are regarded 
as the measure of banks’ output. And under the production approach, only 
physical inputs are required in the production process, thus physical inputs 
such as labour and capital are measured as banks’ input and the interests paid 
for the funds are not included in the measurement of input. In this case, total 
costs also exclude the interest expenses and only contain all the operating 
costs spent on labour and fixed capital.  
 
The empirical study of Ferrier and Lovell (1990) is one of the earliest 
researches adopting the production, and their measurement of output and 
input attract our attention. They suggested five components of banks’ output: 
number of demand deposit accounts ሺ ଵܻሻ, number of time deposits accounts 
( ଶܻሻ, number of real estate loans ( ଷܻሻ, number of installment loans ( ସܻሻ, and 
number of commercial loans ( ହܻሻ; and applied the following three inputs prices 
to the cost function: price of labour ( ଵܹሻ, occupancy costs and expenditure and 
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equipment over the level of deposits ( ଶܹሻ, and expenditure on materials over 
the level of deposits ( ଷܹሻ. And Berger et al. (1997) used the similar output 
specifications as well, that is, number of conducted transactions and loans and 
deposits account to measure the banks’ output as follows: number of deposit 
accounts ( ଵܻሻ, number of debits ( ଷܻሻ, number of credits ( ସܻሻ, number of 
accounts closed ( ହܻሻ, number of loans originated ( ଺ܻሻ. However, the inputs 
prices adopted by them are slightly different from those in literature of Ferrier 
and Lovell (1990), which included average wage rate ( ଵܹሻ and average rental 
rate on capital ( ଶܹሻ. 
 
Moreover, Resti (1997) applied the production approach to measuring the 
banking efficiency as well with the outputs: loans ሺ ଵܻሻ, deposits ሺ ଶܻሻ and 
non-interest income ሺ ଷܻሻ and the inputs: price of labour ሺݓଵሻ and price of 
capital ሺݓଶ). However, we find that Maggi and Rossi (2003) developed a 
modified production approach by using the same output specification but 
including an extra input price variable, price of deposits, to conduct bank 
efficiency analysis. 
 
Regarding to my literature survey of no matter single country or cross-country 
empirical studies in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2, we find only four researches using 
production approach: Ferrier and Lovell (1990), Berger et al. (1997), Resti 
(1997), and Maggi and Rossi (2003). 
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2.4.1.3 Dual Approach 
 
As suggested by Berger and Humphrey (1997), although both of 
intermediation and production approaches have some advantages, neither of 
these two approaches is perfect since neither successfully captures the dual 
roles of banks as: (i) providing transactions and documents processing 
services for customers and (ii) performing the functions of financial 
intermediaries to transfer funds from depositors to borrowers. The failure of 
covering the dual roles results from the dual role of deposits. Deposits have 
the characteristics of input because deposits can be considered as the raw 
materials for loans by banks. Besides, deposits have the characteristics as 
well since they are related a great number of services provided by banks to 
customers such as safekeeping and payments services. It has long been 
controversial to classify deposits as output or input. Since deposits have both 
input and output characteristics, classifying deposits either as input or output is 
not appropriate. In this case, as proposed by Berger and Humphrey (1997), 
the treatment of deposits can significantly affect the estimations of efficiency 
so that deposits should be regarded as both inputs and outputs, which is 
known as dual approach. 
 
After reading recent researches, we find that a few studies such as 
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Lozano-Vivas (1997), Kraft and Tirtiroglu (1998), Hao et al. (2001), Maudos 
and Pastor (2001), Cavallo and Rossi (2002), Maudos et al. (2002), Hasan and 
Marton (2003), Carvallo and Kasman (2005), Chen et al. (2005), Paster and 
Serrano (2005) Kasman and Yildirim (2006), Fu and Heffernan (2007), and 
Berger et al. (2009), applied the dual approach to capture the dual role of 
deposits. The total costs should include the interest paid on deposits and the 
interest rate is included to be one of inputs prices, which is consistent with the 
input characteristics of deposits, that is, being the raw material of investment 
funds. Meanwhile, the values of deposits are considered as outputs. 
 
2.4.1.4 Value Added Approach 
 
The value added approach is based on the concept of value added and it 
requires banks to determine which valued products to be included. We notice 
that several studies applied this value added approach in their empirical 
researches, for example, Berg et al. (1993), Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000), 
Lozano-Vivas et al. (2002), Maggi and Rossi (2003), Bonin et al. (2005a, 
2005b), Fries and Taci (2005), Sensarma (2006), and Yildirim and Philippatos 
(2007a). Generally, the outputs used in the literature are commercial and 
industrial loans, consumer and real estate loans, total securities and core 
deposits, which satisfy the banks’ functions that cost significantly on labour 
and physical capital to produce non-interest banking services. However, there 
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is an argument on whether core deposits should be classified as output. Core 
deposits would produce a great deal of services as output if all deposit service 
can be explicitly priced, which is agreed by Berger and Humphrey (1997), who 
estimated that all US banks and suggested that the implicit revenues occupied 
around 82% of total deposit revenue. 
 
In our analysis, we will employ and compare all of intermediation, production 
and dual approach to assess the characteristics of deposit, test the 
monotonicity condition to find out the most appropriate approach.  
 
2.4.2 Risk Preference and Loan Quality Control Variables 
 
In addition to the commonly used inputs and outputs, some other variables 
need to be included to control the quality of loans and weigh risk preference of 
banks. Theoretically, the comparative study on banking performance should 
be investigated among banks with the equivalent level of output quality and 
risk. However, the fact is that banks may significantly differ from each other 
with respect to risk characteristics and there may be some unmeasured 
differences in output quality since these differences may not be completely 
captured and fully represented by the inputs and outputs specified in the 
frontier model. Therefore, Mester (1996) agreed and stated that it is highly 
possible to miscalculate a bank’s level of inefficiency unless quality and risk 
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are controlled for. Similarly, Hughes and Mester (1993) proposed that the 
quality of a bank’s asset and the probability of a bank’s failure might affect the 
costs of the bank in several manners. And this finding is agreed by the 
empirical result of Hanne and Hanweck (1988) and they argued that the low 
quality of banks’ assets could increase the interest costs of uninsured deposits. 
Therefore, in empirical studies, the average volume of nonperforming loans 
(Hughes and Mester, 1993; Mester 1996), the non-performing loan ratio, i.e. 
the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans (Altunbaş et al., 2000; Huang，
2000；Mertens and Urga, 2001) and loan loss provision (Hasan and Marton, 
2003; Shen et al., 2009) are widely used to control for output quality and risk 
preferences.  
 
On the other hand, Berger and DeYoung (1997) raise that the extent to which 
non-performing loans and loan loss provisions are exogenous determine 
whether it is appropriate to include them into the cost or profit function to 
estimate banks’ efficiency. Non-performing loans and loan loss provisions are 
treated as exogenous variable if caused by so-called “bad luck” such as 
negative economic shocks, financial crisis or unpredictable events, while they 
are considered to be endogenous due to “bad management”, for instance, 
inadequate management capacity in managing and monitoring the loan 
portofios and controlling the operating costs, with reference to the argument by 
Berger and DeYoung (1997), “under the bad luck hypothesis, loan quality is 
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driven by external events, and as such efficiency measurement should control 
for nonperforming loans in cost and profit function” and “under the bad 
management and skimping hypothesis, however, loan quality is driven by 
internal events. As s result, controlling for nonperforming loans in cost and 
profit functions will artificially increase measured efficiency by removing 
statistically the part of the cost inefficiencies (or revenue deficiencies)”. And 
this argument is verified by empirical researches by Berger and Mester (1997) 
and Fu and Heffernan (2007). The former suggest adopting the ratio of 
non-performing loans to total loans as control loan quality variable because it 
is approximately to exogenous and it is almost caused by “bad luck” in the 
banking industry. While according to the latter authors, non-performing loans 
are excluded in Chinese banking sector since it is possible that “bad 
management” of banks leads to these non-performing loans so that they are 
treated as endogenous. 
 
Another control variable always taken into account in the cost and profit 
functions to estimate efficiency is equity capital. There are two major reasons 
why equity capital should be included. One is equity capital may significantly 
impact on the probability of banks’ failure, that is, insolvency risk. And 
generally, insolvency risk is determined by equity capital, which is acting like 
cushion to absorb the losses of non-performing loans. The other is equity 
capital will directly influence the funding costs since it can provide funds as a 
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substitute for deposits and other funding sources. 
 
Intuitively, the price of equity capital should be employed in the cost function as 
control variable because the objective of banks is to minimize costs. However, 
in the previous empirical literature, the level of equity capital rather than the 
price of equity capital is widely used in the cost function (shown in Table, 
Hughes and Mester, 1993; Mester, 1996; Altunbaş et al., 2000; Altunbaş et al., 
2001; Hao et al., 2001; Mertens and Urga, 2001; Vander Vennet, 2002; Weill, 
2003; and Weill, 2004). There are two main reasons why scholars prefer the 
level of equity capital. First of all, bank managers generally take the regulatory 
requirement and their own risk preference into account when determining the 
level of equity capital. For the regulatory requirement, the minimum capital 
ratio should be no less than 8% according to the Basel Accord. And this ratio is 
closely related to the soundness and stability of the whole banking industry 
rather than the objective of individual bank, that is, cost minimization. As a 
result, it is possible that the compulsory equity capital adequacy constrains a 
bank to raise more equity capital than it should have in an unregulated 
environment since the cost of equity capital is much more expensive than the 
cost of deposits, debts or other financing sources. Moreover, there is the 
possibility that a bank is not risk-neutral and the level of equity capital implies 
unacceptable risk for the bank. And Hughes and Mester (1994) acknowledged 
this argument by finding the evidence that banks exhibit non-neutrality toward 
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risk rather than choose the level of equity capital to minimize costs. Overall, 
the level of equity capital rather than the price of equity capital is suggested as 
control variable to be included in the cost function. 
 
2.4.3 Environmental Variables 
 
As mentioned in Section 2, one of basic assumptions in the frontier efficiency 
analysis is that all producers in the sample share the same production 
technology and face the exactly the same conditions. However, it is always not 
the case in reality, particularly for cross-country comparisons of banking 
efficiency in which countries vastly differ from each other in many respects. It is 
extensively agreed by the previous empirical researches of international 
comparisons of banking performance and efficiency, environmental variables 
should be included to control for cross-country heterogeneities. Scholars such 
as Carvallo and Kasman (2005), Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000), Fries and 
Taci (2005), Kasman and Yildirim (2006), Pastor and Serrano (2005) and 
Perera et al. (2007) employed the cross-sectional stochastic frontier analysis 
framework and included several vectors of environmental variables which 
reflecting the differences among countries’ economy, population, geographical 
characteristics and financial regulatory requirements, then found out that 
control for cross-country heterogeneities is significantly important for 
evaluating banking performance and efficiency because cross-country 
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differences may be estimated as  part of inefficiency when these country-level 
differences are not considered. While, Gardener et al. (2011) investigate the 
determinants of banking efficiency in five South Asian countries using DEA and 
Tobit regression and find that national banking development among 
country-level variables has a strong and positive link with efficiency. And Shen 
et al. (2009) incorporated several environmental variables for cross-country 
comparisons of banking efficiency by adopting panel data stochastic frontier 
framework and they filled the literature gap, that is, there was no appraised 
empirical evidence of control for cross-country differences in panel data 
stochastic frontier framework before. And in this thesis, we will complete the 
cross-country comparisons of banking efficiency by incorporating some 
environmental variables in the panel data stochastic frontier analysis 
framework as well since it is said that panel data stochastic frontier analysis 
framework overcomes several disadvantages of cross-sectional framework.  
 
2.5 Literature Review of Banking Efficiency Studies 
 
There is a numerous literature on the analysis of banking efficiency that 
investigates various issues in the efficiency measurement by applying 
non-parametric frontier approach (e.g. DEA) or parametric frontier approach 
(e.g. SFA, DFA and TFA). A number of issues examined for the banking 
efficiency are in terms of efficiency measurement, the estimation techniques, 
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the determinants of efficiency, and international comparisons. 
 
According to Berger et al. (1993), a first exhaustive survey of literature on 
efficiency in financial institutions, in which the authors discussed and 
examined mergers, efficiency and determinants of efficiency with respect to 
scale efficiency and scope efficiency, we find that up to that date scale and 
scope economies rather than X-efficiency are regarded as the efficiency 
measurement in the most empirical studies of banking efficiency. The following 
more comprehensive survey offered by Berger and Humphrey in 1997, they 
reviewed and investigated 130 X-efficiency studies for various kinds of 
financial institutions in 21 countries and discussed several efficiency 
estimation techniques. And in this paper, Berger and Humphrey (1997) 
proposed some suggestions for further research such as improvement of 
efficiency estimation methodologies, cross-country comparison, finding the 
empirical evidence in developing countries and investigating the determinants 
of efficiency. After reviewing existing literature on banking efficiency, we 
observe that in recent years cost and profit efficiency are widely used as 
efficiency measurement instead of scale and scope economies. And the 
empirical studies survey on cost and profit efficiency has been presented in 
Table 2.1 and Table 2.2.   
 
2.5.1 Empirical Studies on Banking Efficiency: Cross-country 
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Comparison 
 
As we reviewed in this paper, the majority of the empirical studies on banking 
efficiency concentrated on single country have already been extremely 
thorough reviewed by several surveys such as Berger and Humphrey (1997), 
Goddard et al. (2001), Berger (2007), Hughes and Mester (2010) and Duygun 
Fethi and Pasiouras (2010). However, as suggested by Berger and Humphrey 
(1997), in which there are only three studies focus on cross-country sample so 
that researchers should pay more attention to measuring and comparing the 
efficiency level of banks in different environments and we find that recently 
there is a rising tendency of empirical studies on cross-country comparison of 
banking efficiency. As particularly enlightened by Berger and Humphrey (1997) 
and Shen et al. (2009), we review and summarize the previous empirical 
literature on the international comparison of banking efficiency. 
 
When the banking efficiency for a single country estimated, theoretically there 
is a corresponding frontier function specified for this country. And when we 
conduct cross-country comparison on the efficiency of banks in different 
countries, it is very difficult to interpret the empirical results since different 
countries have their own country-specific frontiers. Even if we suppose a 
‘common’ frontier, it is still quite hard for us to compare efficiency scores of 
banks in one country to efficiency levels in another country since we are not 
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able to include all the variables reflecting all the cross-country differences such 
as government policy, regulation, market structure, population density and 
geographical factors, etc. In many earlier international comparison studies on 
banking efficiency, the authors simply assume that all the banks in comparison 
provide services under the same production conditions so that they compare 
and evaluate the differences in banking efficiency among different countries by 
measuring the efficiency for individual country instead of applying a ‘common’ 
best practice frontier and banking inefficiency in their studies is naturally 
attributed to poor corporate governance. For example, the earliest 
cross-country studies examine and compare the banking efficiency within the 
EU because the data of these banks are relatively easy to obtain and more 
reliable, and more importantly these banks compete in similar economic 
environment (such as Altunbaş and Clakravarty, 1998; Dietsch and 
Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Altunbaş et al., 2001; Vander Vennet, 2002; Weill, 2004; 
Casu and Girardone, 2006; etc.). Then some studies developed the 
cross-countries comparison on banks of the EU members with the banks in the 
US (such as Allen and Rai, 1996; Maggi and Rossi, 2003; etc.). And recently a 
few studies include banks from Eastern Europe with the enlargement of the 
European Union (such as Hollo and Nagy, 2006, Ksaman and Yilidirim, 
2006;etc.). 
 
However, even though the boundary between banks has become increasingly 
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blurred with financial globalization and the pursuit of profit maximization, the 
managerial abilities may not be the only factor influencing the banking 
efficiency but also the regulatory requirements and macroeconomic climate. 
Therefore, it is necessary to include cross-country heterogeneities into the 
‘common’ frontier. And in recent cross-country comparison literature, various 
environmental variables as cross-country heterogeneous factors reflecting the 
differences across countries are introduced into the frontier function to 
estimate banking efficiency. The empirical results of cross-country studies in 
our survey indicate that efficiency levels are higher with the incorporation of 
cross-country heterogeneities so that the banking efficiency is underestimated 
and inefficiency is overestimated when cross-country differences are excluded 
(e.g. Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Lozano-Vivas et al., 2002; Casu and 
Girardone, 2004). 
 
From the investigation of the previous cross-country studies, we find that the 
most of banking efficiency analysis has turned to using cost and profit 
efficiency (see section 2.2.3.2 for detailed explanation). And some empirical 
results are worthy of concern such as Maudos et al. (1999) find that Portugal 
and the UK are the least cost efficient countries in their sample while the 
efficiency score ranking is fully reversed with respect to profit efficiency, that is, 
they are turned to be most efficient ones.  
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Additionally, in some cases, there are some mixed, even controversial 
empirical results from banks in the same countries in different studies. For 
example, Pastor et al. (1997) suggest that France is one of the most efficient 
countries in the sample, while the efficiency score is lower than the average 
level in the sample according to the results of Allen and Rai (1996). And the 
mixed results may be reasonable since it is possible that the cross-country 
differences are not controlled sufficiently that they may reflect differences in 
the economic environment across countries rather than differences in 
efficiency levels. Latest cross-country studies such as Lozano-Vivas et al. 
(2002), Maudos et al. (2002), Fries and Taci (2005), Kasman and Yildirim 
(2006) and Pasiouras (2008), Gardener et al. (2011), etc. include more 
exhaustive and more appropriate country-specific variables for different 
macroeconomic conditions, market structure, and regulatory requirements to 
improve the estimation of efficiency.  
 
By including additional country-specific environmental variables, a vast 
amount of studies make a cross-country comparison on banking efficiency, 
primarily in the members of EU 15 (Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Cavello 
and Rossi, 2002; Guevera and Maudos, 2002; Lozano-Vivas et al., 2002; 
Casu and Molyneux, 2003; Casu and Girardone, 2004; Casu and Girardone, 
2006, etc.). However, there is an on-going debate on the most and least 
efficient country in the EU and the efficiency difference among countries are 
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even greater as argued by Casu and Molyneux (2003). Nevertheless, there is 
consensus that country-specific variables are significantly important 
determinants in interpretation the differences in banking efficiency in EU.  
 
With the expansion and integration of the EU, some latest studies pay more 
attention on the comparison of transition countries within the Eastern Europe, 
the comparison between the Eastern and Western Europe and the comparison 
of Central and Eastern European countries (Grigorian and Manole, 2002; Weill, 
2004; Bonin et al. 2005; Fries and Taci, 2005; Kasman and Yildirim, 2006; 
Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007a; Kosak et al., 2009, etc.) And Weill (2004) 
indicates that banks in Western European countries are more cost efficient 
than banks in Eastern European countries. However, there is no agreement on 
the banking efficiency level rankings among Eastern European countries.  
 
Moreover, recently more scholars have concentrated on international 
comparison of banking inefficiency not one particular area any more. In this 
case, some authors such as Allen and Rai (1996), Maudos and Pastor (2001), 
Bos and Kolari, 2005, and Maggi and Rossi (2003), etc. include developed 
countries such as the US, Japan and Canada to European countries to extend 
the cross-country comparison. And they find that generally banks in US are the 
most efficient, Japanese banking sector is least efficient and European banks 
stand in the middle. Meanwhile, some researchers pay their attention on the 
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cross-country comparisons in the emerging economies and developing 
countries. For example, Perera et al. (2007) measure the banking efficiency 
and compare them in four South Asian countries, Shen et al. (2009) provide a 
comparison of cost efficiency in ten Asian banking industries, Carvallo and 
Kasman (2005) investigate the differences in the banking cost efficiency in 16 
Latin American countries, Gardener et al. (2011) explores the determinants of 
efficiency in five South East Asian countries’ banking industries, and Duygun et 
al. (2015) present a significant cross-country comparison of banking efficiency 
by investigating 485 banks in 34 emerging economies during the financial 
upheaval period of 2005-2008 with a novel approach which places a great 
emphasis on the role equity capital. 
 
Furthermore, the difference in clarifying the role of deposits is revealed in the 
cross-country studies as well. The role of deposits determines which one of the 
intermediation approach, production approach, dual approach and 
value-added approach is going to be applied in the cross-country comparison 
on banking efficiency (see the detailed explanation in section 2.4.1). Even 
though we acknowledge the importance of the dual role of deposits, whether 
regarding deposits as inputs or outputs is actually determined by the 
availability of data on deposits. And according to our literature survey, majority 
of empirical cross-country studies on banking efficiency use the value of total 
deposits instead of the number of deposits accounts so that it is more 
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appropriate for us to define the deposits as inputs and apply the intermediation 
approach to measure the banking efficiency for the cross-country comparison. 
 
Finally, we look into the last but not the least aspect in comparing the banking 
efficiency across countries, that is, the estimation techniques for measuring 
the efficiency level. Regarding to the first cross-country studies survey 
provided by Berger and Humphrey (1997), five out of six cross-country 
comparisons are applied by a non-parametric approach (DEA, a mathematical 
programming technique) and the left one is adopted the parametric 
approaches (distribution free approach, DFA and thick frontier approach, TFA). 
And with reference to the literature survey of 38 cross-country studies on 
banking efficiency provided by Pasiouras (2008), 15 out of 38 empirical studies 
employ a non-parametric approach (DEA or the DEA-like Malmquist index) 
and the remaining ones utilize at least one of parametric approach (SFA, DFA 
and TFA) to estimate the banking efficiency. And several empirical studies, for 
instance, Lozano-Vivas et al. (2002), Casu et al. (2004), and Weill (2004) 
investigate the differences in banking efficiency across countries with respect 
to different estimation techniques. 
 
SFA is a very widely used parametric approach, which overcomes the critical 
disadvantage of DEA, under which no random error is included. There are 
numerous empirical studies in banking studies use this stochastic frontier 
	 65
analysis approach, in the literature survey (Table 2.1 and 2.2), for instances, 
42 out of 61 studies use SFA approach, including Ferrier and Lovell (1990), 
Kaparakis et al. (1994), Allen and Rai (1996), Kwan and Eisenbeis (1996), 
Lang and Welzel (1996), Mester (1996), Berger and DeYoung (1997), 
Lozano-Vivas (1997), Chang et al. (1998), Kraft and Tirtiroglu (1998), Altunbaş 
et al., 2000, Huang (2000), Altunbaş et al., 2001, Christopoulos and Tsionas 
(2001), Hao et al. (2001), Maudos and Pastor (2001), Mertens and Urga 
(2001), Carbo et al. (2002), Christopoulos et al. (2002), Maudos et al. (2002), 
Vander Vennet (2002), Hasan and Marton (2003), Weill (2003, 2004), Casu 
and Girardone (2004), Girardone et al. (2004), Sturm and Williams (2004), 
Bonin et al. (2005a, 2005b), Carvallo and Kasman (2005), Fries and Taci 
(2005), Kasman and Yildirim (2006), Sensarma (2006), Fu and Heffernan 
(2007), Kumbhakar and Wang (2007), Perera et al. (2007), Yildirim and 
Philippatos (2007a), Berger et al. (2009), Kosak et al. (2009), Shen et al. 
(2009), Abdul-Majid et al. (2011), and Duygun et al. (2015). Despite SFA is 
criticized by presupposing the shape of an unknown frontier with a strict 
functional form, numerous scholars believe that the risk of misspecification 
could be reduced by conducting statistical and econometric test on the model, 
testing the theoretical properties of the presumed functional form and 
introducing reasonable explanatory variables. Therefore, although there is no 
consensus on the ‘best’ frontier methodology, SFA is still preferred as it allows 
random noises that out of control of firms, which may comprise measurement 
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error, specification error and sampling error. 
 
DFA, which is proposed by Berger et al. (1993), only estimates with a panel 
data set under the assumption that efficiency differences are stable over time 
and does not require specific assumptions of distribution. TFA, which is 
developed in Berger and Humphrey (1991), in which the authors assume that 
differences among the predicted costs in the lowest quartile of costs are due to 
random factors, while the differences in costs among quartiles are attribute to 
inefficiency. And from the perspective of profits, the assumption is differences 
among the predicted profits in the upper quartile of profits are due to random 
factors, where as the differences in profits among quartiles are owing to 
inefficiency. What’s more, there are two types of SFA based on the types of 
sample: cross-sectional stochastic frontier approach and panel data stochastic 
frontier approach. Since the latter approach overcomes the drawbacks of the 
former approach such as very strong distribution required on the inefficiency 
term, inconsistent estimates of inefficiency, no time-varying inefficiency and no 
correlation between the inefficiency term and regressors, the researchers 
prefer to use the panel data stochastic frontier approach, which coincides with 
our observation. That is, panel data SFA is the most prevailing approach for 
estimation of efficiency. Therefore, in our analysis, we will compare the 
efficiency by incorporating cross-countries heterogeneities and evaluate the 
direction and magnitude of every environmental variable on the differences in 
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estimated cost efficiency in Asian banking industries by applying stochastic 
frontier analysis approach, using translog functional form and under the 
framework of intermediation approach. 
  
To our best knowledge, up-to-date, there are three largest cross-country 
studies from the perspective of geographical coverage. The first one is 
Gonzalez (2005a), in which the author provides international comparisons of 
the banking efficiency in terms of the determinants of efficiency in the 69 
countries. Secondly, we find that in the study of Hollo and Nagy (2006) the 
authors investigate banking efficiency in 25 countries of enlarged European 
Union. And the third one in turns to Pasiouras (2008) who provides an 
excellent and exhaustive survey of 38 cross-country studies in terms of the 
estimation techniques, the geographical coverage and the overall examined 
issues, and also proposes a comprehensive international comparison of 
banking efficiency in 95 countries to suggest that the banking industries in 
Asian Pacific are the most efficient while banks in Latin America and 
Caribbean are the least efficient ones.  
 
2.5.2 Determinants of Efficiency 
 
Exploring the determinants of efficiency is an important area in banking 
efficiency studies and we find that substantial empirical researches have been 
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conducted to examine the sources of the variations in efficiency. Although 
there is no consensus on what explanatory variables should be used in the 
analysis of the determining factors of efficiency or inefficiency so far, some 
common factors indicating bank-specific characteristics (such as bank size, 
ownership, corporate governance, risk preferences and capitalization, etc.) 
and environmental factors (such as regulation/deregulation, inflation, merger 
and acquisition, market structure and competition, etc.) are usually considered. 
Therefore, it is worth to summarizing the findings of the literature on the 
determinants of efficiency. 
 
2.5.2.1 The Effect of Bank Size on Efficiency 
 
Empirical evidence is ambiguous on the relative efficiency with respect to bank 
size effect. According to the finding of Allen and Rai (1996), bank size is 
significantly positive related with inefficiency, that is, the larger inefficiency is 
associated with large banks, which are agreed by the empirical results from 
the analysis of efficiency in the US banking system (Kaparakis et al., 1994), in 
European banking banks (Maudos et al., 2002; Girardone et al, 2004) and in 
the Chinese banking sector (Kumbhakar and Wang, 2007; Berger et al., 2009). 
However, opposite conclusion is drawn by Altunbaş et al. (2000), who find the 
significant negative size effects on inefficiency, that is, inefficiency decreases 
with the growth of bank size. And this empirical evidence is also suggested in 
	 69
banks of Germany, Netherlands, Spain and UK through the study of Cavello 
and Rossi (2002); in the Greek banking system by Christopulos et al. (2002); 
in Hungarian banks by Hasan and Marton (2003); in Latin American banking 
sectors by Carvallo and Kasman (2005); in four South Asian banking industries 
for both cost and profit efficiency by Perera et al. (2007). Moreover, unlike the 
significant positive or negative relationship between bank size and banking 
inefficiency presented in the above literature, both of Mester (1996) and 
Mertens and Urga (2001) argue that the coefficient of size effect is 
insignificantly different from zero so that there is hardly effect of bank size on 
banking inefficiency. However, Chen et al. (2005) investigate bank size effect 
on the technical, allocative and cost efficiency in the Chinese banks by 
adopting non-parametric DEA approach and suggest that the medium sized 
banks are least cost efficient banks, that is, both the large banks and smaller 
banks have higher cost efficiency level than medium sized banks. Furthermore, 
in some studies, the authors find no apparent laws of bank size on efficiency. 
For example, Ferrier and Lovell (1990) examine the cost efficiency of the 
banks in US by employing both parametric and non-parametric frontier 
techniques and find no indication that large banks are more cost efficient than 
small banks. Similarly, Casu and Girardone (2002), Vander Vennet (2002) and 
Weill (2004) investigate the banking efficiency in Europe from the cost 
efficiency perspective and suggest no clear tendency although banking 
efficiency levels differ among different size categories. The last but not the 
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least, the empirical results for the same sample may be significantly different 
under different estimation frontier models. Lang and Welzel (1996), for 
instance, apply the fixed-effect model and random-effect model to estimate the 
cost efficiency in German banks and find totally different results: the efficiency 
level is lower under the random-effect model but does not have a clear trend 
while under the fixed-effect model the trend is relative apparent that large 
banks are less efficient than small banks. 
 
2.5.2.2 The Effect of Ownership on Efficiency 
 
Ownership effect on banking efficiency is a prevailing subject in the empirical 
study on the banking industry in emerging and transition economies, which is 
normally investigated from two main aspects: privatization and foreign 
ownership. 
 
In general, privatization is usually expected to have a significantly positive 
effect on banking efficiency, that is, state-owned banks are expected to 
perform less efficiently than private banks. And according to Shirley and Walsh 
(2000), state-owned banks with relatively lower efficiency may be caused by 
greater political regulation, less competition stress and weaker corporate 
governance. However, empirical evidence is ambiguous on the comparative 
banking efficiency of state-owned banks and private banks. Bonin et al. (2005a) 
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examine cost efficiency and profit efficiency in six transition countries and find 
that private banks are more efficient than state-owned banks with respect to 
both cost efficiency and profit efficiency. And this empirical result is supported 
by Fries and Taci (2005), who estimate the cost efficiency in 15 East European 
transition countries’ banking industries and indicate that cost efficiency of 
state-owned banks is less than that of private banks. Similarly, Berger et al. 
(2009) investigate Chinese banks’ cost efficiency and find the same empirical 
evidence that state-owned banks are the least efficient banks in the Chinese 
banking system. Likewise, the finding of Fu and Heffernan (2007) is consistent 
with above studies and they suggest the coefficient of ownership dummy is 
significantly positive so that joint-stock banks are more efficient than 
state-owned banks in China. And Ariff and Can (2008) find that joint-stock 
banks have higher cost and profit efficiency scores than state-owned banks in 
Chinese banking industry as well. The same evidence is provided by Perera et 
al. (2007) and Girardone et al. (2004), in which they suggest that state-owned 
banks are more cost efficient than privately owned banks in four South Asian 
countries and Italy, respectively. Moreover, Isik and Hassan (2002) examine 
commercial banks’ efficiency in Turkey and state that state-owned banks will 
outperform private banks with precondition that pacing for several other 
significant factors such as bank size, corporate governance and market 
structure, etc. However, Altunbaş et al. (2001) disagree with the significant 
positive relationship between privatization and banking efficiency since they 
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find the coefficient of either cost efficiency or profit efficiency is insignificantly 
different from zero when examining both cost efficiency and profit efficiency in 
Germany.  
 
On the other hand, there is a great number of empirical studies analyzing the 
relationship between foreign ownership and banking efficiency. Usually, 
foreign-owned banks are expected to be more efficient than domestic-owned 
banks in developing and transition countries. Classens et al. (2001) examine 
the relative performance of domestic and foreign banks in 80 developed and 
developing countries and present empirical evidence to support this 
hypothesis by the finding that the profits of foreign-owned banks are higher 
than those of domestic-owned banks in developing countries but the opposite 
is the case in developed countries. And Welli (2003), Bonin et al. (2005a, 
2005b), Fries and Taci (2005) and Kasman and Yildirim (2006) investigate the 
foreign ownership on efficiency and performance through cross-country 
comparison in transition countries and suggest that foreign-owned banks are 
more efficient than domestic-owned banks. And the similar evidence can be 
provided by single-country empirical literature. For example, Hasan and 
Marton (2003) find that foreign banks and banks with majority foreign 
ownership have significantly higher efficiency scores than domestic-owned 
banks. Likewise, Berger et al. (2009) investigate the cost efficiency in the 
Chinese banking system with respect to foreign ownership effect and find that 
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foreign banks are the most efficient among all banks and indicate that minority 
of foreign ownership plays an important role in improving banking efficiency. In 
addition, Isik and Hassan (2002) focus on studying banking efficiency in 
Turkish banking sector and they find the same evidence that foreign-owned 
banks are much more efficient than domestic-owned banks. And Kraft and 
Tirtiroglu (1998) and Mertens and Urga (2001) indicate the same empirical 
result for banks in the Eastern European countries: Croatia and Ukraine, 
respectively. And the same empirical evidence is provided in developed 
countries as well, for example, in the studies of Chang et al. (1998) for banks 
in US and Sturm and Williams (2004) for Australian banks. However, 
Sensarma (2006) find an opposite evidence that the performance of foreign 
banks is the worst compared to state-owned and private banks. 
 
2.5.2.3 The Effect of Equity Capital on Efficiency 
  
As discussed in Section 2.4.2, equity capital ratio is a very important variable 
to control for the output quality and risk reference so that the role of equity 
capital ratio in measuring banks’ performance and estimating banking 
efficiency is necessary to be discussed. Allen and Rai (1996) suggest that 
equity capital ratio is significantly negative associated with cost efficiency for 
universal banks and large banks. However, Altunbaş et al. (2000), Hasan and 
Marton (2003), and Carvallo and Kasman (2005) find opposite empirical 
	 74
results that increase in equity capital ratio will lead to a significant increase of 
cost efficiency in Japanese banks, in Latin American banking sectors and in 
Hungarian banking industry, respectively. Likewise, Kaparakis et al. (1994) 
agree that equity capital ratio will have a significantly negative impact on 
banking inefficiency, which is supported by Girardone et al. (2004) and Perera 
et al. (2007) as well. This finding indicates that higher equity capital ratio will 
increase banks’ efficiency and reduce the level of banks’ insolvency risk so 
that the performance of banks will be simultaneously improved. Meanwhile, 
the mixed evidences are presented in the EU countries from the analysis of 
Cavallo and Rossi (2002), in which they find a significantly positive relationship 
between equity capital ratio and cost inefficiency for banks in Germany and 
Italy but a strong negative effect of equity capital ratio on banking inefficiency 
in UK. 
 
2.5.2.4 The Effect of Non-performing Loan Ratio on Efficiency 
 
Through the literature research and investigation, we find that there is a 
consistent view among scholars on the relationship between non-performing 
loan ratio and banking inefficiency. All studies applied by Altunbaş et al. (2000), 
Mertens and Urga (2001), Girardone et al (2004) and Carvallo and Kasman 
(2005) agree that non-performing loan ratio has positive influence on 
inefficiency.  
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2.5.2.5 The Effect of Market Structure on Efficiency 
 
Investigating the potential sources of banking inefficiency and examining the 
relative economic hypotheses on efficiency are significantly helpful for the 
regulatory reform, government policy formulation and the improvement of 
management capability. Therefore, it is very meaningful for us to acknowledge 
the determinants of efficiency in Asian banking industries. One undoubtedly 
important issue worthy of investigating is the effect of market structure on 
banks’ performance and efficiency and we will discuss it comprehensively in 
the following Chapter 4. 
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Table 2.1 Literature Survey of Banking Efficiency Studies in Single Country 
Studies Sample Period Dependent 
Variable 
          Independent Variables 
 
Average Efficiency estimates 
      Output Input prices   
Abdul-Majid 
et al. (2011) 
Malaysia from 1996-2002; 
Net efficiency and gross 
efficiency; SFA; 9 Evs; 
Intermediation; TL 
Total cost Y1: The sum of total loans  
Y2: Total other earning 
assets 
W1: Price of labour 
W2: Price of financial capital  
W3: Price of physical capital 
Net efficiency: ranges from 1.019 
to 1.217, average 1.066; Gross 
efficiency: ranges from 1.032 to 
1.688, average 1.340 
Altunbas et al. 
(2000) 
Japan from 1993-1996; 
Cost efficiency; SFA; 
Intermediation; FF; Equity 
capital, NPL ratio 
Total cost Y1: Total loans  
Y2: Total securities  
Y3: Total off-balance sheet 
items 
W1: Price of labour  
W2: Price of funds  
W3: Price of physical capital 
Inefficiency level range between 
5% and 7% with no discernible 
trend across size classes. 
Ariff and Can 
(2008) 
 
China from 1995-2004; 
Cost efficiency and Profit 
efficiency; DEA 
  Y1: Loans  
Y2: Investments 
W1: Price of labour  
W2: Price of fixed assets  
W3: Price of deposits 
Cost efficiency: 0.798; Profit 
efficiency: 0.505 
Avkiran 
(1999) 
Austrialia from 
1986-1995; Operating 
efficiency; DEA; 
Intermediation 
  Model A: Y1 Deposits,  
        Y2 Staff numbers; 
Model B: Y1 Net loans,   
   Y2 Non-interest income 
Model A: X1 Interest expense,  
        X2 Non-interest expense; 
Model B: X1: Deposits  
        X2 Staff numbers 
Model A:  78.99% in 1991 to 
91.48% in 1986; Model B: 37.24% 
in 1986 to 79.43% in 1994 
Berger and 
DeYoung 
(1997) 
US from 1985-1994; Cost 
efficiency; SFA; 
Intermediation; FF 
Operating 
cost (only 
include 
non-interest 
expense) 
Y1: Commercial loans  
Y2: Consumer loans  
Y3: Real estate loans  
Y4: Transaction deposits  
Y5: Fee-based income 
W1: Price of labour  
W2: Price of physical capital 
0.92 
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Berger et al. 
(1997) 
US from 1989-1991; Cost 
efficiency; DFA; 
Intermediation; FF 
Total cost Y1: Value of consumer 
transaction accounts  
Y2: Value of consumer 
non-transaction accounts  
Y3: Value of business 
transaction accounts  
Y4: Value of business 
non-transaction accounts 
W1: Average wage rate  
W2: Average rental rate on capital 
0.9-0.95 
  Cost efficiency; DFA; 
Production 
Operating 
cost 
Y1: Number of deposit 
accounts  
Y2: Number of debits  
Y3: Number of credits  
Y4: Number of accounts 
opened  
Y5: Number of accounts 
closed  
Y6: Number of loans 
originated 
W1: Average wage rate  
W2: Average rental rate on capital 
0.75-0.8 
Berger and 
Mester (1997) 
USA from 1990-1995; 
Cost efficiency and Profit 
efficiency; DFA; 
Intermediation; TL, FF；
Z1: Off-balance sheet Z2: 
Physical capital Z3: 
Financial equity capital 
Total 
cost/Profit 
Y1: Consumer loans  
Y2: Business loans (all other 
loans)  
Y3: Securities (all 
non-financial assets 
W1: Price of purchasing funds 
(liabilities except core deposits) 
W2: Price of core deposits W3: 
Price of labour 
Cost efficiency0.86 (TL), 0.87 
(FF); Standard profit: 0.54 (TL), 
0.55 (FF); Alternative profit: 0.45 
(TL), 0.46 (FF) 
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Berger et al. 
(2009) 
China from 1994-2003; 
Cost efficiency; SFA; 
Dual; TL; Z1: Total 
earning asset 
Total cost Y1: Total loans  
Y2: Total deposits  
Y3: Liquid assets  
Y4: Other earning assets 
W1: Interest expense to total assets 
W2: Non-interest expense to fixed 
assets 
0.74 
Chang et al. 
(1998) 
USA from 1984-1989; 
Cost efficiency; SFA; 
Intermediation; TL 
Total cost Y1: All money market assets 
Y2: Commercial and 
industry loans  
Y3: Other loans  
Y4: Other bank output 
W1: Price of labour  
W2: Price of physical capital W3: 
Price of funds  
0.73 (Foreign owned multinational 
banks), 0.79 (US owned 
multinational banks) 
Chen et al. 
(2005) 
China from 1993-2000; 
Technical, allocative 
efficiency and cost 
efficiency; DEA; Dual; TL
  Y1: Loans  
Y2: Deposits  
Y3: Non-interest income 
W1: Price of deposits  
W2: Price of fixed assets 
All banks mean efficiency: 
Technical efficiency, 0.720-0.853; 
Allocative efficiency, 0.634-0.693; 
Cost efficiency, 0.426-0.582 
Christopoulos 
et al. (2002) 
Greece from 1993-1997; 
Cost efficiency; SFA; 
Intermediation; TL 
Total cost Y1: Loans  
Y2: Investments  
Y3: Liquid assets 
W1: Price of funds  
W2: Price of labour  
W3: Price of capital 
0.6-0.95 
Christopoulos 
and Tsionas 
(2001) 
Greece from 1993-1998; 
Cost efficiency; SFA; 
Intermediation; CD 
Total cost Y1: Loans  
Y2: Investments  
Y3: Liquid assets  
W1: Price of funds  
W2: Price of labour  
W3: Price of capital 
0.68 
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Ferrier and 
Lovell (1990) 
USA in1984; Cost 
efficiency; SFA and DEA; 
Production; TL; 12 EVs  
Total cost Y1: Number of demand 
deposit accounts  
Y2: Number of time deposit 
accounts  
Y3: Number of real estate 
loans  
Y4: Number of installment 
loans  
Y5: Number of commercial 
loans 
W1: Price of labour  
W2: Occupancy costs and 
expenditure on furniture and 
equipment over level of deposits 
W3: Expenditure on materials over 
level of deposits 
0.74 (SFA), 0.78 (DEA) 
Fethi et al. 
(2011) 
 
Egypt from 1991-2002; 
DEA; Intermediation 
 
 Y1: Total loans 
Y2:Interestmetns  
Y3: Other income 
 
X1: General and administrative 
expenses  
X2: Fixed assets  
X3: Total deposits 
 
 
Fu and 
Heffernan 
(2007) 
China from 1985-2002; 
Cost efficiency; SFA; 
Dual; TL; Z: Total asset 
Total cost Y1: Total deposits  
Y2: Total loans  
Y3: Investments 
W1: Price of funds  
W2: Price of fixed assets  
W3: Price of employees 
0.41 (H), 0.52 (E), 0.46 (T) 
Girardone et 
al. (2004) 
Italy from 1993-1995; 
Cost efficiency; SFA; 
Intermediation; FF; 
Financial capital an asset 
quality 
Total cost Y1: Loans  
Y2: Other earning assets 
W1: Price of funds  
W2: Price of labour  
W3: Price of fixed assets 
94.8, 78.5 
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Hao et al. 
(2001) 
South Korea from 
1985-1995; Cost 
efficiency; SFA; Dual; TL; 
Equity capital adjust for 
increased costs of funds 
Total cost Y1: Total loans and 
securities  
Y2: Demand deposits  
Y3: Fee income 
W1: Wage rate  
W2: Interest for borrowed funds 
W3: Price of physical capital 
0.89 
Hasan and 
Marton (2003)
Hungary from 1993-1998; 
Cost efficiency; SFA; 
Dual, TL; Equity capital 
and loan loss provision 
  Y1: Total loans  
Y2: Total investments  
Y3: Non-interest or 
fee-related income 
Y4: Total interest of 
borrowed fund 
W1: Price of fund 
W2: Price of labour and related 
expense 
0.71 (all sample), 0.67 (all 
domestic), 0.74 (foreign 
investment) 
Huang (2000) Taiwan Province of China 
from 1981-1995; Profit 
efficiency; SFA; 
Intermediation; TL; 
Non-performing loan and 
financial capital 
Profit Y1: Investments  
Y2: Other earning assets 
W1: Price of labour  
W2: Price of deposits and borrowed 
money 
  
Kaparakis et 
al. (1994) 
USA in 1986; Cost 
efficiency; SFA; 
Intermediation; TL 
Total cost Y1: Individual loans  
Y2: Real estate loans  
Y3: Commercial loans  
Y4: Trading accounts 
securities, assets 
W1: Price of deposits  
W2: Price of funds  
W3: Price of labour  
W4: Price of capital 
0.9 
Kraft and 
Tirtiroglu 
(1998) 
Croatia from 1994-1995; 
Cost efficiency; SFA; 
Dual; TL 
Total cost Y1: Loans  
Y2: Deposits  
W1: Price of funds  
W2: Price of labour  
W3: Price of capital 
0.55-0.88 
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Kumbhakar 
and Wang 
(2007) 
China from 1993-2002; 
Technical efficiency; SFA; 
Input distance function; 
CD and TL 
Costs Y1: Loans  
Y2: Other earning assets 
W1: Price of Labour 
W2: Price of fixed assets W3: Price 
of deposits 
TE: State-owned, 0.4735; all banks, 
0.7894 
Kwan and 
Eisenbeis 
(1996) 
USA from 1986-1991; 
Cost efficiency; SFA; 
Intermediation; TL 
Total cost Y1: Investment securities 
Y2: Real estate loans  
Y3: Commercial and 
industrial loans  
Y4: Consumer loans  
Y5: Off-balance sheet 
commitment 
W1: Price of capital  
W2: Price of funds  
W3: Price of labour  
0.8-0.9 
Lang and 
Welzel (1996)
Germany from 1989-1992; 
Cost efficiency; SFA; 
Intermediation; TL; 
Branch variable, merger 
dummy interactive with 
input prices 
Total cost Y1: Short-term loans to 
non-banks  
Y2: Long-term loans to 
non-bank  
Y3: Loans to banks  
Y4: Other investments  
Y5: Fees and commissions 
Y6: Commodities sale 
revenue 
W1: Price of labour  
W2: Price of capital 
W3: Price of deposits 
0.69 (FE), 0.54 (RE) 
Lozano-Vivas  
(1997) 
Spain from 1986-1991; 
Profit efficiency; SFA; 
Dual; TL; Fixed assets, 
number of branches and 
other dummies  
Profit Y1: Loans  
Y2: Deposits  
Y3: Interbank loans 
W1: Price of funds  
W2: Price of labour  
W3: Price of capital 
0.72 (non-standard), 0.58 (standard) 
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Matthews et 
al. (2007) 
China from 1997-2004; 
DEA 
  Y1: Loans  
Y2: Other earning assets   
Y3: Other operating income 
W1: Price of Labour  
W2: Price of fixed assets  
W3: Price of deposits 
  
Mertens and 
Urga (2001) 
Ukraine from 1998; Cost 
efficiency and Profit 
efficiency; SFA and TFA; 
Intermediation; TL; 
Capital, fixed assets, 
non-performing ratio 
Total 
cost/Profit 
Y1: Interbank loans  
Y2: Client loans  
Y3: Investments in securities 
and other investments 
W1: Price of funds  
W2: Price of labour  
Cost efficiency: 0.67 (SFA), 0.81 
(TFA); Profit efficiency: 0.72 
(SFA), 0.66 (TFA). 
Mester (1996) US from 1991-1992; Cost 
efficiency; SFA; 
Intermediation; TL; 
Average of 
non-performing loans and 
average volume of equity 
capital in 1992 
Total cost Y1: Real estate loans  
Y2: Commercial and 
industrial loans  
Y3: Loans to individuals 
W1: Price of labour  
W2: Price of physical capital  
W3: Price of borrowed money 
0.91-0.94 
Nikiel and 
Opiela (2002) 
Poland from 1997-2000; 
Cost efficiency and Profit 
efficiency; DFA; 
Intermediation; FF; Fixed 
net put: physical capital, 
financial equity capital, 
off-balance sheet items; 
EV: non-performing loans 
Total 
cost/Profit 
Y1: Household loans  
Y2: Business loans  
Y3: Securities 
W1: Interest rate on funds  
W2: Price of labor 
Average cost efficiency: 60.81; 
Average profit efficiency: 78.30 
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Resti (1997) Italy from 1988-1992; 
Cost efficiency; DEA; 
Production; TL 
Operating 
cost 
Y1: Loans  
Y2: Deposits  
Y3: Non-interest income 
W1: Price of labour  
W2: Price of capital 
Average: 0.7 
Sensarma 
(2006) 
India from 1986-2000; 
Cost efficiency; SFA; 
Value-added; TL; Time, 
deregulation dummy, size, 
ownership dummy, labour 
and capital 
Total 
operating 
cost 
Y1: Fixed deposits  
Y2: Savings deposits  
Y3: Current deposit  
Y4: Investments  
Y5: Loans  
Y6: Number of branches 
W1: Price of labour  
W2: Price of capital 
Without group dummies: 0.92 (S), 
0.94 (P), 0.44 (F), 0.63 (NP); with 
group dummies: 0.91 (S), 0.80 (P), 
0.26 (F), 0.1(NP) 
Sturm and 
Williams 
(2004) 
Australia from1988-2001; 
DEA and SFA; TE, SE, 
Input-efficiency; 
Intermediation; TL 
  Y1: Loans  
Y2: Off-balance sheet items 
W1: Number of employees  
W2: Price of deposits  
W3: Price of equity capital 
DEA: Average Technical 
Efficiency 0.73 (1991) - 0.94 
(2000), Scale efficiency 0.84 
(1994)-0.98 (2001); SFA: 0.833  
Tsionas et al. 
(2003) 
Greek from 1993-1998; 
Technical and allocative 
efficiency; DEA; 
Intermediation; TL 
  Y1: Loans  
Y2: Investments  
3: Liquid assets 
W1: Unit Price of labor  
W2: Price of capital  
W3: Price of deposits 
0.984 (TE), 0.974 (AE) 
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Table 2.2 Literature Survey of Cross-countries Studies 
Studies Key features Dependent 
Variable 
Independent Variables Average efficiency 
estimates 
General Conclusion 
Output            Input prices 
Allen and Rai 
(1996) 
15 EU countries and US 
from1988-1992; Cost 
and profit efficiency; 
SFA and DEA; 
Intermediation; TL 
Total cost Y1: Total loans  
Y2: Investment 
securities 
W1: Price of labour  
W2: Price of funds  
W3: Price of capital 
0.85 (universal), 0.79 
(separated) 
Large banks are the most 
efficient as well as 
diseconomies of scale 
Altunbas et al. 
(2001) 
15 EU countries form 
1989-1997; Cost 
efficiency; SFA; 
Intermediation; FF; 
Equity capital 
Total 
cost/operating 
and financial 
cost 
Y1: Total loans 
Y2: Total 
securities  
Y3: Total 
off-balance sheet 
items 
W1: Price of labour  
W2: Price of funds  
W3: Price of physical 
capital 
0.75-0.8 across 
different asset sizes 
Efficiency levels vary 
across country, banks sizes 
and over time, and greater 
cost savings can be 
achieved by improving 
managerial ability. 
Berg et al. 
(1993) 
3 Nordic countries 
in1990; Technical 
efficiency; DEA; 
Value-added 
  Y1: Loans  
Y2: Deposits  
Y3: No. of 
branches 
X1: Capital  
X2: Labur 
Average under 
CRS/VRS: Finland 
(0.53/0.5), Norway 
(0.58/0.41), Sweden 
(0.78/0.69) 
Sweden is the most 
efficient country among 
these countries 
Bonin et al. 
(2005a) 
11 Transition countries 
from1996-2000; Cost 
efficiency and Profit 
efficiency; SFA; 
Value-added; TL; 
Dummies of years and 
country effects 
Total cost/Net 
profit 
Y1: Total deposits 
Y2: Total loans 
Y3: Total liquid 
assets Y4: 
Investments 
W1: Price of capital 
W2: Price of funds 
Average: 
0.78/Average: 0.69 
Majority foreign 
ownership is associated 
with improved bank 
efficiency 
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Bonin et al. 
(2005b) 
6 Transition countries 
from 1994-2002; Cost 
efficiency and Profit 
efficiency; SFA; 
Value-added; TL; 
Dummies of years and 
country effects 
Total cost/Net 
profit 
Y1: Total deposits 
Y2: Total loans 
Y3: Total liquid 
assets  
Y4: Investments 
W1: Price of capital 
W3: Price of funds 
Average: 
0.79/Average: 0.45 
  
Casu and 
Girardone 
(2004) 
5 EU countries from 
1993-1997; Cost 
efficiency and Profit 
efficiency; DEA and 
SFA; Intermediation; FF, 
TL; Country-specific Evs
Total 
cost/Gross 
profit 
Y1: Total loans 
Y2: Other earning 
assets 
W1: Price of labour 
W2: Price of funds 
W3: Price of fixed 
capital 
Average: 0.86 (FF), 
0.87 (TL)/Average: 
0.76 (FF), 0.75 (TL); 
0.54 to 0.9 from 1993 
to 1997 
Efficiency levels are not 
converged; 
Country-specific variables 
are important to interpret 
banking inefficiency; 
Profit efficiency shows a 
sharp growth over time. 
Casu and 
Molyneux 
(2003) 
5 EU countries from 
1993-1997; 
Productive-efficiency; 
DEA and Tobit 
regression; 
Intermediation; Country 
dummies, equity to total 
assets ratio, return on 
average equity, bank type 
dummy  
  Y1: Total loans 
Y2: Other earning 
assets 
X1: Total cost  
X2: Total customers 
and short term 
funding 
Average: 0.65 The efficiency gap among 
countries grew wider over 
the period 1993-1997; 
Country-specific factors 
are important determinants 
in explaining differences in 
banking efficiency 
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Carbo et al. 
(2002) 
12 EU countries 
from1989-1996; Cost 
efficiency; SFA; 
Intermediation; FF 
Total cost Y1: Loans  
Y2: Securities 
Y3: Off-balance 
sheet activities 
W1: Price of labour 
W2: Price of funds 
W3: Price of physical 
capital 
Average: 0.78   
Cavallo and 
Rossi (2002) 
6 EU countries from 
1992-1997; Cost 
efficiency; Dual; TL;Size 
dummies, organizational 
dummies and bank 
balance indicators 
Total cost Y1: Loans  
Y2: Deposits  
Y3: Investment 
W1: Price of labour 
W2: Price of deposits 
W3: Price of fixed 
capital 
    
Carvallo and 
Kasman 
(2005) 
16 Latin American and 
Caribbean countries from 
1995-1999; Cost 
efficiency; SFA; Dual; 
TL; Country-specific Evs
Total cost Y1: Loans  
Y2: Deposits  
Y3: Other earning 
assets (investment 
securities) 
W1: Price of labour 
W2: Price of 
purchased funds  
W3: Price of physical 
capital 
Average: 0.822 The efficiency level 
significantly varies across 
country and the largest 
economy is the most 
efficient. 
Dietsch and 
Lozano-Vivas 
(2000) 
Spain and France 
from1988-1992; Cost 
efficiency; DFA; 
Value-added; TL; 7 Evs 
Total cost Y1: Deposits  
Y2: Loans  
Y3: Other earning 
assets 
W1: Price of labour 
W2: Price of physical 
capital  
W3: Price of 
financial facto  
Without/Withs EVs: 
France (0.58/0.89); 
Spain (0.09/0.75) 
  
Duygun et al. 
(2015) 
34 emerging economies 
from 2005-2008; Cost 
efficiency; SFA; 
Intermediation; TL; 
Equity to asset ratio, 9 
Evs 
Total cost Y1: Loans  
Y2: Securities 
Y3: Off-balance 
sheet 
W1: Funding price 
W2: Capital price 
  Confirm the importance of 
the regulated equity capital 
ratio as a constraint on cost 
minimizing behaviour 
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Fries and Taci 
(2005) 
15 Transition countries 
from1994-2001; Cost 
efficiency; SFA and 
DFA; Value-added; TL; 
8 country-level Evs 
Total cost Y1: Loans  
Y2: Deposits  
W1: Price of labour 
W2: Price of physical 
capital  
Without EVs: 0.63, 
With EVs: 0.71 
Private banks are more 
efficient than state-owned 
banks; Foreign ownership 
imposes the managerial 
ability 
Gardener et al. 
(2011) 
Five South East Asian 
Countries from 
1998-2004; Technical 
efficiency and cost 
efficiency; DEA and 
Tobit regression 
 Y1: Net loans 
over total assets 
Y2: Other earning 
over total assets  
W1: Price of fixed 
assets over total 
assets  
W2: Price of deposits 
over total assets  
W3: Price of 
personnel costs over 
total assets 
Mean (TE, CE): 
Indonesia (58.2, 41.9), 
Malaysia (85.9, 71.9), 
Philippines (79.1, 
57.4), Thailand (70.4, 
49.8), Vietnam (80.1, 
61.8) 
Efficiency has 
significantly declined over 
1998-2004; foreign banks 
are more efficient than 
domestic banks; 
State-owned banks have 
greater efficiency than 
local private banks; 
national banking 
development shows a 
strong and positive link 
with bank efficiency. 
Kasman and 
Yildirim 
(2006) 
8 Central and eastern 
European countries 
from1995-2002; Cost 
efficiency and Profit 
efficiency; SFA; Dual; 
FF; 11 country-level Evs
Total 
cost/Profit 
Y1: Loans  
Y2: Total deposits 
Y3: Other earning 
assets 
W1: Price of funds 
W2: Price of labour 
W3: Price of capital 
Average: 
0.81/Average: 0.63 
Cost and profit efficiency 
vary dramatically across 
countries; Foreign banks 
are more efficient than 
domestic banks 
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Kosak et al. 
(2009) 
5 new EU Member States 
and 3 Baltic States from 
1996-2006; Cost 
efficiency; SFA; 
Intermediation; TL; 3 
country-level EVs, 3 
structure of banking 
industry, 5 bank-specific 
Total cost Y1: Total loans 
Y2: Securities 
Y3: Other earning 
assets 
W1: Price of 
borrowed  
W2: Price of physical 
capital  
W3: Price of labour 
Average: overall, 0.88; 
CZ, 0.81; EE, 0.95; 
HU, 0.90; LT, 0.94; 
LV, 0.93; PL, 0.92; SI, 
0.91; SK, 0.77 
The level od competition is 
more important than 
ownership to improve cost 
efficiency. 
Lozano-Vivas 
et al. (2002) 
10 EU countries from 
1993; Cost efficiency; 
DEA; Value-added; 10 
Country-specific Evs 
  Y1: Loans  
Y2: Deposits  
Y3: Other earning 
assets 
X1: Personnel 
expenses  
X2: Non-interest 
expense 
Average without/with 
Evs: Belgium 
(0.42/0.79), Denmark 
(0,2/0.75), France 
(0.24/0.41), Germany 
(0.27/0.58), Italy 
(0.25/0.33), 
Luxembourg 
(0.49/0.62), 
Netherlands 
(0.37/0.52), Poland 
(0.16/0.8), Spain 
(0.19/0.82), UK 
(0.22/0.59) 
Country-specific Evs play 
an important role on the 
behaviour of banking 
industry 
Maggi and 
Rossi (2003) 
15 EU countries and US 
from 1995-1998; Cost 
efficiency; DFA; 
Production; TL, FF, 
Box-Cox; 
Country-specific Evs 
Total cost Y1: Deposits  
Y2: Loans  
Y3: Services 
W1: Price of labour 
W2: Price of capital 
W3: Price of deposits
EU: 0.64 (FF), 0.68 
(TL); US: 0.62 (FF), 
0.63 (TL) 
 
	
	
89
Maggi and 
Rossi (2003) 
Value-added  Y1: Deposits  
Y2: Loans  
Y3: Services 
W1: Price of labour 
W2: Price of capital 
  
Maudos et al. 
(2002) 
10 EU countries from 
1993-1996;Cost 
efficiency and Profit 
efficiency; SFA and 
DFA; Dual; TL 
Total 
cost/Operating 
profit 
Y1: Loans  
Y2: Other earning 
assets  
Y3: Deposits 
W1: Price of deposits 
W2: Price of labour 
W3: Price of physical 
capital 
Cost efficiency: 0.83 
(DFA), 0.84 (RE), 0.77 
(FE); Profit efficiency: 
0.45 (DFA), 0.52 (RE), 
0.22 (FE) 
Profit efficiency scores are 
lower than cost efficiency 
scores 
Maudos and 
Pastor (2001) 
US, Europe, Japan from 
1984-1995; Cost 
efficiency and Profit 
efficiency; SFA ; Dual; 
TL 
Total cost/Net 
income and 
profit before 
tax 
Y1: Loans  
Y2: Other earning 
assets  
Y3: Deposits 
W1: Price of deposits 
W2: Price of labour 
W3: Price of physical 
capital 
Cost efficiency: 0.85 
(EU), 0.97 (US), 0.95 
(Japan)/ Profit 
efficiency: Net income, 
0.7 (EU), 0.75 (US), 
0.5 (Japan); Profit 
before tax, 0.45 (EU), 
0.55 (US), 0.5 (Japan) 
 
Pasiouras 
(2008) 
95 countries from 2003; 
Technical and scale 
efficiency; DEA and 
Tobit regression; 
Intermediation; 
Regulatory variables, 5 
bank-specific and 12 
country-specific control 
variables  
  Y1: Loans 
Y2: Other earing 
assets  
Y3: Non-interest 
income 
X1: Customer 
deposits and short 
term funding  
X2: Equity  
X3: Total Cost 
The average bank in 
sample could improve 
its overall technical 
efficiency by 33.20% 
and pure technical 
efficiency by 29.20% 
while it deviates5.5% 
from its efficient size 
of scale 
Some of bank-specific and 
country-specific variables 
are significantly important 
to technical and scale 
efficiency 
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Pastor et al. 
(1997) 
8 EU countries from 
1992; Technical 
efficiency; DEA; 
Value-added  
  Y1: Loans  
Y2: Other 
productive assets 
Y3: Deposits  
X1: Non-interest 
expense, other than 
personnel expense 
X2: Personnel 
expense 
CRS: 0.95 (France), 
0.822 (Spain), 0.806 
(Belgium), 0.773 
(Italy), 0.650 
(Germany), 0.624 
(US), 0.608 (Austria), 
0.537 (UK); VRS: exist 
scale inefficiency 
(Austria, Germany, the 
US and Italy), smaller 
scale inefficiency 
(Belgium, Spain, the 
UK and France) 
The large banks are more 
efficient than the small 
ones 
Pastor and 
Serrano (2005)
7 EU countries from 
1993-1997; Cost 
efficiency and Profit 
efficiency; DFA; Dual; 
TL; 13 country-level EV 
Total 
cost/Operating 
profit 
Y1: Loans  
Y2: Other earning 
assets  
Y3: Deposits 
W1: Price of deposits 
W2: Price of labour 
W3: Price of physical 
capital 
Cost efficiency: 0.89, 
0.88 (risk adjusted); 
Profit efficiency: 0.52, 
0.57 (risk adjusted) 
 
Perera et al. 
(2007) 
4 South Asian countries 
from 1997-2004; Cost 
efficiency; SFA; 
Intermediation; TL; 8 
country-level EV 
Total cost Y1: Net total 
loans  
Y2: Other earning 
assets 
W1: Price of funds 
W2: Price of labour 
W3: Price of capital 
Sample mean: 0.89; 
Bangladesh, 0.89; 
India, 0.92; Pakistan, 
0.89; Sri Lanka, 0.87 
Overall efficiency declined 
from 1997-2004; Larger 
banks, banks with 
widespread ownership 
appear to be the most cost 
efficient while state-owned 
banks are less efficient. 
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Shen et al. 
(2009) 
10 Asian countries and 
regions from 1998-2005; 
Cost efficiency; SFA; 
Intermediation; TL; 8 
country-level EV 
Total cost Y1: Loans  
Y2: Other earning 
assets  
Y3: Non-interest 
income 
W1: Price of funds 
W2: Price of labour 
W3: Price of fixed 
assets 
  Joint-stock banks are more 
efficient than state-owned 
banks 
Vander Vennet 
(2002) 
17 EU countries from 
1995-1996; Cost and 
Profit efficiency; SFA; 
Intermediation; TL, FF; 
Equity capital 
Total 
cost/Profits 
Y1: Total loans 
Y2: Total 
securities  
Y3: Total 
non-interest 
income 
W1: Price of labour 
W2: Price of physical 
capital  
W3: Price of deposits
0.7 (traditional 
intermediation output), 
0.8 (mix of traditional 
and non-traditional 
output) 
Conglomerates are more 
revenue efficient than their 
specialized competitors 
and that the degree of both 
cost and profit efficiency is 
higher in universal banks 
than in separated banks; 
the current trend toward 
further de-specialization 
may lead to a more 
efficient banking system; 
operational efficiency has 
become the major 
determinant of bank 
profitability and that 
oligopolistic rents have 
become less prevalent in 
European banking. 
	
	
92
Weill (2003) Polish and Czech 
Republic from 1997; 
Cost efficiency; SFA; 
Intermediation; TL; 
Equity capital and 
country dummy 
Total cost Y1: Loans  
Y1: Investment 
assets 
W1: Price of labour 
W2: Price of physical 
capital  
W3: Price of 
borrowed funds 
0.7 (foreign owned), 
0.62 (domestic owned) 
On average foreign-owned 
banks are more efficient 
than domestic-owned 
banks, this advantage does 
not result from differences 
in the scale of operations 
or the structure of 
activities 
Weill (2004) 5 EU countries from 
1992-1998; Cost 
efficiency; DEA, SFA, 
DFA; Intermediation; 
FF; Equity capital 
Total cost Y1: Loans  
Y2: Investment 
assets 
W1: Price of labour 
W2: Price of physical 
capital  
W3: Price of 
borrowed funds 
France: 0.71, Germany: 
0.83, Italy: 0.84, Spain: 
0.78, Switzerland: 0.66
Lack of robustness 
between approaches, even 
if there are some 
similarities in particular 
between parametric 
approaches. Mixed 
empirical results of the 
effect of the bank size on 
efficiency 
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Yildirim and 
Philippatos 
(2007a) 
12 Transition Economies 
of CEE from 1993-2000; 
Cost efficiency and 
Profit efficiency; SFA 
and DFA; Modified 
version of Value-added; 
TL; Equity capital 
Total 
cost/ROE 
Y1: Loans  
Y2: Investments 
Y3: The produced 
deposits (sum of 
demand, savings 
and time deposits)
W1: Price of 
borrowed funds  
W2: Price of labour 
W3: Price of physical 
capital 
Cost efficiency: 0.72 
(DFA), 0.77 (SFA); 
Profit efficiency: 0.66 
(SFA), 0.51 (DFA)  
Higher efficiency levels 
are associated with large 
and well-capitalized banks; 
The degree of competition 
has a positive influence on 
cost efficiency and a 
negative one on profit 
efficiency, while market 
concentration is negatively 
linked to efficiency; 
foreign banks are found to 
be more cost efficient but 
less profit efficient relative 
to domestically owned 
private banks and 
state-owned banks. 
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Chapter3 Cost Efficiency Analysis of Banking System in 9 
Asian Countries and Regions 
  
3.1 Sample Data  
 
3.1.1 Summary of Observations in the Sample Data Set 
 
In this study, one main task is to measure and compare cost efficiency in 9 
Asian banking sectors by using panel data stochastic cost frontier functions 
with considering the impacts of exogenous environmental variables and with 
incorporating cross-country heterogeneities. These 9 Asian countries and 
regions are China, HK SAR, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Taiwan Province of China and Thailand.  
 
The data are annual unconsolidated data based on the generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP) from Bankscope database, which is well known 
database providing most detailed financial information for banks all over the 
world. Sample data used in this study are living commercial banks that only 
focus on retail banking business rather than wholesale banking business from 
these Asian banking industries. And I only consider positive value of deposits 
over loans margin. The reason of choosing the retail commercial banking data 
is that retail commercial banks are regarded as financial intermediaries that 
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collect the deposits from individuals and institutions and loan to customers. 
Therefore, the most income of banks is provided by the interest margin 
between loans and deposits. In order to maximize the revenues and profits, 
some bank managers may expand businesses such as off-balance sheet 
businesses and financial derivatives by providing loans and investments 
beyond the limits of deposits. These banks behave just like investment banks 
and use borrowings from the wholesale markets besides own deposits. In the 
booming financial markets and rapidly developed economic conditions, these 
banks would benefit from those financial services to obtain huge profits and 
perform more efficiently. However, default risks exist all the time, thus in the 
long run, these banks may have high risks to lose and even become bankrupt 
like the financial crisis which happened in 2008. In this case, the selected time 
period in this study is from 2005 to 2012, which covers the newest banking 
reform that is induced by the financial crisis in 2008 and strengthened by 
openness of the financial market. 
 
In case the missing variables or unreliable variables or false information 
provided by Bankscope, the data can be carefully collected from other data 
sources such as Statistical Yearbook of individual country, annual report of 
individual bank, the labour department of individual country and the countries’ 
statistical departments and well checked. Since all data are originally collected 
on their nominal value, these monetary values are converted to constant price 
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US dollars by first using purchasing power parity exchange rates (PPP) 
(shown in Table 3.1), then adjusted for US inflation for the cross-country 
comparison. The PPP exchange rate for the 9 Asian countries and regions is 
obtained from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook 
Database. And concretely there are two stages in these conversions. Firstly, 
use the PPP to convert to current US dollars; secondly, adjust data for US 
inflation by dividing by the US price index, i.e. GDP deflator or CPI. 
 
The sample data, i.e. 2078 observations with 286 banks will be filtered by the 
following principles that are proposed by Bikker and Bos (2008): 
(1) The deposits to assets ratio should be less than 98%; 
(2) The rate of loans to assets should be no more than 1; 
(3) The total income to assets ratio should be less than 20%; 
(4) Both personnel expenses to assets ratio and other expenses to assets ratio 
should be between0.05%and 5%; 
(5) The rate of equity to assets should be kept between 1% and 50%. 
 
The purpose of those financial ratio rules is to capture outliers, which suggest 
banks are in very extraordinary circumstances or the data of bank is obviously 
mistaken and abnormal. Besides, the whole data in the regressions are 
log-mean-corrected, which means the data are expressed by the deviations 
from the sample means after having been transformed to natural logarithms 
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and standardized residual test suggested by Duygun et al (2015) is operated 
after filtering the data. In this statistical criterion, we need to drop the 
observations with a standardized Ordinary Least Square (OLS) residual 
exceeding the absolute value 2 after estimating a simple pooled OLS translog 
model for the whole sample set, which is approximately equivalent to filter 
observations by an instrumental dummy variable at 5% level of significance. 
 
Therefore, after applying all above filtering rules, an unbalanced 
unconsolidated panel data set including 278 banks with 1881 observations will 
be used in the empirical estimations (shown in Table 3.2).
	 98
Table 3.1 PPP Exchange Rates for the Asian Countries (National Currency per Current International 
Dollar) 
Country 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
China 3.448 3.472 3.641 3.848 3.796 3.999 4.228 4.232 
Hong Kong 5.688 5.489 5.514 5.478 5.416 5.366 5.469 5.585 
India 14.669 15.145 15.603 16.630 17.504 18.826 19.992 21.250 
Indonesia  3934.250 4354.630 4719.630 5469.420 5876.740 6285.900 6665.450 6847.490 
Korea 788.920 764.296 760.023 767.161 787.401 806.100 802.716 796.472 
Malaysia  1.734 1.749 1.787 1.935 1.805 1.857 1.922 1.903 
Singapore 1.079 1.068 1.105 1.072 1.092 1.081 1.066 1.070 
Taiwan 19.342 18.560 17.989 17.122 17.114 16.577 15.763 15.702 
Thailand 15.932 16.243 16.330 16.603 16.780 17.166 17.518 17.432 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2013 
   
Table 3.2 Summary No. of Banks and Observations in 9 Asian Countries and Regions 
 
China 
HK 
SAR 
India Indonesia Korea Malaysia Singapore
Taiwan Province 
of China 
Thailand Total 
No. of 
Banks 
66 20 43 57 15 20 6 36 15 278 
No. of 
Obs. 
424 139 316 381 98 136 38 243 106 1881 
 
Total assets share of selected banks as sample in the whole banking system is summarized in Table 
3.3. It demonstrates that the majority of total assets are over 80% during the period from 2005 to 
2012 despite that the figure is relatively small for HK SAR, India, Korea and Singapore at some 
specific year. For HK SAR and Korea, the figures are 50.47% and 73.21% respectively in 2005; for 
Korea in 2011, the number of total assets share is 59.85%; for Singapore, the sampling banks’ total 
assets only occupies 61.94% of the total assets of the whole Singapore banking industry.  
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These relatively small percentages can be mainly explained by three reasons. 
Firstly, it is caused by lack of sufficient bank information of the top 3 largest 
total assets banks. For example, in 2005, only 18 out of 20 commercial banks 
in HK SAR are selected (HSBC with largest total assets is not included) and 
only 11 out of 15 banks in Korean banking sector (KB KooKmin bank with the 
largest total assets is not included). This reason stands for Korean banking 
sample in 2011 as well. It can be noticed that 10 out of 15 banks have been 
chosen, the banks (KB KooKmin Bank and Woori Bank) with top 2 largest total 
assets are not included. And it also found that the data of DBS BANK Ltd., 
which ranked No. 1 by the total assets in Singapore in 2011, is missing. 
Secondly, in the sampling data, the differences of the total assets shares of 
commercial banks are 10% or so, for example, the share is 95.71% in China 
then it changes to 85.32% in 2008; the sampling share is 100% in Thailand 
and the number is changed to 90.08% in 2008. This relatively large gap may 
be partly explained by the impact of the global financial crisis in 2008. Some 
banks were forced out of market or were merged by other larger and healthy 
banks. The last but not least, in the post crisis period, some banks had less 
deposits to loan and had less efficient and less competitive financial 
businesses, then it resulted that the values of non-interest income of some 
banks are negative. Thus the banks with negative values are deleted from 
sample. Since in this study only living retail commercial banks are considered, 
it is reasonable to cause this considerable gap in total assets shares. The total 
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assets shares are around 75%-95% for the majority of the sample period 
indicates that the selected banks are good representation of the whole banking 
industry in these nine Asian countries and regions given the market share, 
regulatory control, information availability and information credibility due to 
publication requirements. Thence, this sample represents majority in the 
banking system and the empirical findings will present significantly.    
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Table 3.3 Total Assets Share of Selected Banks as Sample in the Banking Sector (2005-2012) 
 
 
China 
HK 
SAR 
India Indonesia Korea Malaysia Singapore 
Taiwan 
Province 
of China 
Thailand
2005 95.71 50.47 92.12 97.78 73.21 99.06 98.23 95.33 100.00 
2006 94.88 99.96 96.39 95.96 99.02 99.79 98.72 97.19 92.11 
2007 81.06 98.24 88.58 98.35 100.00 98.92 98.16 92.95 88.51 
2008 85.32 93.75 91.33 97.97 93.37 95.40 97.87 93.27 90.08 
2009 93.99 92.19 92.93 99.39 98.59 99.04 99.01 91.81 91.11 
2010 93.13 81.45 93.27 98.11 74.29 98.51 97.81 94.31 89.41 
2011 93.69 98.95 94.69 98.80 59.85 98.44 99.11 92.89 89.04 
2012 93.95 96.67 96.68 99.37 93.62 98.39 61.94 91.63 90.10 
No. of 
Banks 
66 20 43 57 15 20 6 38  15 
Source: Bankscope Database, April 2013 and author’s own calculation. 
 
Table 3.4 Total Assets Share of Top 10 Commercial Banks (ranked in the sample) 
 
China 
HK 
SAR 
India Indonesia Korea Malaysia Singapore 
Taiwan 
Province of 
China 
Thailand
 
2005 90.2 44.3 66.0 79.7 73.0 87.8 98.2 66.3 98.2 
2006 86.4 91.3 65.4 75.4 95.2 88.4 89.3 65.0 87.2 
2007 72.4 91.1 62.5 76.3 95.1 88.0 89.2 63.0 85.5 
2008 85.3 88.2 64.2 76.4 91.5 88.1 96.4 64.1 85.8 
2009 82.3 89.0 63.1 76.2 95.1 89.2 92.1 63.7 86.5 
2010 79.9 77.1 62.9 75.1 74.3 89.0 92.6 61.9 85.1 
2011 78.2 92.3 63.7 74.1 59.9 89.8 92.9 58.4 84.1 
2012 77.2 90.2 63.6 73.7 92.1 90.5 60.5 57.8 84.8 
Source: Bankscope Database, April 2013 and author’s calculation. 
Note: 1. Top 10 commercial banks are ranked by the total assets of selected commercial in the sample; 2. Since the least 
number of observations of commercial banks in Singapore is 3 in the sample in 2005, total assets shares for Top 10 
commercial banks in Singapore are actually calculated as Top 3 banks. 
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Table 3.5 Total Assets Share of Top 10 Commercial Banks (ranked in the sample) 
 
China 
HK 
SAR 
India Indonesia Korea Malaysia Singapore 
Taiwan 
Province of 
China 
Thailand
 
2005 91.0 90.8 66.0 79.7 97.0 87.8 98.2 66.3 98.2 
2006 86.4 91.3 65.4 75.4 95.2 88.4 89.3 65.0 87.2 
2007 83.7 91.4 65.0 76.3 95.1 88.0 89.2 63.0 85.5 
2008 85.3 91.9 65.2 76.4 95.2 88.3 96.4 64.1. 85.8 
2009 82.3 91.7 64.5 76.2 95.1 89.2 92.1 63.7 86.5 
2010 79.9 92.2 64.3 75.1 94.8 89.0 92.6 61.9 85.1 
2011 78.2 92.3 63.7 74.1 94.5 89.8 92.9 58.4 84.1 
2012 77.2 92.1 63.6 73.7 94.1 90.5 93.1 57.8 84.8 
Source: Bankscope Database, April 2013 and author’s calculation. 
Note: 1. Top 10 commercial banks are ranked by the total assets in the banking system; 2. Since there are only six Singaporean 
commercial banks in the sample and the smallest number of observations is reduced to 3 in 2005 and 4 in 2008, total assets 
shares for Top 10 commercial banks in Singapore are actually calculated as Top 3 banks. 
 
The structure of banking system particularly banking concentration and market power is 
significantly important in considering cross-country heterogeneities, which are regarded as 
environmental variables when measuring the efficiency score and competition conditions of 
banks. As shown in Table 3.4 and Table 3.5, Top 10 commercial banks in individual country and 
region in the sample period, ranked by their total assets shares, takes up the majority of the total 
assets in the banking system. In table 3.5, Top 10 living commercial banks has a market share of 
over 70% in China, HK SAR, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, which 
indicates the dominance of large commercial banks in the banking industries. In contrast, Top 10 
commercial banks in India and Taiwan Province of China have a relatively low market share, 
around 55%-65%, suggesting the relative competitive financial market in these countries. These 
percentages are consistent with the descriptive data of bank concentration (Z5) collected from 
IMF database on Financial Development and Structure (see Table 8), where the bank 
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concentration ratio of top 3 commercial banks for India and Taiwan Province of China is 38.3% 
and 26.2% respectively. In fact, as reasons mentioned before (missing data and negative value 
of non-interest income of some top 3 commercial banks in HK SAR, Korea and Singapore), the 
market shares of top 10 commercial banks in the sample shown in Table 3.4 have slice 
difference from the ratios presented in Table 3.5. For instance, the market shares of top 10 
commercial banks in HK SAR are only 44.3% in 2005 and 77.1% in 2010; the ratios in Korean 
banking system are 73% in 2005, 74.3% in 2010 and 59.9% in 2011; the total assets share in 
Singaporean banking sector decreases to 60.5%.
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In conclusion, even though the sample set does not include all the commercial 
banks in individual country and region, it does constitute the majority of the 
banking system and does stand for the point of view of the top tier. Hence, the 
measurement of banking performance and cost efficiency by using this data 
set will reflect the real conditions of the banking businesses in these 9 Asian 
countries and regions and demonstrate actual situation of how the banking 
system is running.  
 
3.1.2 Dependent and Independent Variables (Outputs and Inputs) 
 
In this section, the definitions and measurements of dependent and 
independent variables will be discussed. The descriptive summary of total 
costs, outputs and inputs prices will be listed in Table 3.6 and Table 3.7. 
 
It is common accepted that total costs can be defined as the sum of interest 
expenses, the personnel expenses and other operating expenses.  
 
As discussed before, the key of debate is the role of deposits that whether it 
should be considered as inputs or outputs. In production approach, banks are 
seen as product units that provide financial services to the customers. In this 
case, the deposits’ accounts should be regarded as one of outputs of banks. 
Conversely, the deposits should be considered as one of inputs in the 
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intermediation theory. In the view of intermediation approach, banks are 
considered as financial intermediaries collecting funds from individuals or 
institutions and loaning these funds to customers to gain the interest margin as 
income. As we all know, neither of the two approaches fully explained the dual 
role of the financial institutions. In this circumstance，Berger and Humphrey 
(1997) proposed that deposits should be regarded as both inputs and outputs. 
Thus a new approach- dual approach should be adopted. Nevertheless, dual 
approach is well explained in theory and used in empirical studies. There are 
rare statistical tests to check the properties of the production function, or its 
dual cost function and production function. And these specific properties 
should be satisfied when applying the dual approach. In this case, I could 
discuss this issue and run statistic tests to compare inputs and outputs 
specifications for each approach. In this part, intermediation approach is 
applied firstly. The deposits are regards as inputs instead of outputs. Thence, 
outputs contain three variables as following. 
1) Total loans (Y1), which contain short-term loans, trade bills and bills 
discounted, medium and long-term loans and other loans, but exclude the loan 
loss reserves; 
2) Other earning assets (Y2), including short-term and long-term investments, 
deposits with central bank and other banks; 
3) Non-interest income (Y3), derived from net fee and commission and other 
operating income. 
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Inputs also include three variables that are defined as  
1) Deposits (I1), which include short-term deposits from customers and 
company, long-term deposits, and other short-term and long-term 
borrowing and funding; 
2) Labour (I2), the registered full time employees in individual bank; 
3) Fixed assets (I3), providing the essential materials for bank operating. 
 
The definition and calculation of the input prices are shown as follows. 
1) Price of funds (W1): the ratio of interest expense to total deposits; 
2) Price of labour (W2): the ratio of personnel expense (total remuneration, 
that is, salaries, wages and other benefits paid to employees) to the number of 
employees. Not all the banks publish their employee expense figures in their 
financial statements so that it is very hard to collect the data of the number of 
employees and the personnel expenses from Bankscope. To obtain detailed 
data, we check the central bank website, the statistic department yearbook, 
annual report of individual bank and other possible sources. However, some 
data are still not available. The ways to solve this problem rely on some 
acceptable and practical assumptions. When the information for number of 
employees is not collectable, we assume that the growth rate of the number of 
employees is the same as the growth rate of total assets for a given bank 
(Altunbas et al., 2001, Vander Vannet, 2002, and Fu and Heffernan, 2007). In 
the case that the data of personnel expenses is not available, we assume that 
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the growth rate in the average wage rate in the finance sector of individual 
country or region proxies the growth rate in the unit price of labour. Otherwise, 
if both of data are not available, these banks should be excluded. 
3）Price of fixed assets (W3): the ratio of other operating expenses to the fix 
assets. The operating expenses contain depreciations and other capital 
expenses. 
 
It is common known that total costs are defined as the sum of interest 
expenses, the personnel expenses and other operating expenses.  
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Table 3.6 Description of Banking Costs, Outputs and Inputs Prices for 9 Asian Banking Sectors at Sample Mean Values for the Period 
2005-2012 (mil. US $) 
 
China HK SAR India Indonesia Korea Malaysia Singapore 
Taiwan Province 
of China 
Thailand 
 
Total Costs 6706.512 2001.113 5165.380 590.284 4448.030 1391.349 2927.869 1085.341 1587.544 
Total Assets 255661.900 87208.540 75768.000 8168.550 111744.700 41526.510 131339.700 52696.650 40788.390 
Equity Capital 14820.200 6500.523 4770.781 859.671 7853.199 3091.810 13267.960 3280.545 3859.889 
Output  
Y1: Loans 127642.600 36151.730 45323.850 4572.952 77759.320 24810.760 65401.140 32204.550 27122.640 
Y2:Other Earning Assets 119959.900 39132.770 23236.400 2646.019 23503.910 9131.109 49862.450 16925.440 10273.050 
Y3: Non-interest Income 1287.030 913.674 1037.434 125.580 454.196 400.556 1212.079 334.581 527.213 
Y4: Deposits 233166.700 69675.340 66370.190 6959.378 94472.720 36710.730 100621.700 47265.440 34561.940 
Input Prices 
W1: Price of Funds 0.019 0.020 0.057 0.052 0.030 0.024 0.016 0.013 0.022 
W2: Price of Labour 0.046 0.066 0.030 0.031 0.118 0.055 0.074 0.071 0.087 
W3: Price of Fixed Assets 0.878 1.230 1.148 2.057 0.752 2.541 4.092 0.449 1.546 
Number of Banks 66 20 43 57 15 20 6 36 15 
Number of Observations 424 139 316 381 98 136 38 243 106 
Total Observations 1881 
Source: Bankscope Database, April 2013, the Annual Report of individual bank, the Statistical Yearbook of individual country or region, the Labour Statistical Yearbook of 
individual country or region and author’s calculation. 
 
 
	 109
Table 3.7 Summary Statistics on Total Costs, Total Assets, Equity Capital, Outputs and Inputs Prices for Period 2005-2012 (mil. US $) 
 TC TA E Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 W1 W2 W3 
China Mean  6706.512 255661.900 14820.200 127642.600 119959.900 1287.030 233166.700 0.019 0.046 0.878 
Median 722.111 24801.326 1473.116 10831.962 12733.046 91.000 22522.954 0.018 0.044 0.691 
Min 27.275 1235.138 60.148 694.758 396.815 0.174 1155.818 0.005 0.002 0.174 
Max 108337.700 4145136.000 266649.100 2028187.000 1984019.000 26152.650 3695370.000 0.068 0.217 5.903 
Std.Dev. 16153.910 638900.900 39516.830 317578.200 304133.400 3981.932 579038.200 0.008 0.028 0.636 
HK SAR Mean  2001.113 87208.540 6500.523 36151.730 39132.770 913.674 69675.340 0.020 0.066 1.230 
Median 661.744 22388.629 2422.969 11086.466 10119.199 171.340 19643.262 0.018 0.065 0.424 
Min 28.065 812.131 65.735 159.652 286.583 3.446 670.716 0.003 0.005 0.079 
Max 25038.990 1086003.000 84705.100 420598.600 474450.700 12837.310 792125.700 0.054 0.115 15.292 
Std.Dev. 4151.633 188971.500 12802.920 68042.780 87154.600 2348.353 141685.100 0.012 0.021 2.056 
India Mean  5165.380 75768.000 4770.781 45323.850 23236.400 1037.434 66370.190 0.057 0.030 1.148 
Median 2509.055 37664.711 2158.731 22932.740 11408.903 333.421 33959.754 0.056 0.028 0.915 
Min 43.370 666.998 36.942 334.610 228.018 3.064 578.970 0.030 0.015 0.180 
Max 75123.630 1003839.000 60840.880 655344.900 257501.000 19162.230 861706.200 0.110 0.066 7.826 
Std.Dev. 9289.381 129393.300 8244.788 78467.170 38307.620 2549.031 110197.800 0.010 0.009 0.874 
Indonesia Mean  590.284 8168.550 859.671 4572.952 2646.019 125.580 6959.378 0.052 0.031 2.057 
Median 163.519 2265.597 233.790 1445.639 550.009 20.713 1939.919 0.052 0.023 1.452 
Min 4.547 95.898 16.122 33.941 6.705 0.001 75.322 0.008 0.008 0.141 
Max 5230.731 92825.060 11063.270 54676.780 30879.160 2082.140 75287.080 0.125 0.356 16.000 
Std.Dev. 1012.116 15312.130 1609.124 8196.545 5667.029 279.400 13057.240 0.018 0.035 2.065 
Korea Mean  4448.030 111744.700 7853.199 77759.320 23503.910 454.196 94472.720 0.030 0.118 0.752 
Median 3282.731 78864.833 6150.324 46377.985 20205.037 212.315 64193.198 0.030 0.111 0.678 
Min 128.784 2600.010 151.473 1732.495 505.248 3.239 2290.093 0.014 0.067 0.315 
Max 18065.310 347332.600 26517.870 257209.000 69316.610 3071.845 291336.400 0.049 0.225 2.407 
Std.Dev. 4148.087 101356.500 7543.595 74030.750 19952.210 561.435 86590.260 0.008 0.034 0.374 
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 TC TA E Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 W1 W2 W3 
Malaysia Mean  1391.349 41526.510 3091.810 24810.760 9131.109 400.556 36710.730 0.024 0.055 2.541 
Median 878.287 24255.798 1812.358 14673.609 5031.846 275.244 21534.464 0.024 0.047 1.511 
Min 16.551 506.690 184.083 21.898 21.648 4.152 303.460 0.008 0.019 0.462 
Max 8361.587 260068.800 23024.070 163859.500 59806.310 2747.872 217031.300 0.094 0.220 14.417 
Std.Dev. 1515.441 47363.780 3738.890 29522.140 11190.280 473.495 41118.750 0.009 0.032 2.558 
Singapore Mean  2927.869 131339.700 13267.960 65401.140 49862.450 1212.079 100621.700 0.016 0.074 4.092 
Median 3300.526 154528.287 15640.317 68259.665 53797.472 1309.004 103116.634 0.011 0.075 1.107 
Min 133.395 5182.099 812.260 3160.430 642.697 7.216 4183.976 0.005 0.040 0.402 
Max 6876.923 329990.700 32896.260 195696.300 119398.400 2926.168 269995.300 0.037 0.125 36.000 
Std.Dev. 2147.267 103128.600 10125.390 56164.520 38450.960 877.077 79951.650 0.009 0.023 7.530 
Taiwan  Mean  1085.341 52696.650 3280.545 32204.550 16925.440 334.581 47265.440 0.013 0.071 0.449 
Province of Median 795.681 35277.098 2080.505 18294.145 10754.299 229.652 31724.557 0.012 0.066 0.341 
China Min 40.211 2149.834 52.159 27.461 291.633 2.278 685.053 0.002 0.032 0.058 
Max 4738.232 258225.800 15400.780 138653.300 104878.500 1771.494 224691.000 0.033 0.343 5.427 
Std.Dev. 906.619 48732.970 3113.454 29813.130 17727.960 338.916 43196.220 0.006 0.029 0.523 
Thailand Mean  1587.544 40788.390 3859.889 27122.640 10273.050 527.213 34561.940 0.022 0.087 1.546 
Median 1323.622 24770.792 2131.620 16389.687 8471.376 327.228 21528.981 0.022 0.045 0.808 
Min 8.662 676.714 254.425 479.381 72.312 0.439 406.390 0.006 0.020 0.150 
Max 4801.342 138867.600 15608.990 87012.560 44707.890 2289.927 118775.800 0.049 0.920 9.733 
Std.Dev. 1323.708 37439.010 3667.047 25118.830 10236.020 558.373 32029.190 0.009 0.148 1.523 
Source: Bankscope Database, April 2013, the Annual Report of individual bank, the Statistical Yearbook of individual country or region, the Labour Statistical Yearbook of 
individual country or region and author’s calculation. 
Notes: TC=Total Costs; TA=Total Assets; E=Equity Capital; Y1=Total Loans; Y2=Other Earning Assets; Y3=Non-interest income; Y4= Deposits; W1= Price of Funds; 
W2= Price of Labour; W3= Price of Fixed Assets
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3.1.3 Environmental Variables 
 
As elaborated by Berger and Humphrey (1997), “cross-country comparisons 
are difficult to interpret because the regulatory and economic environments 
faced by financial institutions are likely to differ importantly across nations… 
Such cross-country differences were not specified when a ‘common’ frontier 
was being estimated and this may affect the cross-country results.” Previous 
researches studied the cost efficiency on a common assumption that banks of 
those countries in comparison provide banking services under the same 
production process and conditions. Thus, they may get overestimated 
inefficiency. And the observed inefficiency would be attributed to poor 
managerial level and poor performance. However, it is common known that the 
differences between countries may not only be geographical, but also be 
caused by the conditions of macroeconomic power and financial regulatory 
requirements. In this case, different levels of managerial abilities between 
banks may not be the only reason for observed differences in the banking 
performance. Therefore, in the process of setting up the common frontier, 
cross-countries heterogeneities factors cannot be excluded. The empirical 
results of recent studies show that efficiency scores are higher when 
environmental variables are considered, which suggests that cross-country 
differences may explain part of the efficiency scores may be underestimated 
by neglecting these factors. 
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In the existing literature two categories of environmental variables are 
commonly used. 
1) Variables that indicate the main macroeconomic conditions and that can 
determine the banking product demand characteristic; 
2) Variables that demonstrate the structure of the banking system. 
 
The first part of environmental variables, that is, macroeconomic indicators 
consist of Population Density, GDP per Capita, Inflation and unemployment 
rate. These variables suggest the main macro circumstance in which banks 
are offering their financial services.  
 
1) Density of Population (Z1): population per square kilometers. Banks may 
cost inefficiently when providing products and services in the area with a 
low population density. (Data Source: IMF) 
2) GDP per capita (Z2): i.e. per capita income, the ratio of GDP over 
inhabitants. Generally, a country with high per capita income indicates that 
it has a relatively well-developed, open and more competitive financial 
market. In this way, banks in countries with higher per capita income have 
to offer a more competitive interest rate to attract borrowers and lenders. 
And higher costs may incur when banks are running in an emerging and 
blooming condition and relative higher labour expenses incur when banks 
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expanding their services. However, the relationship between costs and 
GDP per capita may become negative when financial markets are mature 
and stable, that is, the banks’ cost might be saved due to the technological 
improvement and a large number of reliable customers. 
3) Countries with high per capita income may have a banking system that 
operates in a mature environment, which can set a more competitive 
interest rate and profit margin. Thus the expectation for GDP per capita 
can be either positive, suggesting that the more developed economy is, 
the higher costs banks incurs as if banks are operating in a powerful and 
booming condition, they offer competitive interest rates and at the 
meanwhile the labour expenses may also be higher than before; or 
negative since the more developed economy, the higher possibility that 
their banking system may experience technological improvement and that 
individual customer may use a wide range of banking services, which may 
save banks’ cost to search new customers and expand their services. 
(Data Source: IMF) 
4) Inflation (Z3): average CPI (Consumer Price Index) as a proxy of inflation, 
an important indicator of macro economic condition. The increase of 
inflation may lead to the depreciation of the national currency and the 
increase in the prices of products. For the banking industry, banks have to 
increase interest rates or find other funding sources since the depositors 
may reduce their savings to maintain their living standards and the 
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loaners may increase due to the decrease in the cost of borrowings. As 
the cost of funding from depositors is much cheaper than other funding 
sources, the cost of banks is expected to be higher in pace with the 
increase of inflation. According to the previous literature studies, the 
actual rate of inflation may be a substitute of expected rate of inflation in 
the analysis of the relationship between cost of banks and inflation. (Data 
Source: IMF) 
5) Unemployment rate (Z4): To some extent, higher unemployment rate 
implies the depression of the whole economy, which significantly 
influences the banking industry. Higher unemployment rate normally 
indicates higher costs of banks running due to the precautionary savings 
demand. (Data Source: IMF, China Statistics Year Book and CIA- The 
World Fact Book) 
 
The second part of environmental variables includes four variables: Bank 
Concentration, Net Interest Margin, Capital Ratio and Intermediation Ratio. 
And these variables reflect the structure of banking system.  
 
1) Bank concentration (Z5): the total assets of three largest banks as a share 
of the total assets of the whole banking industry. There is an ambiguous 
relationship between bank concentration and banks’ cost. As argued by 
Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas (2000), bank concentration as an indicator of 
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the market power, it is positively related to the cost of banks. While, the 
cost may be greatly diminished due to the superior management. And 
higher production efficiency may result in higher concentration. Thus the 
relationship between bank concentration and banks’ cost is negative. 
(Data Source: World Bank, database on the Financial Development and 
Structure) 
2) Net interest margin (Z6): the ratio of the accounting value of bank’s net 
interest revenue to the total earning assets. Net interest margin reflects 
the difference between different banking sectors with respect to their 
ability to convert deposits to loans. And as we expect, a banking industry 
with relatively high net interest margin, which might have correspondingly 
more net interest revenue and lower cost. (Data Source: World Bank, 
database on the Financial Development and    Structure) 
3) Intermediation ratio (Z7): the ratio of loans to deposits, which reflects the 
ability of banks converting their deposits to loans. Generally, the cost of 
banks is expected to be negatively associated with the intermediation ratio. 
That is, the lower intermediation ratio, the higher the cost of individual 
bank. (Data Source: individual country’s central bank website) 
 
The mean values of these two categories of environmental variables for these 
9 Asian countries and regions in the sample period from 2005 to 2012 are 
listed below (Table 3.8). The values in this table suggest that there are very 
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large differences in the conditions of macroeconomic and bank structure 
across countries. We can infer that it would expect biased cost efficiency 
scores if they are measured without incorporating these variables. 
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Table 3.8 Summary Statistics of Environmental Variables in the 9 Asian Countries 
 
China HK SAR India Indonesia Korea Malaysia Singapore 
Taiwan 
Province of 
China 
Thailand 
Macro Indicators 
Z1 138.897 6335.249 355.141 122.653 489.129 84.329 6625.141 637.343 123.720 
Z2 0.002 0.044 0.002 0.002 0.026 0.012 0.049 0.034 0.004 
Z3 242.107 98.461 156.770 112.175 95.352 96.531 101.166 97.451 93.750 
Z4 0.041 0.043 0.039 0.082 0.035 0.033 0.024 0.045 0.009 
Bank Structure 
Z5 0.497 0.703 0.382 0.440 0.515 0.521 0.925 0.262 0.456 
Z6 0.025 0.016 0.027 0.057 0.022 0.026 0.020 0.025 0.030 
Z7 0.672 0.708 0.745 0.724 0.853 0.778 0.792 0.799 0.890 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2013; World Bank (Database on Financial Development and 
Structure). 
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3.2 Methodology 
 
3.2.1 Panel Data Stochastic Frontier Approach 
 
Stochastic frontier approach has been widely applied in the efficiency studies 
since first proposed by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen and van den Broeck 
(1977). These models allow for technical inefficiency and notice the fact that 
random noise outside the control of producers can influence the outputs of the 
producer. The idiosyncratic errors should be separated from the technical 
inefficiency by a way that forming a specific composed error term. Therefore, 
the outside random noises cannot be seen as inefficiency. And the technical 
inefficiency cannot be overestimated by including some random errors.  
 
While cross-sectional stochastic frontier models have been widely used in the 
cross-country studies, panel data stochastic frontier is adopted and developed 
by overcoming the limitations of cross-sectional models as discussed in the 
previous chapter. Since this study is to measure and compare cost efficiency 
in Asian banking systems, it is very important to know how panel data 
stochastic frontier approached are modeled with cost function. 
 
The classical panel data cost frontier model can be written as follows 
ln ܥ௜௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ∑ ߚ௝ ln ݕ௝௜௧௝ ൅ ∑ ߜ௠ lnݓ௠௜௧௠ ൅ ߭௜௧ ൅ ߤ௜௧                   [3.1] 
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where ܥ௜௧  represents total costs for the i-th firm (i=1,2,3…N) at time t 
(t=1,2,3…T), ݕ௝௜௧	and ݓ௠௜௧ stands for the j-th (j=1,2,3…J) output and the input 
price of the m-th (m=1,2,3…M) input for the i-th firm at time t, respectively. And 
ߤ௜௧ ൒ 0 means cost inefficiency while ߭௜௧~݅݅݀ሺ0, ߪజଶሻ stands for the random 
errors that are out of the control of firms. 
 
If cost efficiency is time-invariant, the fixed-effects (FE) and random-effects 
(RE) models can be applied and the formula [3.1] is modified as  
ln ܥ௜௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ∑ ߚ௝ ln ݕ௝௜௧௝ ൅ ∑ ߜ௠ lnݓ௠௜௧௠ ൅ ߭௜௧ ൅ ߤ௜                    [3.2] 
 
In Fixed-effects models, it assumes that ߭௜௧  is uncorrelated with the 
regressors. And no distributional assumption is made on cost inefficiency ߤ௜ 
and ߤ௜  could be correlated with the regressors or ߭௜௧ . Due to ߤ௜  can be 
considered as fixed value, which becomes the specific intercept to be 
estimated with ߚ௝ and ߜ௠ by using the least squares with dummy variables 
(LSDV). The model [3.2] is modified as 
ln ܥ௜௧ ൌ ߙ଴௜ ൅ ∑ ߚ௝ ln ݕ௝௜௧௝ ൅ ∑ ߜ௠ lnݓ௠௜௧௠ ൅ ߭௜௧                        [3.3] 
where ߙ଴௜=ߙ଴ ൅ ߤ௜. By adopting the transformation ߙො଴= min(ߙො଴௜) and ̂ߤ௜ =ߙො଴௜ 
−ߙො଴, cost efficiency can be obtained from CEi = exp(−̂ߤ௜). However, FE model 
have a potential problem that cost inefficiency ߤ௜ may be overestimated by 
capturing all the time-invariant effects that vary across firms, including 
time-invariant inefficiency and other time-invariant factors. For example, the 
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factors are caused by the policies and regulation. 
 
Schmidt and Sickles (1984) proposed that this defect of FE model could be 
overcame by RE model. RE model assumes that random errors ߭௜௧ could be 
correlated with some time-invariant regressors and cost inefficiency ߤ௜  is 
randomly distributed with constant mean and variance and not correlated with 
any regressors. In this case, RE model can be written as  
ln ܥ௜௧ ൌ ሾߙ଴ ൅ ܧሺߤ௜ሻሿ ൅෍ߚ௝ ln ݕ௝௜௧
௝
൅෍ߜ௠ lnݓ௠௜௧
௠
൅ ߭௜௧ ൅ ሾߤ௜ െ ܧሺߤ௜ሻሿ 
         =ߙ଴∗ ൅ ܧሺߤ௜ሻሿ ൅ ∑ ߚ௝ ln ݕ௝௜௧௝ ൅ ∑ ߜ௠ lnݓ௠௜௧௠ ൅ ߭௜௧ ൅ ߤ௜∗         [3.4] 
where ߙ଴∗= ߙ଴ ൅ ܧሺߤ௜ሻ  and ߤ௜∗= 	ߤ௜ െ ܧሺߤ௜ሻ . ܧሺߤ௜ሻ  represents the mean of 
cost inefficiency. Cost efficiency can be estimated by using generalized least 
squares (GLS). 
 
Based on this model, Pitt and Lee (1981) modified it by adding further 
distributional assumptions, that is, letting ߭௜௧~݅݅݀ሺ0, ߪజଶሻ and ߤ௜௧~݅݅݀൫0, ߪఓଶ൯. 
Then the cost efficiency can be estimated by maximum likelihood estimation 
(MLE) that is consistent and asymptotically efficient. 
 
However, in a long run, it is not reasonable to assume cost inefficiency to be 
time-invariant. Especially, when banks are in a competitive and open 
regulatory environment. The longer the time period, the more compulsory it is 
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to ease the time-variant assumption. In the existing studies, huge number of 
researchers trended to use Battese and Coelli (1992,1995) RE models by 
either of two ways. The first is by introducing additional term ߤ௜௧ ൌ exp(−ߟሺݐ െ
ܶሻ)*	ߤ௜  into Pitt and Lee (1984) RE model. Thus cost inefficiency	ߤ௜௧  will 
decrease in an increasing rate if ߟ>0 and 	ߤ௜௧ will increase in a decreasing 
rate if	ߟ<0. This is the Battese and Coelli (1992) model. Alternatively the 
second way is by making the distribution mean of the inefficiency component 
depending on additional variables which may include time; this is the Battese 
and Coelli (1995) model. 
 
However, as raised by Greene (2004, 2005), there is a very notable limitation 
in above panel data models. That is, these models do not include the 
time-invariant heterogeneities. If these time-invariant heterogeneities do exist, 
they will be calculated into the intercept ߙ଴ and then into cost inefficiency term 
ߤ௜ , finally the cost inefficiency score will be overestimated. To relax this 
limitation, Greene introduced two models, which are called ‘true’ fixed-effects 
model and ‘true’ random-effects model. 
 
In Greene’s ‘true’ FE model, firm specific constant term are added in the 
stochastic frontier models, and this ‘true’ FE model is written as 
ln ܥ௜௧ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ∑ ߚ௝ ln ݕ௝௜௧௝ ൅ ∑ ߜ௠ lnݓ௠௜௧௠ ൅ ߭௜௧ ൅ ߤ௜௧                     [3.5]               
where ߙ௜  contains all the time-variant firm specific heterogeneities. It 
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assumes that the regressors, random errors and cost inefficiency term are 
mutually uncorrelated. And the most importantly, ߤ௜௧ is not restricted to be 
time-invariant. Then the MLE can used to estimate cost inefficiency. The ‘true’ 
FE model introduces the random constant term to incorporate the 
time-invariant firm specific heterogeneities in the cost function. Finally, the 
model can be written as 
ln ܥ௜௧ ൌ ሺߙ ൅ ݓ௜ሻ ൅ ∑ ߚ௝ ln ݕ௝௜௧௝ ൅ ∑ ߜ௠ lnݓ௠௜௧௠ ൅ ߭௜௧ ൅ ߤ௜௧               [3.6]                
Since the cost inefficiency could be time-invariant to some reasonable extent 
in the financial systems, especially in the condition of the performance of 
banks are weekly related to the incentives, these ‘true’ FE and RE models may 
overcompensate for the time-invariant firm specific heterogeneities. Besides, if 
there is persistent inefficiency, it is completely subsumed into the firm specific 
constant term that also captures all the time-variant heterogeneities. Therefore, 
the classical panel data stochastic frontier models might overestimate the 
inefficiency, while ‘true’ FE and RE models might underestimate the 
inefficiency. That is, the cost efficiency score might be underestimated in the 
classical panel data SFA models and it might be overestimated in Greene’s 
models. 
 
To compare cost efficiency of banking industries in 9 Asian countries and 
regions, one should measure time-variant effects of both time-invariant 
heterogeneities and time-variant inefficiency based on the information of 
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cross-country heterogeneities factors, which are from geographic, economic, 
bank structure and regulatory aspects. It is obvious that the classical FE model 
does not incorporate cross-country heterogeneities while the classical RE 
model can be applied for this cross-country comparison. Thus I can compare 
cost efficiency scores estimated from different models, the classical ones and 
Greene’s ‘true’ SFA models on the first step. Then introducing environmental 
variables as new terms, the performance and cost efficiency of banking sector 
can be explained by a different perspective with cross-country heterogeneities.  
 
3.2.2 Model Specification  
 
The translog cost functional form will be used in these models for comparisons. 
The function can be written as  
ln ܥ௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ∑ ߚ௝ ln ݕ௝௜௧ଷ௝ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ߜ௠ lnݓ௠௜௧ଷ௠ୀଵ ൅ ∅௜ 	ln ܧ௜௧ ൅
ଵ
ଶ∑ ∑ ߚ௝௞ ln ݕ௝௜௧ଷ௞ୀଵ ln ݕ௞௜௧ଷ௝ୀଵ ൅
ଵ
ଶ∑ ∑ ߜ௠௡ lnݓ௠௜௧ଷ௡ୀଵଷ௠ୀଵ lnݓ௡௜௧ ൅
ଵ
ଶ∑ ∑ ߜߛ௝௠ ln ݕ௝௜௧ଷ௠ୀଵଷ௝ୀଵ lnݓ௠௜௧ ൅ ߠଵݐ ൅
ଵ
ଶ ߠଶݐଶ ൅ ∑ ߦ௝ ln ݕ௝௜௧ଷ௝ୀଵ ݐ ൅
∑ ߞ௠ lnݓ௜௧ଷ௠ୀଵ ݐ ൅ ∑ ߬௟ ln ݖ௟௜௧௟଼ୀଵ ൅ ߭௜௧ ൅ ߤ௜௧            [3.7]                                
where ܥ௜௧ stands for total costs of the i-th bank (i=1,2,3…N) at t (t=1,2,3…T) 
time, with the function that depending on three outputs ݕ௝௜௧ (j=1,2,3), input 
prices of three inputs ݓ௠௜௧ (m=1,2,3), the equity capital ratio ܧ௜௧ and eight 
environmental variables ݖ௟௜௧  that represents cross-country heterogeneities 
that vary over time. It is notice that these environmental variables should not 
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vary across banks within each country but they do vary across countries. 
Although cross-country heterogeneities are time-varying over time, however, 
these differences are minimal and trifling and it is really difficult to rule out 
time-invariant characteristics in these time-varying heterogeneities. In addition, 
according to the LR test, it is suggested that the estimates of the parameters 
and inefficiency scores are quite similar even if the time-varying 
heterogeneities are treated as time-invariant, which indicate that time-invariant 
heterogeneities are the potential characteristics in the cross-country 
heterogeneities. Moreover, in this function, equity capital ratio is seen as a risk 
control factor owing to equity capital may affect the probability of banks’ failure, 
the interest margin and total costs. Besides, one bank’s capital level could 
directly influence total costs by supplying an alternative funding source. 
 
McFadden (1978) and Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) proposed that the 
properties of cost function should be satisfied to ensure cost efficiency 
estimated are truly estimated from the cost function. The properties of cost 
function are as follows: 
1) non-decreasing in y, as ப ୪୬஼೔೟ப ୪୬௬ೕ೔೟ ൒ 0;  
2) non-decreasing in w, as ப ୪୬஼೔೟ப ୪୬௪೘೔೟ ൒ 0; 
3) homogenous of degree one in w, as ܥ௜௧(y, ௪௪೘೔೟ , ݐሻ ൌ
஼೔೟ሺ௬,௪,௧ሻ
௪೘೔೟ , this term can 
be written in log terms as ln ܥ௜௧ሺy, ௪௪೘೔೟ , ݐሻ=ln ܥ௜௧ሺݕ, ݓ,ሻ-lnݓ௠௜௧ ; 
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4) concave in w 
5) scale elasticity of cost function can be calculated by 
E=∑ ப୪୬஼೔೟ப ୪୬௬ೕ೔೟
௃
௝ୀଵ =∑ ݁ݕ௝௃௝ୀଵ            [3.8] 
By imposing the third property, ln ܥ௜௧ሺy, ௪௪೘೔೟ , ݐሻ= ln ܥ௜௧ሺݕ, ݓ, ݐሻ- lnݓ௠௜௧ , cost 
function for estimation can be rewritten as 
ln ஼೔೟௪య ൌ ߙ ൅ ∑ ߚ௝ ln ݕ௝௜௧
ଷ௝ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ߜ௠ ln ௪೘೔೟௪య
ଷ௠ୀଵ ൅ ∅௜݈݊ܧ௜௧ ൅
ଵ
ଶ∑ ∑ ߚ௝௞ ln ݕ௝௜௧ଷ௞ୀଵ ln ݕ௞௜௧ଷ௝ୀଵ ൅
ଵ
ଶ∑ ∑ ߜ௠௡ ln
௪೘೔೟
௪య
ଷ௡ୀଵଷ௠ୀଵ ln ௪೙೔೟௪య ൅
ଵ
ଶ∑ ∑ ߜߛ௝௠ ln ݕ௝௜௧ଷ௠ୀଵଷ௝ୀଵ ln
௪೘೔೟
௪య ൅ ߠଵݐ ൅
ଵ
ଶ ߠଶݐଶ ൅ ∑ ߦ௝ ln ݕ௝௜௧ଷ௝ୀଵ ݐ ൅
∑ ߞ௠ ln ௪೘೔೟௪య
ଷ௠ୀଵ ݐ ൅ ∑ ߬௟଻௟ୀଵ ln ݖ௟௜௧ ൅ ߭௜௧ ൅ ߤ௜௧              [3.9]                              
 
Moreover, restrictions ߚ௝௞ ൌ ߚ௞௝ and ߜ௠௡ ൌ ߜ௡௠ must be imposed to ensure 
the symmetry condition. The first and second properties are aimed to satisfy 
the condition of monotonicity. And calculating the elasticity of outputs and 
inputs prices can test the monotonicity property, ݁ݕ௝ ൌ ப ୪୬஼೔೟ப ୪୬௬ೕ೔೟  and eݓ௠ ൌ 
ப ୪୬஼೔೟
ப ୪୬௪೘೔೟, which can be expressed by the coefficients of the fitted cost function. 
 
Concavity property of cost function in input prices w is satisfied when the 
Hessian matrix of cost function with respect to input prices w is negative 
semi-definite. It is derived as H (w) = δ − sˆ + ssT               
[3.10]                                                                                
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Where δ is the matrix of the second coefficients of input prices. s is the column 
matrix of share equations, ݏ௠ ൌ  ப ୪୬஼೔೟ப ୪୬௪೘೔೟ ൌ eݓ௠  and ݏ
் ൌ
ሾݏଵ, ݏଶ, ݏଷ, … , ݏெሽ்.		And sˆ is the diagonal matrix with the share ݏ௠on the main 
diagonal. 
 
3.2.3 Alternative Modeling with Considering the Impact of the Equity 
Capital  
 
The researches of modeling banking system emphasized on the economics of 
industrial organization have greatly developed in recent years. And thanks to 
the studies of Freixas and Rochet (2007) and Degryse et al. (2009), a new 
approach estimating the cost of equity capital to evaluate efficiency in the 
banking industry was proposed and drew more and more concerns over last 
decade. It is very well known that equity indicates the capacity of banks 
absorbing loss and the regulatory authorities of banking sectors in different 
countries and regions formulate different levels of compulsory equity capital 
ratios to ensure the solvency of banks. As suggested by Duygun et al (2015) 
who developed a formal cost minimizing model with considering that the cost 
of the equity capital to meet the capital requirements would impose additional 
costs on the efficient allocation of resources, I will add a quasi-fixed input, 
equity capital, which is noted as ܧ and input price ଴ܹ  to the parametric 
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frontier dual cost function based on K inputs variables X=( ଵܺ, … , ܺ௞) with input 
prices W=( ଵܹ, … , ௞ܹ)  and J outputs  Y=( ଵܻ, … , ௃ܻ) as well. Then the efficient 
boundary of the input requirement set at time t can be represented by a 
transformation function: ܨሺy,w, 	݁଴, tሻ ൌ 0. Hence, interpreting equity capital or 
equity to assets ratio ܧ as a quasi-fixed input, which might be fixed in the 
short run and become variable in the long run, will be very useful to stress the 
important of the capital requirements in the analysis of banking industry. It is 
very essential to assume that production technology of banks has the 
properties of convexity and weak disposability. Since weak disposability 
suggests that the first derivatives of the above transformation function could 
either be positive or negative, this property allows us to employ models in the 
dual cost function to adapt both positive and negative shadow prices.    
 
In the light of the analysis of Braeutigam and Daughety (1983) and the 
arguments of Duygun et al. (2015), all inputs including equity capital E are 
variable in the following form of the dual long run cost function: 
C(y, w,	ݓ଴, t)=min௫,௘బ ሼݓ
ᇱݔ ൅ 	ݓ଴݁଴: ܨሺy, w, 	݁଴, tሻൌ 0ሽ                   [3.11]                  
On the other hand, input E is treated as fixed in the short run cost function and 
the form is written as: 
ܥௌ(y, w,		݁଴, t)=		ݓ଴݁଴+ܥ௩(y, w,		݁଴, t)=	min௫ ሼݓᇱݔ ൅ 	ݓ଴݁଴: ܨሺy,w, 	݁଴, tሻൌ 0ሽ [3.12]             
And the envelop of short run total costs can be formulated as C(y, w,	ݓ଴, 
t)=min௓బ ሼܥ
௩ሺy,w, 	݁଴, tሻ ൅ 	ݓ଴݁଴ሽ  by the long run total cost according to the 
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envelope theorem, which demands ߲C ߲݁଴ൗ  =0 in the neighbourhood of the 
tangency of the short run cost function and the long run cost function. Thus, we 
can get  
߲Cሺy,w, 	ݓ଴, tሻ ߲݁଴ൗ = ቂ
߲ܥ௩ሺy,w, 	݁଴, tሻ ߲݁଴൘ ቃ + 	ݓ଴ =0                
[3.13]                  
Consequently, the shadow price of equity capital can be obtained by 
rearranging the last equation, 
	ݓ଴ ൌ െ ቂ߲ܥ
௩ሺy,w, 	݁଴, tሻ ߲݁଴൘ ቃ                
[3.14]                                                                                
In addition, the long run cost function can be written as: 
ln ܥ௜௧=ln ܥௌሺy,w, 	݁଴, tሻ+ߥ௜௧+ߤ௜௧                                      [3.15]                
where ܥ௜௧is total costs for each bank ݅ in each country and region at time t,	ߥ௜௧ 
is idiosyncratic error and ߤ௜௧	is inefficiency component. Then the negative 
value of the elasticity of cost with respect to equity price, 
-ቂ߲ ln Cሺy,w, 	ݓ଴, tሻ ߲ ln ݁଴ൗ ቃ, is interpreted as the shadow return on equity. If the 
absolute value of the elasticity of cost with respect to equity capital the shadow 
return on equity is relatively high, it indicates that banks are over-leveraged, for 
instance, banks is over-reliant on debt or equity capital of banks is 
under-utilized.  And if the shadow return on equity has a relatively low 
absolute value, it implies that banks are possible to be less-leveraged. 
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Moreover, when banks are experiencing major re-capitalization or banks are in 
the recovery phase from the financial crisis, the value of shadow return on 
equity might be very low possible severely negative. 
 
To estimate cost efficiency ܥܧ௜௧for each bank ݅ in each country and region at 
time t with different stochastic frontier analysis models as mentioned in last 
chapter, equity capital will be added into the translog cost functional form 3.7. 
And the new function can be written as  
ln ܥ௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ∑ ߚ௝ ln ݕ௝௜௧ସ௝ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ߜ௠ lnݓ௠௜௧ଷ௠ୀଵ ൅ ∅ଵ ln ܧ ൅
ଵ
ଶ∑ ∑ ߚ௝௞ ln ݕ௝௜௧ସ௞ୀଵ ln ݕ௞௜௧ସ௝ୀଵ ൅
ଵ
ଶ∑ ∑ ߜ௠௡ lnݓ௠௜௧ଷ௡ୀଵଷ௠ୀଵ lnݓ௡௜௧ ൅
∑ ∑ ߛ௝௠ ln ݕ௝௜௧ଷ௠ୀଵସ௝ୀଵ lnݓ௠௜௧ ൅ ߠଵݐ ൅ ଵଶ ߠଶݐଶ ൅ ∑ ߦ௝ ln ݕ௝௜௧ସ௝ୀଵ ݐ ൅
∑ ߞ௠ lnݓ௠௜௧ଷ௠ୀଵ ݐ ൅ ଵଶ ∅ଶ 	ln ܧ ln ܧ ൅ ∑ ߩ௝ ln ݕ௝௜௧ସ௝ୀଵ ln ܧ 	൅ ∑ ߮௠ lnݓ௠௜௧ଷ௠ୀଵ ln ܧ ൅
߰ݐ ln ܧ ൅ ∑ ߬௟ ln ݖ௟௜௧଻௟ୀଵ ൅ ߭௜௧+ߤ௜௧                 [3.16]                                    
where ߭௜௧ are random variables and ߭௜௧ ∼ ܰሺ0, ߪజଶሻ, ߤ௜௧ are non-negative 
random variables and ߤ௜௧ ∼ ܰା	൫0, ߪఓଶ൯ , and cost efficiency measure is 
ܥܧ௜௧=ሼሺy,w, 	݁଴, ݐሻ/ܥ௜௧ሽ ∈ ሺ0,1ሿ, and ܥܧ௜௧=exp	ሺെܧሾߤ௜௧|݁ప௧෦ሿ. And this cost function 
should be homogeneous of degree (i.e. ∑ ߜ௠ଷ௠ୀଵ ൌ 1 , ∑ ߜ௠௡ଷ௡ୀଵ ൌ
0, ܽ݊݀	∑ ߛ௝௠ଷ௠ୀଵ =0), linear symmetry (i.e. ߚ௝௞ ൌ ߚ௞௝  and ߜ௠௡ ൌ ߜ௡௠ ) and 
concave in input prices.   
 
3.3 Empirical Results  
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3.3.1 Cost Efficiency Estimates without Cross-Country Heterogeneities 
 
The estimated parameter coefficients of panel data models without 
considering cross-country heterogeneities and average cost efficiency scores 
across the sample and for individual country and region are presented in Table 
3.9 and Table 3.11, respectively. When the impact of cross-country 
heterogeneities are not considered, it can be observed that cost efficiency 
scores from classical models are much less than these from Greene’s SFA 
models from Table 3.11, which are consistent with our expectation. 
 
From the perspective of the whole sample mean, the cost efficiency score is 
around 0.1554 from Classical Fixed-Effects Model, which is lower than the 
efficiency score from classical Random-Effects Models, 0.7601 in Pitt and Lee 
RE Model and 0.7596 in Battese and Coelli RE Model, respectively. The same 
climate can be found when measuring the average cost efficiency score for 
individual country and region. There are mainly three reasons that the results 
are exactly as expected. Firstly, it is assumed that cost inefficiency ߤ௜ is fixed 
in the FE model. Therefore, the FE model will finally absorb all time-invariant 
effects that are time-invariant heterogeneities but not only inefficiency. 
Secondly, one of assumptions in FE model is that cost inefficiency ߤ௜ could be 
correlated with the regressors while Pitt and Lee RE Model assumes that ߤ௜ is 
uncorrelated with regressors and is half-normally distributed. The higher cost 
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efficiency score might be the consequence of the stronger distributional 
assumption. Finally, the parameters are estimated by adopting LSDV with 
firm-specific intercept ߙ଴௜ in the FE model. Since αˆo = min(αˆ0i ) and uˆi =αˆ0i 
−αˆ0, cost efficiency can be obtained by the equation CEi = exp(− uˆi ). These 
efficiency estimates are relative to the best performing bank in the sample, 
thus they are regarded as the relative efficiency rather than the absolute 
efficiency score. In this way, even if the best performing bank is viewed as 100% 
efficient, it may be only 85% efficient but better than other banks as a result of 
an up bias produced by the FE model. 
 
The conclusion can be found by the results of correlation matrix among FE 
model, Pitt and Lee RE model and Battese and Coelli RE model. In the Table 
3.10, the correlation between FE model and Pitt and Lee RE model is 0.57417 
and the correlation between FE model and Battese and Coelli RE model is 
0.54997. This result is significantly different with the most of previous studies 
researching the comparisons of FE and RE models, in which the correlation of 
the estimates of FE and RE are ranged from 0.8 to approximately 1. In 
constant to relatively low average cost efficiency scores with classical models, 
cost efficiency from Greene’s ‘true’ FE model and ‘true’ RE model are quite 
high, 0.9044 and 0.8968, respectively. This coincides with our expectation due 
to the ‘true’ SFA models have moved some factors from
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Table 3.9 Estimated Parameter Coefficients for Classical and ‘True’ Panel Data Models without Considering Cross-country 
Heterogeneities 
Time-invariant Models Time-varying Models 
FE Pitt and Lee RE Battese and Coelli RE  True FE True RE 
Parameters Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio 
Constant     .09595*** 7.01 .09859*** 7.24 .25083***    60.7 
Y1 .59722*** 26.68 .66483*** 59.71 .67144*** 59.45 .65030*** 129.62 .66747*** 113.56 
Y2 .27012*** 19.18 .27997*** 28.77 .28022*** 29.72 .21233*** 84.8 .26420*** 52.7 
Y3 .02263*** 2.86 .04560*** 6.79 .04505*** 6.8 .09166*** 43.15 .04554*** 11.09 
W1 .67654*** 68.36 .69064*** 87.32 .69628*** 85.59 .75478*** 149.5 .68619*** 176.66 
W2 .17042*** 15.76 .16809*** 21.76 .16196*** 20.62 .16605*** 77.75 .17351*** 48.34 
LnE 0.00923 0.45 -0.02052 -1.23 -0.01334 -0.79 -.02517*** -6.63 .02926*** 3.47 
Y11 .07786*** 14.21 .05859*** 20.24 .06063*** 20.27 .04532*** 40.25 .06194*** 30.55 
Y12 -.13775*** -15.35 -.11890*** -19.19 -.11944*** -18.9 -.11606*** -46.57 -.12651*** -27.81 
Y13 0.0036 0.66 .01617*** 3.71 .01370*** 3.01 .03217*** 25.41 .01684*** 5.91 
Y22 .07102*** 16.03 .06544*** 19.65 .06460*** 18.64 .05501*** 42.95 .06590*** 27.39 
Y23 -.00845* -1.91 -.01561*** -4.13 -.01180*** -2.95 -.01984*** -18.04 -.01445*** -6.27 
Y33 .00249* 1.74 .00386*** 3.08 .00329** 2.57 .00663*** 16.7 .00347*** 4.04 
W11 .05337*** 14.02 .05465*** 19.68 .05572*** 19.45 .06589*** 66.82 .05031*** 32.44 
W12 -.06722*** -11.3 -.07699*** -17.93 -.07956*** -18.08 -.09874*** 0 -.06768*** -26.82 
W22 .00776** 2.43 .01206*** 5.32 .01299*** 5.55 .02554*** 29.13 .00576*** 4.34 
Y1W1 -0.00491 -0.68 -0.002 -0.43 -0.00371 -0.8 .02807*** 18.71 0.00264 0.89 
Y1W2 -0.00984 -1.3 0.00666 1.37 .00871* 1.69 -.01374*** -7.8 0.00234 0.73 
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 Time-invariant Models          Time-varying Models    
 FE  
Pitt and Lee 
RE 
 
Battese and 
Coelli RE 
 True FE  True RE  
Parameters Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio 
Y2W1 0.00978 1.64 -0.00029 -0.07 0.00346 0.81 -.03352*** -21.53 -.00814*** -3.09 
Y2W2 -0.0035 -0.56 -0.00434 -0.93 -.00813* -1.65 .03434*** 20.67 0.00273 0.94 
Y3W1 -.01734*** -3.65 -.01389*** -3.78 -.01348*** -3.66 0.00017 0.14 -.01262*** -5.37 
Y3W2 .00870** 2.48 -0.00043 -0.16 -0.00118 -0.44 -.02095*** -19.72 -0.0025 -1.32 
T -0.00401 -1.16 -.01633*** -8.54 -.02501*** -9.39 -.00812*** -16.63 -.01590*** -12.72 
SQRT .00086* 1.68 0.00075 1.26 0.0005 0.83 .00271*** 18.02 -0.00049 -1.15 
Y1T -.01547*** -6.93 -.00900*** -5.9 -.00857*** -5.37 -.00249*** -3.98 -.00919*** -7.7 
Y2T .00544*** 2.79 -0.00048 -0.35 0.00058 0.42 .00131** 2.57 0.0003 0.3 
Y3T .00382*** 2.86 .00342*** 3.21 0.00173 1.57 -.00137*** -3.57 .00257*** 3.19 
W1T -0.00034 -0.22 -.00255** -2.09 -.00428*** -3.13 -.00271*** -7.23 -.00172** -2.26 
W2T .00583*** 4.61 .00640*** 7.14 .00695*** 7.13 .00538*** 15.47 .00651*** 9.65 
SQRLnE -0.01565 -1.16 -.06605*** -7.7 -.06536*** -7.6 -.06926*** -21.63 -.03741*** -6.09 
Y1LnE .02635* 1.78 -.02987*** -3.75 -.03119*** -3.79 -.05439*** -19.07 -.03420*** -6.21 
Y2LnE -0.0003 -0.02 .02286** 2.52 .02586*** 2.84 .01491*** 6.14 .03451*** 6.71 
Y3LnE -0.0051 -0.63 .01664** 2.38 .01797*** 2.58 .05849*** 27.3 .02390*** 5.31 
W1LnE 0.01321 1.19 .03824*** 4.35 .04161*** 4.74 .05623*** 23.54 .02896*** 5.99 
W2LnE 0.00468 0.44 0.00396 0.49 0.00354 0.44 -.01865*** -9.1 0.00221 0.52 
TLnE .01266*** 4.02 .02029*** 7.74 .02119*** 7.9 .01865*** 21.35 .01368*** 7.5 
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R-square 0.99847          
σ 2.0675  0.33607  0.36721  .09906***     160.36 .14898***    66.87 
η     -.03187***   -4.92     
λ 
 
  3.40462*** 6.55 3.76905***   173.64 2.39639***    199.46 4.02732***   13.65 
ߪఓ   .32244***    12.51 .35493***    88.39 0.09142  0.14459  
L.L.F.     1335.401   1342.78032   -7889.27446   1436.57255   
Note: ***, **, * denote the rejection of the null at 1%, 5%, 10% significant level, respectively 
 
 
Table 3.10 Correlation Matrix among Panel Data Models without Incorporating 
Cross-country Heterogeneities 
 
  
FE 
Pitt and Lee 
RE 
Battese and 
Coelli RE  
True FE True RE 
FE 1.00000 0.57417 0.54997 0.35633 -0.04882 
Pitt and Lee RE 0.57417 1.00000 0.98926 0.73286 0.09045 
Battese and Coelli RE  0.54997 0.98926 1.00000 0.72500 0.09887 
True FE 0.35633 0.73286 0.72500 1.00000 0.41105 
True RE -0.04882 0.09045 0.09887 0.41105 1.00000 
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Table 3.11 Estimated Average Efficiency Score from Panel Data Models without Considering Heterogeneities 
Time-invariant Models Time-varying Models 
 
Time-invariant Models     Time-varying Models 
FE Pitt and Lee RE Battese and Coelli RE  True FE True RE 
Mean  
Standard 
Dev. 
Mean  
Standard 
Dev. 
Mean  
Standard 
Dev. 
Mean  
Standard 
Dev. 
Mean  Standard Dev. 
Whole Sample 
Efficiency Score 
0.1554 0.0461 0.7601 0.1068 0.7596 0.1083 0.9044 0.0748 0.8968 0.0684 
Country Specific Efficiency Score 
China 0.1471 0.0214 0.7767 0.0918 0.7746 0.0938 0.9022 0.0740 0.8967 0.0699 
HK SAR 0.1555 0.0400 0.7614 0.0994 0.7590 0.1019 0.9038 0.0707 0.8818 0.0847 
India 0.1384 0.0210 0.7540 0.0585 0.7561 0.0615 0.9442 0.0530 0.9167 0.0364 
Indonesia 0.1817 0.0603 0.7303 0.1334 0.7264 0.1329 0.8792 0.0764 0.8899 0.0777 
Korea 0.1571 0.0201 0.8741 0.0606 0.8803 0.0603 0.9650 0.0393 0.9084 0.0520 
Malaysia 0.1694 0.0453 0.7843 0.1013 0.7857 0.1012 0.9004 0.0771 0.8920 0.0699 
Singapore  0.1728 0.0379 0.8878 0.0703 0.8880 0.0722 0.9438 0.0640 0.8860 0.0805 
Taiwan Province 
of China 
0.1438 0.0604 0.7418 0.0994 0.7429 0.1019 0.8942 0.0743 0.8993 0.0644 
Thailand 0.1450 0.0571 0.6776 0.1024 0.6771 0.1022 0.8437 0.0609 0.8767 0.0773 
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the time-invariant heterogeneities out of the cost inefficiency term. Thus lower 
inefficiency will be generated and higher cost efficiency could be observed. 
This result is also consistent with the estimates of ߣ, which can be obtained by 
ߣ ൌ ߪఓ ߪజൗ , and ߣ for Pitt and Lee RE model and Battese and Coelli RE model 
are 3.40462 and 3.76905, suggesting that the dominated decomposition of the 
variance is the cost inefficiency term and that will lead to higher inefficiency 
level. Moreover, for ‘true’ RE model, 	ߣ  is 4.02732, which means the 
inefficiency level is relatively higher, However, for ‘true’ FE model, ߣ  is 
2.39639, indicating relatively lower inefficiency level. The difference in model 
specifications between classical models and Greene’s ‘true’ SFA models can 
be reflected in Table 3.10 as well, in which the correlation between the pair of 
classic FE and ‘true’ FE models are around 0.35633 while the correlation 
between the pair of classic FE and ‘ true’ RE models are less than 0. The 
relative low values of correlations indicate the existence of large number of 
time-invariant heterogeneities. Time-invariant external factors play an 
important role in analyzing the cost efficiency as the sample data set is consist 
of 9 Asian countries and regions banking industries and these data differ in 
many aspects such as geography, macroeconomic, banking structure and 
financial regulation. Therefore, these environmental variables have to be 
considered into measuring the banking performance. However, cost efficiency 
scores are quite high and evenly distributed across countries and regions, 
especially from the ‘true’ FE model. For example, average cost efficiency 
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score in India is 0.9442, is 0.9650 in Korea and is 0.9438 in Singapore. Such 
high efficiency scores indicate banking industries are operating in a very high 
efficient performance. However, these results are not consistent with our 
expectation, regarding to impact of the global financial crisis in 2008, it is really 
unreasonable and unreliable to have such a high efficiency level across the 
sample period that is from 2005 to 2012. The reason for such a high efficiency 
score from ‘true’ SFA models can be explained by their model specifications. 
As mentioned in above section, these models can move some of time-invariant 
heterogeneities out of inefficiency, even though they cannot distinguish these 
heterogeneities from time-invariant inefficiency. The ‘true’ SFA models will 
measure time-varying inefficiency only if inefficiency is persistent in long time 
period and it will be completely absorbed in the firm-specific constant term as 
time-variant heterogeneities. This indicates that heterogeneities are 
overcompensated by ‘true’ FE model and RE model. Thus cost inefficiency is 
underestimated, thereby cost efficiency is overestimated. Essentially, this is a 
potential defect of the ‘true’ SFA models since ߙ௜ ൅ ߤ௜௧ includes bank-specific 
and country-specific heterogeneities and inefficiency, and it is possible that 
many of them contain both time-invariant and time-varying components. And 
most importantly, according to Greene (2004), the ‘true’ RE model will be 
unstable when the regressions are including more variants. Table 3.12 
illustrates estimated parameter coefficients from all three classical panel data 
models and ‘true’ SFA models with incorporation of cross-country 
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heterogeneities and average efficiency score from these models both with 
country-specific environmental variables and without these variables are 
summarized in Table 13. As expected, in ‘true’ FE model, an increase of 5 
percentage points over average efficiency score estimated is generated when 
considering cross-country heterogeneities, increasing from 0.9044 to 0.9485. 
These increases might be the result of overcompensation of time-invariant 
heterogeneities. However, it is worth to note that average cost efficiency score 
is slightly increased from 0.8968 to 0.8977 in ‘true’ RE model for the whole 
sample. 
 
To summarize above section, it is known that all the time-invariant effects are 
assumed to be time-invariant inefficiency in classical panel data stochastic 
frontier model, thereby, all time-invariant heterogeneities are included in cost 
inefficiency. In constant, ‘true’ FE and RE models assume that all the 
time-variant effects to be time-invariant heterogeneities that also absorb 
time-invariant inefficiency. It can be concluded that classical panel data 
models underestimate cost efficiency scores while Greene’s ‘true’ SFA models 
overestimate them. This study intends to examine whether cross-country 
differences are important to the performance of banks by employing a panel 
data stochastic frontier model with cross-country heterogeneities. Thus it is 
really important to distinguish between time-invariant heterogeneities and 
time-invariant inefficiency to ensure no overcompensation for time-invariant 
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heterogeneities or underestimate cost inefficiency to obtain more accurate 
estimation of cost efficiency. In this circumstance, ‘true’ SFA models are not 
the apposite models to adopt. Moreover, it is known that the classical FE 
model applies least squares with dummy variables (LSDV) in the estimation, 
which provides no means of including country-specific environmental variables. 
Therefore, only the classical RE models can comprise cross-country 
heterogeneities, which are separated from time-invariant inefficiency. 
Furthermore, Battese and Coelli (1992) model assumes that inefficiency can 
vary over time, which is more appropriate than Pitt and Lee (1981) model and 
it will be used in measuring cost efficiency with considering cross-country 
heterogeneities in the following part.  
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Table 3.12 Estimated Parameter Coefficients for Classical and ‘True’ Panel Data Models with Considering Cross-country Heterogeneities 
 
Time-invariant Models Time-varying Models 
FE Pitt and Lee RE Battese and Coelli RE  True FE True RE 
Parameters Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff.     t-ratio 
Constant .07357*** 4.16 .07024*** 4.01 .24459***    36.46 
Y1 .61197*** 26.13 .65485*** 45.59 .66054*** 48.22 .63621*** 69.97 .66895*** 104.64 
Y2 .25048*** 17.21 .26863*** 25.25 .27151*** 27 .24957*** 47.67 .26411*** 43.32 
Y3 .01874** 2.39 .04884*** 6.85 .04842*** 6.84 .07564*** 28 .04272*** 9.67 
W1 .70012*** 67.45 .68849*** 82.15 .69685*** 81.84 .72375*** 76.45 .68392*** 152.38 
W2 .15860*** 14.58 .16876*** 21.14 .16014*** 19.5 .19005*** 49.65 .17611***  41.63 
LnE -0.00804 -0.4 -0.01264 -0.67 -0.00283 -0.15 .03205*** 5.54 .02653*** 3.04 
Y11 .07928*** 14.57 .05894*** 18.27 .06164*** 17.99 .05346*** 30.28 .06306*** 28.02 
Y12 -.13729*** -15.55 -.12188*** -17.8 -.12471*** -17.29 -.12702*** -35.26 -.12864*** -26.36 
Y13 0.00349 0.65 .01556*** 3.48 .01342*** 2.88 .02286*** 13.64 .01595*** 5.52 
Y22 .06982*** 15.9 .06559*** 17.74 .06561*** 17.02 .06484*** 35.48 .06721*** 26.44 
Y23 -.01012** -2.33 -.01424*** -3.55 -.00934** -2.18 -.01480*** -10.03 -.01411*** -5.91 
Y33 .00260* 1.86 .00390*** 3.18 .00303** 2.38 .00541*** 11.74 .00331*** 3.94 
W11 .05305*** 13.54 .05393*** 17.91 .05613*** 17.68 .05981*** 41.64 .04861*** 29.44 
W12 -.06774*** -11.07 -.07596*** -16.41 -.07977*** -16.77 -.08329*** -40.84 -.06514*** -23.72 
W22 .00933*** 2.8 .01167*** 4.83 .01309*** 5.29 .01601*** 16.47 .00439*** 2.99 
Y1W1 0.00045 0.06 -0.0044 -0.88 -0.00797 -1.59 .02080*** 9.79 0.0016 0.52 
Y1W2 -0.01033 -1.39 .00990* 1.95 .01389*** 2.58 0.00137 0.6 0.00357 1.1 
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 Time-invariant Models   Time-varying Models    
 FE          Pitt and Lee RE            Battese and Coelli RE True FE      True RE  
Parameters Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio 
Y2W1 .01108* 1.88 0.00219 0.49 0.00706 1.57 -.01995*** -10.07 -.00614** -2.29 
Y2W2 -0.00565 -0.92 -0.00614 -1.21 -.01178** -2.25 .01521*** 7.76 0.00142 0.49 
Y3W1 -.01918*** -4.09 -.01470*** -3.97 -.01244*** -3.4 -.01208*** -7.58 -.01342*** -5.65 
Y3W2 .00951*** 2.75 -0.00126 -0.46 -0.003 -1.08 -.01077*** -8.89 -0.00172 -0.9 
T .01696*** 3.05 -.02005*** -8.5 -.03351*** -10.43 -.00581*** -6.85 -.01583*** -10.58 
SQRT 0.00052 0.97 0.00084 1.35 0.00054 0.88 .00205*** 11.48 -0.00056 -1.29 
Y1T -.01467*** -6.64 -.00750*** -4.59 -.00719*** -4.51 -0.00097 -1.28 -.00898*** -7.42 
Y2T .00425** 2.14 -0.00196 -1.33 -0.00055 -0.36 -.00445*** -6.96 -0.00049 -0.47 
Y3T .00496*** 3.56 .00320*** 2.62 0.00076 0.57 .00082* 1.78 .00321*** 3.9 
W1T -0.00191 -0.99 -.00375*** -2.72 -.00576*** -3.87 -0.0005 -1.02 -.00196** -2.47 
W2T .00672*** 3.97 .00760*** 6.83 .00817*** 6.91 .00458*** 9.97 .00684*** 8.76 
SQRLnE -0.01944 -1.47 -.06762*** -7.26 -.06627*** -7.54 -.05420*** -12.85 -.03804*** -6.19 
Y1LnE .02871** 1.98 -.02729*** -3.35 -.02961*** -3.57 -.04509*** -11.04 -.03159*** -5.46 
Y2LnE -0.00345 -0.28 .02301** 2.49 .02706*** 2.95 .03746*** 10.16 .03367*** 6.34 
Y3LnE -0.00805 -1.01 .01599** 2.27 .01862*** 2.69 .04460*** 16.52 .02124*** 4.64 
W1LnE 0.01635 1.49 .03734*** 4.14 .04096*** 4.53 .06191*** 18.19 .02940*** 5.94 
W2LnE 0.00683 0.64 0.0046 0.54 0.00424 0.51 -.01899*** -6.39 0.00418 0.94 
TLnE .01356*** 4.03 .02029*** 7.62 .01955*** 7.12 .01569*** 14.17 .01417*** 7.55 
K1 0.16696 0.54 0.01173 1.24 -0.00138 -0.15 -.01744*** -7.52 .03719*** 13 
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K2 -.41005*** -6.54 -.03029** -2.2 -0.01997 -1.44 -.08573*** -24.41 -.04607*** -9.14 
K3 -.31935*** -3.6 0.07258 1.63 .10209** 2.51 -.17367*** -18.64 -0.01512 -1.17 
K4 .12427*** 5.96 0.02756 1.05 0.0314 1.17 -0.0002 -0.05 .03400***  5.67 
K5 -.53080*** -5.6 -.14040*** -3.68 -.17595*** -4.81 -.09017*** -12.87 -.10873*** -12.93 
K6 -.08687*** -3.26 -.10414*** -4.01 -.09107*** -3.67 -.23245*** -28.48 -.04803*** -3.59 
K7 -.17484*** -2.76 -0.04321 -0.85 -0.03869 -0.76 -.13565*** -7.63 -0.00812 -0.25 
R-square 0.999          
ߪఓ 
  
.31017***         12.37 .35685***       85.78 0.03744 
 
0.14337 
 
ߪజ 0.09411 0.09301 0.03279 0.03584 
λ 3.29575***        6.47 3.83668***      174.48 1.14162***      58.33 4.00010***       13.45 
σ 2.068 0.32414 0.36877 .04977***       78.22 .14778***       65.83 
η -.04222***      -6.23 
L.L.F     1355.6200   1368.50464   -9533.56186   1447.73074   
Note: ***, **, * denote the rejection of the null at 1%, 5%, 10% significant level, respectively. 
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Table 3.13 Summary of Average Efficiency Scores from Classical Models and ‘True’ SFA Models with and without Incorporating 
Environmental Variables 
 
Time-invariant Models Time-varying Models 
FE Pitt and Lee RE Battese and Coelli RE  True FE True RE 
without EV with EV without EV with EV without EV with EV without EV with EV without EV with EV 
 Mean 0.1554 0.1979 0.7601 0.7730 0.7596 0.7695 0.9044 0.9485 0.8968 0.8977 
 Std.Dev. 0.0461 0.1010 0.1068 0.1116 0.1083 0.1149 0.0748 0.0456 0.0684 0.0678 
Minimum 0.0793 0.0673 0.5027 0.4972 0.4773 0.4660 0.8096 0.8624 0.5726 0.5768 
Maximum 1.0000 1.0000 0.9927 0.9932 0.9937 0.9944 0.9944 0.9961 0.9892 0.9902 
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3.3.2 Cost Efficiency Estimates with Cross-Country 
Heterogeneities 
 
In table 3.14, estimated efficiency scores from Battese and Coelli Model with 
additional cross-country heterogeneities across the sample in individual year 
are presented. And the estimated parameter coefficients of cost function are 
listed in Table 3.15. 
 
Table 3.14 Estimated Average Efficiency Score from Battese and Coelli Model 
with Cross-country Heterogeneities 
 
Mean Std.dev. Minimum Maximum 
No.of 
Observations 
2005 0.7982 0.1018 0.5410 0.9944 197 
2006 0.7860 0.1076 0.5266 0.9942 234 
2007 0.7829 0.1096 0.5123 0.9939 232 
2008 0.7721 0.1134 0.4977 0.9937 235 
2009 0.7688 0.1137 0.4980 0.9934 237 
2010 0.7616 0.1162 0.4957 0.9931 238 
2011 0.7540 0.1208 0.4810 0.9928 252 
2012 0.7414 0.1231 0.4660 0.9925 256 
Average 0.7706 0.1133 0.5023 0.9935 
Sample Obs.    1881 
 
As presented in Table 3.14, the average efficiency score is 0. 0.7706 for the 
whole sample, an extremely minimal decrease of 1.45 percentage points 
compared with the efficiency score estimated when environmental variables 
are not included. This result shows that the differences among countries play 
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not important role to explain banking performance and efficiency. And this 
result is not as expected. The reasons of that will be explain in the next section, 
which can found in Table 3.19 where summarise the expected and observed 
influences of environmental variables in banking performance for individual 
model. The effects of individual environmental variable might be offsite. In 
spite of little differences between efficiency scores from Battese and Coelli 
model with and without environmental variables, neutral technical progress 
could be found in these selected Asian countries and regions banking systems. 
The time coefficient is statistically significantly negative (-.03351, with a t-value 
-10.43), indicating banks benefit from adopting new technology, for example, 
the introduction of internet banking services, mobile banking services, and 
ATMs. However, the overall cost efficiency score in these Asian countries and 
regions decreases from 0.7982 in 2005 to 0.7414 in 2012. This decreasing 
trend is reflected by the estimated value of ߟ as -.04222 with t-value of -6.23.  
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Table 3.15 Estimated Battese and Coelli Model with Cross-country 
Heterogeneities 
Parameters Coeff. t-ratio 
Constant .07024*** 4.01 
Y1 .66054*** 48.22 
Y2 .27151*** 27 
Y3 .04842*** 6.84 
W1 .69685*** 81.84 
W2 .16014*** 19.5 
LnE -0.00283 -0.15 
Y11 .06164*** 17.99 
Y12 -.12471*** -17.29 
Y13 .01342*** 2.88 
Y22 .06561*** 17.02 
Y23 -.00934** -2.18 
Y33 .00303** 2.38 
W11 .05613*** 17.68 
W12 -.07977*** -16.77 
W22 .01309*** 5.29 
Y1W1 -0.00797 -1.59 
Y1W2 .01389*** 2.58 
Y2W1 0.00706 1.57 
Y2W2 -.01178** -2.25 
Y3W1 -.01244*** -3.4 
Y3W2 -0.003 -1.08 
T -.03351*** -10.43 
SQRT 0.00054 0.88 
Y1T -.00719*** -4.51 
Y2T -0.00055 -0.36 
Y3T 0.00076 0.57 
W1T -.00576*** -3.87 
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W2T .00817*** 6.91 
SQRLnE -.06627*** -7.54 
Y1LnE -.02961*** -3.57 
Y2LnE .02706*** 2.95 
Y3LnE .01862*** 2.69 
W1LnE .04096*** 4.53 
W2LnE 0.00424 0.51 
TLnE .01955*** 7.12 
K1 -0.00138 -0.15 
K2 -0.01997 -1.44 
K3 .10209** 2.51 
K4 0.0314 1.17 
K5 -.17595*** -4.81 
K6 -.09107*** -3.67 
K7 -0.03869 -0.76 
ોૄ .35685***          85.78 
ો્ 0.09301  
λ 3.83668***           174.48 
σ 0.36877  
η -.04222***       -6.23 
L.L.F 1368.50464   
Note: ***, **, * denote the rejection of the null at 1%, 5%, 10% significant level, respectively. 
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Table 3.16 Estimated Cost Efficiency Score for Individual Country and Year 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Average 
China 0.8582 0.8441 0.8430 0.8325 0.8311 0.8275 0.8144 0.8008 0.8315 
HK SAR 0.7544 0.7304 0.7235 0.7077 0.6896 0.6647 0.6823 0.6467 0.6999 
India 0.8366 0.8267 0.8234 0.8165 0.8069 0.7997 0.7858 0.7808 0.8096 
Indonesia 0.7391 0.7455 0.7450 0.7253 0.7250 0.7141 0.7200 0.7010 0.7269 
Korea 0.8400 0.8279 0.8309 0.8252 0.8092 0.8373 0.8227 0.8021 0.8244 
Malaysia 0.7772 0.7667 0.7519 0.7370 0.7578 0.7454 0.7248 0.6996 0.7451 
Singapore  0.8146 0.7773 0.7510 0.7691 0.7498 0.7407 0.7132 0.7228 0.7548 
Taiwan Province 
of China 
0.8130 0.7904 0.7895 0.7869 0.7739 0.7551 0.7563 0.7611 0.7783 
Thailand 0.6649 0.6284 0.6566 0.6281 0.6367 0.6312 0.6042 0.5953 0.6307 
Average 0.7887 0.7708 0.7683 0.7587 0.7533 0.7462 0.7360 0.7234 0.7557 
No. of Obs. 197 234 232 235 237 238 252 256 1881 
 
According to Battese and Coelli (1992) model, the statistically significant negative value of ߟ 
means that the cost efficiency score is increasing in an increasing rate. The decrease in efficient 
level may not necessarily indicate that the deterioration of banking performance over the time 
period as in the estimation progress the quality of outputs such as the quality of loans is not 
included. Given the argument of Kumbhakar and Wang (2007), an improvement in quality of 
outputs, for example, disposal of non-performing loans might lead to a decrease in efficiency. 
The global financial crisis happened in 2008, the year is included in the sample period. It is 
known that the crisis left a large volume of NPLs (for short of non-performing loans) for Asian 
banks. Thus one of important objectives in post-crisis financial and banking reforms was to 
reduce the volume of NPLs in banks’ assets. Consequently, this may appear as a reduction in 
net loan values for given inputs and then reflect as a decline in efficiency. In addition, the 
requirement to reduce the quantity of NPLs in the banking sector might force governments to 
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push for mergers between healthy and troubled banks, resulting in declined performance and 
efficiency of existing healthy banks. The average cost efficiency scores for individual country and 
region from 2005 to 2012 are presented in Table 3.16. In addition, the trend of cost efficiency in 
each banking industry is shown in Figures 3.1-3.9.  
 
The declining tendency can be seen as same as the trend of the overall efficiency scores, in 
spite of a few observations of efficiency improvement in some years, which might be caused by 
the defect of the unbalanced panel data sample set itself.  
 
From Table 3.16, we can find that the banking industry of China is most efficient with the average 
efficiency score of 0.8315，which followed by Korea, India and Taiwan Province of China with 
efficiency scores of 0.8244, 0.8096 and 0.7783 respectively. And fifth to eighth countries and 
regions ranked by cost efficiency scores of 0.7548, 0.7451, 0.7269 and 0.6999, respectively for 
Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, HK SAR and Taiwan Province of China. With an efficiency 
score of 0.6307 the banking system of Thailand is the least efficient. 
 
Figure 3.1: Efficiency Trend for Chinese 
Banking Sector 
 
Figure 3.2: Efficiency Trend for Banking 
Sector in HK SAR 
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Figure 3.3: Efficiency Trend for Indian 
Banking Sector  
Figure 3.4: Efficiency Trend for 
Indonesia Banking Sector  
 
Figure 3.5: Efficiency Trend for Korean 
Banking Sector 
 
Figure 3.6: Efficiency Trend for 
Malaysian Banking Sector 
Figure 3.7: Efficiency Trend for 
Singaporean Banking Sector	
Figure 3.8: Efficiency Trend for Banking 
Sector in Taiwan Province of China	
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        Figure 3.9: Efficiency Trend for Banking Sector in Thailand 
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Table 3.17 Monotonicity Property, Scale Property and Concavity Property of the Fitted Cost 
Function Adopting Battese and Coelli Random Effects Model with cross-country heterogeneities at 
the sample mean and the whole sample 
Monotonicity Property Parameters Standard 
errors 
Violations 
Rate (%) 
whole sample:% of sample 
points with cost increasing in 
outputs and input prices 
At the sample mean 0.7730 0.1344 0 100 
At the sample mean 0.3638 0.1480 0 100 
At the sample mean 0.0393 0.0175 2.07 97.93 
At the sample mean 0.7203 0.1000 0 100 
At the sample mean 0.1542 0.0671 0.904 99.096 
Scale Property Scale 
Elasticity 
Standard errors T-value whole sample:% of sample points 
with increasing returns to scale   
At the sample mean E=1.176  0.238 -2.4437 21.106 
    
Reject null: 
E=1 
Concavity Property Objective 
Function 
Principle Minors Values Violation 
Rate of 
negative 
definite 
whole sample:% of 
sample where H(w) is 
negative definite 
At the sample mean H(w) First order -0.1666 6.38 93.62 
-0.1318 
Second order 0.0194 
 
To ensure the reliability of cost efficient estimates, properties of the translog cost function have 
to be satisfied. The results of violation and satisfaction of properties are presented in Table 3.17 
and all the requirements of properties have been checked at the sample and all over the sample 
set. Since the elasticities of outputs and inputs prices are statistically significantly higher than 
zero, monotonicity conditions are strongly satisfied at sample mean and are satisfied at the 
majority of the sample poins, which indicate the cost function is non-decreasing in y and w. 
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Furthermore, concavity condition is satisfied at sample mean and at about 93.62% of the sample 
points, given the Hessian matrix with respect to the input prices must be negative semi-definite. 
Due to the satisfaction of monotonicity and concavity properties, the fitted model is a true cost 
function and parameter estimates of cost efficiency are reliable. 
 
In addition, the scale elasticity at the sample mean is 1.176 and is significantly different from one 
and 21.106 % of sample points are with increasing returns to scale. 
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Table 3.18 The Expected and Practical Impacts of Environmental Variables on 
the Total Costs 
Macroeconomic Indicators      Bank Structure 
Z1 Z2 Z3 Z4 Z5 Z6 Z7 
Expected  - + or -  +  - + or - - - 
Classical FE Model  + - - + - - - 
Pitt and Lee RE Model + - + + - - - 
Battese and Coelli RE Model - - + + - - - 
‘True’ FE Model - - - - - - - 
‘True’ RE Model + - - + - - - 
Notes: Z1= Population Density; Z2= GDP per capita; Z3= Inflation Ratio; Z4= Unemployment Rate;  
Z5= Bank Concentration; Z6= Net Interest Margin; Z7 =Intermediation Rate. 
 
To improve the cost frontier and move out some part of time-invariant 
heterogeneities out of inefficiency, it is very helpful to introduce cross-country 
environmental variables. Besides this purpose, it is constructively significant to 
test and verify whether the impacts of these environmental variables are 
consistent with our expectation. The expected and empirical influences are 
reported in Table 3.18. 
 
1) First of all, opposite to the expectation, the coefficient of population 
density variables has a positive sign except that for Battese and Coelli RE 
model and Greene’s ‘true’ FE model. That is, higher density of population 
contributes to a growth in banks’ costs, instead of the expected decline 
effects. The main reason is competition between banks. In higher density 
area, banks may be forced to open more branches and increase the 
number of ATMs to compete with other banks for customers. 
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Advertisements, promotions and other strategic operations and services 
may increase banks’ costs. 
2) Secondly, the influences of GDP per capita are expected can be either 
positive or negative. And the coefficients of this parameter coincide with 
the expectation for all five models and negative sign suggests that newest 
technological change, well-diversified financial services and expansion of 
the businesses will magnificently reduce the costs of banks and increase 
efficiency of banking system. 
3) Thirdly, the positive signs of inflation rate in models in Pitt and Lee RE 
model and Battese and Coelli RE model are consistent with the 
expectation that the higher inflation, the more costs it may generate as a 
result of an increased inputs prices. For instance, to offset the increase of 
the living costs, employees may demand higher salaries and customers 
may seek for higher interest rates of deposits, etc. The major impact of 
higher inflation however is the additional opportunity cost for the banking 
system of adjusting for higher and more volatile inflation expectations and 
therefore additional risks and uncertainty. 
4) The last one in the group of macroeconomic indicator, very significant one, 
unemployment rate. Theoretically, high unemployment rate indicates poor 
economic environment. Hence, banks in area with high unemployment 
rate have to find alternative funding and expand businesses to maintain 
the services level and reduce the potential risk of loans becoming 
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non-performing loans and risks in other operational businesses. Moreover, 
banks may cut the costs dramatically to balance the income. However, it is 
obviously that the observations of this variable with all three classic 
models and ‘true’ RE model in Table 19 have opposite sign with the 
expectation. 
5) The second group of country-specific environmental variables reflects the 
banking structure and regulatory conditions. As discussed before, bank 
concentration may increase or reduce costs. On the one hand, as argued 
by Leibenstein (1966), costs may go the same direction with bank 
concentration if high concentration is contributed by market power. If bank 
concentration is positively on the total costs, the possible explanation is 
that the lack of competitive pressure of operating monopoly industries 
would lead to higher costs than those businesses are under high 
competition. Additionally, it is highly likely that bank managers are capable 
of reducing costs if the financial market forced them to do so. On the other 
hand, a negative sign may be expected if higher bank concentration 
results from the superior management as proposed by Demsetz (1973) 
that higher concentration could be related with lower costs. Specifically, 
an industry could be concentrated only if some firms are far better than 
others in producing and marketing products under the environment of 
competition. In this way, these firms have an extremely advantage in 
expanding businesses and developing firms. Such expansion will increase 
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the concentration of the industry, thus firms can earn their own cost 
advantage and the increases in the rate of return. And cost advantage 
might influence in economics of scale or in downward shifts in marginal 
cost curves. In this case, the estimates of bank concentration with all the 
models stand for this argument with negative signs. 
6) Sixthly, the sign of net interest margin is expected to be negative as the 
higher net interest margin, the more profitable is in banks. And high net 
interest margin suggests higher ability of transferring deposits to loans, 
which might lower the banking costs. The empirical results in all five 
models are in the same line with this expectation.  
7) The last but not least environmental variable, intermediation ratio that 
reflects the ability of banks to convert the deposits into loans. The higher 
intermediation ratio suggests the higher ability of repaying the interests of 
depositors and then might lower banks’ costs. However, it is possible that 
the relationship between intermediation ratio and total costs. This situation 
happens when the intermediation ratio is larger than 1, this high ratio 
might result in very high credit risks. Thus banks may huge costs to avoid 
loans to become non-performing loans. Then higher costs might produce 
and in this case I have to filter the observations with the value of the 
intermediation ratio greater than 1. Therefore, the empirical results can be 
observations just as expected. 
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3.4 The Outputs and Input Prices Specifications 
 
Table 3.19 Output and Input Prices Specifications 
  Intermediation Approach Dual Approach Production Approach 
Outputs Total Loans (Y1) Total Loans (Y1) Total Loans (Y1) 
Other Earning Assets (Y2) Other Earning Assets (Y2) Other Earning Assets (Y2)
Non-interest Income (Y3) Non-interest Income (Y3) Non-interest Income (Y3) 
Total Deposits (Y4) Total Deposits (Y4) 
Input  Price of Funds (W1) Price of Funds (W1) Price of Labour (W1) 
Prices Price of Labour (W2) Price of Labour (W2) Price of Fixed Assets (W2)
  Price of Fixed Assets (W3) Price of Fixed Assets (W3) 
 
Table 3.19 presents the general outputs and input prices specifications in the 
framework of intermediation approach, dual approach and production 
approach, respectively. As we discussed in section 2.4.1, the main difference 
of these three approaches is the role of deposits. And regarding to Table 3.19, 
four outputs and three input prices are defined under the dual approach, while 
for production approach four outputs and two input prices are identified. To 
compare these approach and test robustness of the intermediation approach 
adopted in my thesis, we estimated cost efficiency with dual and production 
approach as well. And the empirical results of estimates and proprieties of cost 
function employing these two approaches are separately shown in Table 3.20 
and Table 3.21. The average estimated cost efficiency from production 
approach is 0.0.5128, which is approximately 32% less than the mean cost 
efficiency scores estimated from intermediation approach (0.7557). This is 
partially due to the two main outputs are found to be poor explanatory 
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variables. Total loans ( ଵܻሻ is insignificantly positive related to total costs while 
non-interest income ( ଷܻ) is insignificantly negative associated with total costs. 
Moreover, according to Table 3.21, non-interest income ( ଷܻ ) fails the 
monotonicity test as well. The poor outcomes of production approach coincide 
with the discussion on the choice of output and input specifications in section 
2.4.1. As suggested by Ferrier and Lovell (1990), we’d better to use the 
number of total deposits account rather than the value of total deposits to be 
the measure of total deposits. As the number of total deposits account is not 
available in our research, we have to employ the value of total deposits to be 
measure of total deposits and this maybe the major cause of the deviations to 
the expected empirical results of coefficients so that production approach 
appears to be underperforming. Therefore, in the absence of reliable data on 
the number of total deposits, it is more advisable to avoid using the production 
approach since the estimation may mislead the empirical results.  
 
In the same way, the number of total deposits should be regarded as the 
measure of total deposits to be one of outputs in the dual approach based on 
the dual role of deposits. The empirical results of using dual approach to 
estimate cost efficiency are exhibited in the Table 3.20 and 3.21 as well. The 
average cost efficiency score is 0.7631, very close to the estimated efficiency 
level under intermediation approach and the monotonicity and concavity 
conditions are satisfied. However, the coefficient of other earning assets ( ଶܻ) is 
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insignificantly negative.  
 
To briefly summarise, in this section we discuss the choice of different 
approaches used in defining outputs and inputs variables, compare the 
empirical results and test the robustness of intermediation approach, 
production approach and dual approach. If the date on the number of total 
deposits is available, it is appropriate to adopt dual approach to measure 
banking efficiency given the dual role of deposits. Otherwise, intermediation 
approach is highly recommended since the empirical results of using 
production approach and dual approach to measure banking efficiency may be 
unreliable. And regarding to our case, it is appropriate to use intermediation 
approach given the satisfaction of all theoretical and statistical properties. 
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Table 3.20 Parameter Estimates for Dual Approach and Production Approach  
  Dual Approach Production Approach 
Parameters Coeff. t-ratio Coeff. t-ratio 
Constant .06598*** 3.82 1.20051*** 21.75 
Y1 .19812*** 6.06 0.18502 1.61 
Y2 -0.01277 -0.55 .14104** 2.08 
Y3 .03364*** 4.87 -0.02655 -1.17 
Y4 .77568*** 15.09 .73422*** 4.22 
W1 .69527*** 87.26 
W2 .15865*** 20.94 .56554*** 35.58 
Z0 .08894*** 4.23 .12385** 2.19 
Y11 .05740** 2.32 -0.03724 -0.55 
Y12 .08094** 2.02 -0.17866 -1.55 
Y13 0.00781 0.5 .11765** 2.31 
Y14 -.19432** -2.22 0.15417 0.57 
Y22 0.01274 0.85 0.00587 0.14 
Y23 -0.0072 -0.69 0.00944 0.28 
Y24 -.11428* -1.71 0.23333 1.1 
Y33 .00228* 1.83 .38136D-04 0.01 
Y34 0.00177 0.07 -0.13525 -1.61 
Y44 .16551** 2.04 -0.14857 -0.54 
W11 .05421*** 18.34 
W12 -.08079*** -17.81 
W22 .01526*** 6.57 -.03501*** -7.83 
Y1W1 -.06132*** -4.94 
Y1W2 -0.0017 -0.12 -.17028*** -4.44 
Y2W1 -.03568*** -4.48 
Y2W2 0.00158 0.17 -.08302*** -3.72 
Y3W1 -.01063*** -2.71 
Y3W2 0.00059 0.24 .03506*** 3.67 
Y4W1 .10107*** 5.06 
Y4W2 -0.00674 -0.32 .19326*** 3.25 
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T -.03915*** -12.97 -.06607*** -8.35 
SQRT 0.0002 0.39 -0.00107 -0.6 
Y1T -.02129*** -4.58 -.03419** -2.01 
Y2T -0.00337 -1.02 -.02693** -2.53 
Y3T 0.00193 1.54 0.00418 0.98 
Y4T .01597** 2.18 .06078** 2.21 
W1T -.00675*** -5.08 
W2T .00908*** 8.02 .00840*** 2.95 
SQRZ0 0.02194 1.45 .11851** 2.49 
Y1Z0 -.07014** -2.25 -0.12296 -1.2 
Y2Z0 -.05323** -2.16 .14661* 1.79 
Y3Z0 0.00895 1.16 -.04989* -1.79 
Y4Z0 .14605*** 2.64 0.06244 0.33 
W1Z0 .05208*** 5.3 
W2Z0 -0.00217 -0.23 0.03148 1.33 
Z0T .02075*** 7.95 -0.00398 -0.39 
K1 .04301*** 4.98 .32282*** 10.52 
K2 -.04853*** -3.9 -.50701*** -11.05 
K3 .15228*** 4.22 -0.10111 -0.91 
K4 0.03327 1.43 -.24036*** -3.97 
K5 -.20909*** -5.38 -.51769*** -5.88 
K6 -.05522** -2.27 .58226*** 8.08 
K7 0.02746 0.54 .29536** 2.01 
ߪఓ .36870***       77.08 .94881***      16.96 
λ 4.61084***       233.44 3.62431***      220.81 
η -.04672***       -7.31 -0.00557 -1.06 
Cost Efficiency 
Mean 0.7631 0.5128 
Std.Dev. 0.1170 0.2104 
Minimum 0.4359 0.0644 
Maximum 0.9949   0.9726   
Note: ***, **, * denote the rejection of the null at 1%, 5%, 10% significant level, respectively. 
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Table 3.21 Properties of Cost Functions with Dual and Production Approach 
    Dual Approach   Production Approach   
Monotonicity Property Elasticity Coefficient sample % Satisfied Coefficient sample % Satisfied 
Sample Mean ey1 0.2322 98.62 Yes 0.0706 62.73 Yes 
(1st order derivatives) ey2 0.0180 61.03 Yes 0.0235 57.26 Yes 
ey3 0.0275 96.92 Yes -0.0111 39.71 No 
ey4 1.0617 100 Yes 0.5822 89.69 Yes 
ew1 0.7163 100 Yes 
  ew2 0.1548 98.67 Yes 0.6123 100 Yes 
Concavity Property Principle Minors           
Sample Mean First order -0.1577 Yes 
-0.1182 
  
Second 
order 
0.0178   Yes 
      
sample%: % of sample where H(w) is negative definite in the whole sample 
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3.5 The Effect of Bank Size on Banking Efficiency 
 
Table 3.22 The Effect of Bank Size on Cost Efficiency with/without Environmental Variables 
    Time-invariant Models       Time-varying Models     
FE Pitt and Lee RE Battese and Coelli RE True FE True RE 
Total Assets (Mil.) 
Number 
of Obs。
Without EV With EV Without EV With EV Without EV With EV Without EV With EV Without EV With EV 
<500  60 0.2281 0.4147 0.8254 0.8294 0.8232 0.8255 0.9010 0.9448 0.8765 0.8777 
500-1000  80 0.2358 0.3965 0.8256 0.8289 0.8205 0.8205 0.9272 0.9551 0.8912 0.8918 
1000-5000 236 0.1952 0.2888 0.7587 0.7710 0.7584 0.7686 0.8956 0.9459 0.8837 0.8845 
5000-10000 203 0.1585 0.2004 0.7207 0.7489 0.7228 0.7485 0.8807 0.9351 0.8859 0.8872 
10000-50000  703 0.1485 0.1714 0.7407 0.7624 0.7392 0.7577 0.9043 0.9473 0.8982 0.8992 
50000-100000 264 0.1320 0.1586 0.7495 0.7616 0.7488 0.7610 0.9084 0.9531 0.9061 0.9069 
100000-1000000 301 0.1298 0.1359 0.8143 0.8043 0.8136 0.7970 0.9285 0.9630 0.9069 0.9074 
 >1000000  34 0.0927 0.1033 0.7418 0.7283 0.7581 0.7514 0.8163 0.9008 0.9128 0.9124 
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Figure 3.10: Cost Efficiency for Banks of Different Sizes under FE Model 
 
 
Figure 3.11: Cost Efficiency for Banks of Different Sizes under Pitt and Lee RE 
Model 
 
 
Figure 3.12: Cost Efficiency for Banks of Different Sizes under Battese and 
Coelli RE Model 
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Figure 3.13: Cost Efficiency for Banks of Different Sizes under Greene’s True FE 
Model 
 
 
Figure 3.14: Cost Efficiency for Banks of Different Sizes under Greene’s True RE 
Model 
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Figure 3.15: Cost Efficiency for Banks of Different Sizes under Five Panel Data 
SFA Models without Considering Cross-country Heterogeneities 
 
 
Figure 3.16: Cost Efficiency for Banks of Different Sizes under Five Panel Data 
SFA Models with Incorporating Cross-country Heterogeneities 
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Greene’s ‘true’ models with/without incorporating cross-country heterogeneity. 
The average efficiency scores are presented in Table 3.22, the lines of cost 
efficiency in different banks sizes under individual model with/without 
considering cross-country differences are shown in Figures 3.10-3.14, and 
Figure 3.15 and Figure 3.16 illustrate cost efficiency in different bank sizes by 
using five models with incorporating cross-country heterogeneities and without 
considering these environmental variables, respectively. There is no 
convergence empirical result of the effect of bank size on efficiency level with 
employing different models. Under fixed effect model, cost efficiency level is 
negative related to bank size with considering cross-country differences while 
without incorporating these environmental variables total assets of banks with 
the peak level of cost banking efficiency lie in the range from $mil. 500-1000. 
In general, the largest banks are least cost efficient under the fixed effect 
model. Similarly, the largest banks are found out to be the least efficient and 
even less efficient than the smallest banks under the Pitt and Lee RE model, 
Battese and Coelli RE model and Greene’s ‘true’ FE model even if the sizes of 
the most efficient banks at different intervals of total assets. By contrast, the 
efficiency level is approximately increasing with the sizes of banks under 
Greene’s ‘true’ RE model no matter incorporating cross-country 
heterogeneities or not. That is, the largest banks are most efficient and the 
smallest banks are least efficient under Greene’s ‘true’ RE models. Moreover, 
we find that the effect of bank sizes on efficiency level differs dramatically by 
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adopting different models. Furthermore, cross-country differences are 
relatively not so important to the impact of bank size on banking efficiency. 
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3.6 Scale Bias and Scale Elasticity 
 
Table 3.23 Estimated Elasticity of Scale from Panel Data Models 
Country FE   Pitt and Lee RE Battese and Coelli RE  True FE   True RE   
Elasticity of scale 
Panzar-
Willig 
Adjusted 
Panzar-
Willig 
Adjusted 
Panzar-
Willig 
Adjusted 
Panzar-
Willig 
Adjusted 
Panzar-
Willig 
Adjusted 
Sample Mean 1.222 1.140 0.890 0.918 0.886 0.910 0.786 1.292 1.241 1.365 
China 1.360 1.270 0.991 0.997 0.9862 0.9863 0.859 1.380 1.397 1.471 
HK SAR 1.104 1.055 0.911 0.941 0.906 0.931 0.632 0.791 1.129 1.196 
India 1.077 1.013 0.934 0.926 0.925 0.908 0.620 0.851 1.061 1.086 
Indonesia 1.338 1.223 0.719 0.781 0.715 0.780 1.091 2.446 1.284 1.662 
Korea 1.263 1.206 0.968 0.997 0.967 0.991 0.734 1.005 1.352 1.367 
Malaysia 1.098 1.078 0.836 0.905 0.832 0.901 0.606 0.829 1.078 1.208 
Singapore 1.057 0.911 0.974 1.049 0.968 1.037 0.532 0.557 1.021 1.030 
Taiwan Province of 
China 
1.162 1.070 0.912 0.925 0.912 0.921 0.716 0.882 1.286 1.311 
Thailand 1.149 1.085 0.860 0.924 0.856 0.918 0.615 0.830 1.227 1.369 
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In addition, the shadow return of the equity to asset ratio can be used to 
interpret the measurement of returns to scale. Generally, the elasticity of cost 
with respect to output is written as ∑ ሺݕ௝ሺ డ஼డ௬ೕሻሻ/ܥ
௝ୀ௃
௝ୀଵ .  Then according to 
Panzar and Willig (1977), the inverse of it can be derived as follows: 
ܧ௖௬ିଵ=C/∑ ሺݕ௝ሺ డ஼డ௬ೕሻሻ
௝ୀ௃
௝ୀଵ =1/∑ ሺ డ௟௡஼డ௟௡௬ೕሻ
௝ୀ௃
௝ୀଵ  
And the result of ܧ௖௬ିଵ implies different laws of returns to scale. (See Table 
3.24) 
 
Table 3.24 The Classifications of Returns to Scale 
ܧ௖௬ିଵ<1 Decreasing returns to scale, i.e. diseconomies of scale 
ܧ௖௬ିଵ=1 Constant returns to scale 
ܧ௖௬ିଵ>1 Increasing returns to scale, i.e. economies of scale 
 
As proposed by Braeutigam and Daughety (1983), the short run total cost can 
replace the long run total cost when it closes to the optimal level of the fixed 
input. Thus, the elasticity of scale can be adjusted by the short run total cost 
with respect to the equity-asset ratio, that is, 
ܧ௖௬ିଵ ൎ ሺ1 െ డ௟௡஼డ௟௡	௘బ)/	∑ ሺ
డ௟௡஼
డ௟௡௬ೕሻ
௝ୀ௃
௝ୀଵ  
We will compare these two measurements of the returns to scale regarding the 
theory of Duygun et al (2015), the adjusted measure may be more appreciate 
than the long run Panzar-Willig estimate if the allocation of inputs is expected 
to be optimum level in the industry. 
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The empirical results of the Panzar-Willig estimates of the elasticity of scale 
and the measures adjusted by the equity-asset ratio at the sample mean and 
at individual country and region sample under different models are shown in 
Table 3.24. And the Panzar-Willig measures imply that the banking industry in 
these countries and regions are out of equilibrium. Additionally, the adjusting 
measures of the scale elasticity with equity-asset ratio indicate a small degree 
of increasing returns under the Pitt-Lee Random Effect Model, Battese-Coelli 
Random Effect Model and Greene Random Effect Model; a relatively 
significant increase on returns to scale (0.786 to 1.292) under the Greene 
Fixed Effect Model; however, there is a small decrease on returns to scale 
under Schmidt-Sickles Fixed Effect Model. It is worth noting that both the long 
run Panzar-Willig scale elasticity and adjusted scale elasticity suggest 
diseconomies of scale even the returns to scale are increased by a small 
degree under Pitt-Lee Random Effect Model and Battese-Coelli Random 
Effect Model. And the small degree of increasing returns might imply some 
merger or consolidation in the banking sectors. 
 
3.7 Policy Recommendation from Efficiency Study 
 
The empirical findings of efficiency study shed light on the issue of improving 
the banking efficiency and on the potential reforms in Asian banking industries. 
The policy implications from these findings are summarised as follows.  
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First, our empirical results of the long run Panzar-Willig scale elasticity and 
adjusted scale elasticity indicate that the nine Asian banking sectors exhibit 
diseconomies of scale. This suggests that banks are too large to efficiently 
operate, to effectively utilize resources and earn profits. Thus, large-sized 
banks or over-sized banks that are operating under decreasing returns to 
scale could improve their scale efficiency by reducing their size.  
 
Second, the banking efficiency could be increasing by diversifying the 
ownership structure, promoting liberalization and deregulation. For example, in 
China, especially state-owned banks, which are considered as over-sized 
banks, are less cost efficient than non state-owned banks, could increase their 
efficiency by relaxing the entry requirement of the foreign and private capital to 
dilute the state ownership.  
 
Third, it is worth noting that the Panzar-Willig measures suggest that the 
sampling banking industries are out of equilibrium in the long term. And the 
shadow return on equity is negative after the re-capitalization process as the 
recovery phase from 2008 global financial crisis, that is, banks are required to 
hold higher level of equity capital than they need in the long equilibrium. In a 
result, banks are less efficient since they hold excessive equity that increasing 
the funding costs. Therefore, regulators and policy makers should be more 
cautious about increasing capital adequacy ratio since the benefit gained from 
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increased equity capital rate might be offset by the cost of re-capitalization. 
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Chapter 4 Market Competition Analysis in Asian Banking 
Industries: an application of the traditional modeling 
approaches 
 
4.1 Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) Approach 
 
4.1.1 Introduction 
 
It is very prevalent to analyze the link between performance and market 
structure in the industrial sectors. With reference to the extensive literature, it 
is worth noting that the results have been inconclusive even though “they 
found a relatively large effect of concentration on performance” (Rhoades, 
1977). Since banking market plays a critical role in the economy and regulation 
policies, we employ profitability and concentration to be proxies of 
performance and market structure respectively to investigate the relationship 
between them in the banking industry.  
Similarly to the findings in industrial sectors, bank researchers cannot find a 
consistently significantly positive relationship between concentration and 
profitability. For example, in the researches of Rhoades (1977), Rose and 
Fraser (1976) and Gilbert (1984), only 30 of 39 studies, 6 of 27 estimated 
equations and 27 of 56 studies respectively have been successful to support 
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for the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) approach and back up a 
significantly positive effect of concentration on performance. More importantly, 
with detailed criticism, Osborne and Wendel (1982) suggest that no evidence 
of a positive link between concentration and performance in banking market. 
More and more economists find that the relationship between bank 
performance and market structure is controversial. And this ongoing 
controversy is normally debated with two hypotheses, the traditional 
structure-conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis and efficiency hypothesis. 
The SCP paradigm demonstrates that market structure of industry (cost 
structures, market concentration, and product differentiation, etc.) affects the 
performance of firms (e.g. profitability, market value of firms and growth of new 
business) through the product of firms such as pricing models, collusive 
behavior and competition strategy. The fundamental axiom of the traditional 
SCP hypothesis is that sellers in highly concentrated market can lower their 
costs by collusion. In a highly concentrated market, the market share of 
individual firm is relatively high, that is, the number of firms is small then the 
collusive behavior easily succeeds. As a result of imperfect competition, all 
collusive firms in the market can earn monopoly rents as profits. Essentially, 
the numerous empirical studies with manufacturing data have confirmed that 
market concentration is positively linked with profitability. In this case, it is 
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intuitively easy to believe such a relationship would be verified in the banking 
market. 
In the meantime, the traditional hypothesis has been disputed by a number of 
economists associated with the University of Chicago such as Demsetz (1973), 
McGee (1974)，Peltzamn (1977) and Brozen (1983). Smirlock (1985) named 
this hypothesis as “efficiency hypothesis”, and he concluded the points of 
these scholars and wrote, “concentration is not a random event but rather the 
result of the superior efficiency of the leading firms”. The causal relation 
between market concentration and profitability is opposite. Firms with more 
productive advantages such as superior management, experienced 
employees and innovative technology become large (through pricing 
competition and mergers) and earn more market share then the market 
becomes more concentrated. That is, efficiency is motive force for market 
share and concentration. Efficient leading firms have lower costs then earn 
higher profits. Therefore, in this hypothesis, market share is the proxy of the 
efficiency of firms and it positively related with profits. Instead of collusion, 
concentration emerges from the competitive process, which gives a 
reasonable explanation of the inconsistency of positive relationship between 
concentration and profitability in banking industry. And efficiency hypothesis is 
preferred by Demsetz (1973), Carter (1978), Peltzman (1997) and Smirlock et 
al. (1984), they found evidence by testing the hypothesis with manufacturing 
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data. However, according to Heggestad (1979), and Rhoades and Rutz (1982), 
the relationship between market concentration and profitability might be 
quantitatively weak, especially in the banking sector. That is because 
managers are permitted to behave in a way inconsistent with profit 
maximization, or regulators force efficient banks to undertake actions 
inconsistent with profit maximization, either. 
In summary, both of the traditional SCP approach and the efficiency 
hypothesis state the relationship between market structure and profitability. 
However, these two hypotheses debate with each other for the motive power 
of market concentration. The traditional SCP paradigm regards market power 
as exogenous variable, which is derivative of market concentration by collusive 
behavior. While the efficient hypothesis states another direction, superior 
efficient firms would enlarge to obtain more market share then motivate more 
market power. Therefore, it is very important to determine which of these two 
hypotheses demonstrates the banking market because the regulatory 
applications for policy makers are quite different. If the evidence is provided in 
favor of the traditional SCP approach, in highly concentrated market, the 
collusive pricing behavior of firms is encouraged to earn more profits that 
means these prices would be less beneficial to customers. In this case, 
antitrust policy and regulatory actions should be undertaken to prevent 
accumulation of market power. However, according to the efficiency 
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hypothesis, superior efficient firms will earn supernormal profits. And this 
efficiency is reflected in high market share, thus mergers and acquisitions will 
be inspired. Increasing market concentration is considered to be social costs 
and it is responsibility of banks to outweigh benefits over these costs. As 
asserted by Heggestad (1979), prerequisite of high profits is more resources, 
which indicate a desire for more competition and more entry into markets. 
Thus in favor of the traditional SCP hypothesis, antitrust policy is viewed as a 
social benefit. While according to Rhoades and Rutz (1982), bankers may be 
especially sensitive about showing high profits due to their regulatory status. 
As the regulators may force efficient banks to undertake some actions 
inconsistent with profit maximization, social costs would be incurred. 
4.1.2 The Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) Framework 
In 1963, the US government brought banks under the jurisdiction of antitrust 
laws by applying the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP). After that, 
numerous researches began to analyze the structure-conduct-performance 
relationship in different industries, especially in banking. Then SCP approach 
became a prevalent paradigm in analyzing the effect of concentration on 
performance.   
As we all know, the degree of concentration in the market affects the strength 
of competition among firms since firms could easily collude to price the 
products or reduce the costs in highly concentrated market. For the banking 
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industry, banks would charge higher rates of loans, or lower the deposits rates, 
or charge more service fees as a result of relatively low cost of collusion in 
relatively high concentrated market. Thus, bank performance could be 
estimated as a function of market concentration. And if the estimated 
coefficients of market concentration are significantly positive on performance, 
it can be concluded that the estimated model provides evidence to support 
SCP approach. On the other hand, we can employ the SCP framework to 
investigate competition among banks. It is known that there is no direct ways 
to observe competition level, thus proxies of competition are very necessary. 
One of the most popular proxies is the level of concentration in banking. And 
there are several concentration ratios to be measured as proxies for 
competition. For example, the three-firm concentration ratio (CR3), measuring 
the sum of the market shares of the three largest banks in the market; the 
Herfindhal-Hirschman index (HHI), the sum of squared market shares of all 
banks; Lerner index, which is derived from the differences between market 
price (p) and marginal costs (mc), L=(p-mc)/p; and Boone indicator, the higher 
the Boone indicator is, the stronger is the competition. These proxies will be 
discussed respectively in detail in later parts. 
In spite of the popularity of SCP for analyzing the competition in industrial 
organizations, there are some disadvantages of it that cannot be ignored. For 
example, the direct measure of efficiency is not be incorporated in the SCP 
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approach, the conduct of firms is not considered, etc. Thus the SCP paradigm 
is not the best model for investigate market power and performance. As a 
result of the weaknesses of the SCP approach, some other approaches are 
developed, such as Panzar-Rosse model, Lerner index and Boone indicator. 
4.1.3 Overview of Market Structure in 9 Asian Banking 
Industries 
 
4.1.3.1 Measurements of Market Structure 
 
Besides the product differentiation, and barriers to entry or exit, economists 
usually use market concentration, which describes the state of market with the 
size and the number of banks to measure the degree of competition and to 
differentiate the market form. Among a few of measures of market 
concentration, the concentration ratio and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) are most popular and widely employed proxies. The concentration ratio 
is an indicator of the relative size of firms in one industry in relation to the 
industry as a whole, which facilitate to determine the market structure of the 
industry. Generally, the n-firm concentration ratio ܥܴ௡ is calculated as the 
percentage of market share (MS) occupied by the n largest firms in the 
industry where there are N firms in the whole industry. The higher the 
concentration ratio is, the lower the competition in the market. 
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ܥܴ௡ = ∑ ெௌ೔
೙೔సభ
∑ ெௌ೔೔ಿసభ
               
[4.1] 
As the most commonly used concentration ratio, ܥܴଷ is the three-firm 
concentration ratio, which is calculated by the sum of the market shares of the 
three largest firms in the industry. That is, ܥܴଷ=∑ ெௌ೔
య೔సభ
∑ ெௌ೔೔ಿసభ
. 
 
Table 4.1 demonstrates the market forms, which is classified by the 
concentration ratio as following: 
Table 4.1: Classification of Competition Form Based on Concentration Ratio 
Market From Concentration Ratio 
Low Concentration a very low concentration ratio or close to 0 
Medium Concentration below 40%  
High Concentration above 60% 
Very High Concentration close to 100% 
Source: U.S. Department of Justice 
 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) indicates the degree of the competition 
among firms in the market, which is a very widespread application in 
competition law and antitrust policy to investigate and prevent detrimental 
monopolies and collusion. The HHI index (which can be expressed either as 
decimals between zero and one, or as squared percentage between zero and 
ten thousand) is defined as the sum of the squared market shares of all the 
firms within the industry.  
	 183
HHI= ∑ ܯ ௜ܵଶே௜ୀଵ                
[4.2]                                                
A HHI index below 0.01 (or 100) indicates a highly competitive market. 
A HHI index below 0.15 (or 1500) indicates an unconcentrated market. 
A HHI index between 0.15 and 0.25 (or between 1500 and 2500) indicates 
moderate concentration. 
A HHI index above 0.25 (or above 2500) indicates high concentration. 
Source: U.S. Department of Justice  
 
According to U.S. Department of Justice, mergers resulting in an increase in 
the value of HHI in highly competitive markets or in unconcentrated markets 
are unlikely to have adverse competitive effects, generally there is no 
requirement for further analysis; in moderately concentrated markets mergers 
involving an increase in the HHI of more than 100 points potentially raise 
significant competitive concerns and often warrant scrutiny; in highly 
concentrated markets mergers involving an increase in the HHI of between 
100 points and 200 points potentially lead to significant competitive concerns 
and often warranty scrutiny and mergers resulting in an increase in the HHI of 
more than 2000 points will be presumed to be likely to enhance market power.  
     
An increase in the value of the Herfindahl-Hirschman index generally suggests 
a decline in competitive level and an increase of market power. Compared with 
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concentration ratio, the essential benefit of the HHI index is giving more 
weights to larger firms and the trouble of it is that it needs more information to 
calculate. 
 
In the following section, we employ market share, concentration ratio	ܥܴଷ and 
HHI index with respect to total assets, total loans and total deposits, for 
commercial banks in 9 Asian banking industries during the period from 2005 to 
2012. 
 
4.1.3.2 Concentration Index 
 
To measure the level of market concentration in the banking industry, we adopt 
ܥܴଷ, the total market share of the top three largest banks in the market, which 
is a conventional proxy. As listed in Table 4.2 to Table 3.10, the ܥܴଷ with all 
aspects in Chinese banking sector was constantly greater than 46% even 
though it dropped from 59.6% in 2005. And the highest values of ܥܴଷ were in 
2007, which were 64.6%, 61.8% and 63.7%, respectively. The decline of 
market concentration in loan market is slightly smaller than that in deposit 
market and that in total assets. The ܥܴଷ decreased in deposits and total 
assets by 13%, while only 11% in loans. This may be caused by the growing 
competition from other depository institutions, especially from joint equity 
banks and city commercial banks. In spite of the decrease of market share, 
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these three largest state-owned banks still have absolute advantage, for 
example, policy support, good reputation, more branches and experienced 
staff, and have majority control over the banking industry. In sum, the 
decreasing tendency in market concentration indicates that large banks have 
less market power and the market encounters fierce competition in the sample 
period. According to the classification from the standard literature, and the 
value of ܥܴଷ in the end of sample period is below than 60%, the Chinese 
banking sector should be characterized as moderately concentrated market, 
which was highly concentrated market in the early years. As demonstrated in 
Tables4.2-4.10, the same situation can bee seen in banking industries of India, 
Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand, the ܥܴଷ in terms of all aspects decreased 
by approximately 9%, 7%, 5% and 6%, respectively. The differences of 
decreasing magnitude for concentration in total assets, in total loans and in 
total deposits are less 2%, which is similar with decreasing magnitude 
difference in Chinese banking industry. Specifically, in Indian banking sector, 
the ܥܴଷ in terms of all aspects was always above 35%, which is fallen from 44% 
in the beginning of the sample period. Thus the Indian banking industry could 
be characterized as moderately concentrated market in the whole sample 
period. For the Indonesian banking sector, the values of ܥܴଷ are 43% in total 
assets, 40.7% in total loans and 42.8% in total deposits in 2012. And the ܥܴଷ 
in terms of total assets, total loans and total deposits are 50.3%, 46.9% and 
50.5%, respectively. Even after the level of concentration decreasing over the 
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sample period in all terms, the ܥܴଷ is at least higher than 39.1%. Indonesia 
has a moderately concentrated banking market as well. For the banking 
industry in Singapore, the ܥܴଷ in all three terms was always retained above 
90% in the whole period although it dropped from around 98% in 2005 to 
around 93% in 2012. Based on all three measures, Singapore banking system 
was still dominated by these three large banks. Therefore, Singapore has 
significantly high level of market concentration. For the banking market in 
Thailand, there is a decreasing trend in the sample period. The ܥܴଷ values in 
total assets, in total loans and total deposits have respectively declined from 
58.2%, 59.7% and 58.3% to 52.2%, 51.7% and 53.1%. Since the least the ܥܴଷ 
is 47.9%, the banking industry in Thailand could be identified as moderately 
concentrated market. 
 
Furthermore, the values of ܥܴଷ in three areas show an increasing tendency in 
banking market of HK SAR and Malaysia. As demonstrated in Table 4.3, in HK 
SAR, in 2010, the values of ܥܴଷ in total assets, total loans and total deposits 
get to the highest points that are 81%, 75.9% and 79.4%, respectively. After 
growing from 61.7%, 57.5% and 62.7% for three measures in 2005 to 71.4%, 
66.2% and 68.6% in 2012, the raising magnitude for concentration in deposits 
market is smaller than that in loan market and total assets. The former is 5.9% 
and latter are 9.7% and 8.7%, respectively. And it can be calculated that the 
ܥܴଷ maintains above 60% in the whole sample period, hence the banking 
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market in HK SAR could be recognized as highly concentrated market. 
Meanwhile, in the Malaysia banking industry, the increasing magnitudes for 
concentration in three measures are all around 7%. And in the whole time, 
ܥܴଷ values are keeping increase, the lowest value is 47.9% and the highest 
value is 55.6%. Thus the banking market in Malaysia could be classified to 
moderately concentrated market. 
 
Moreover, in the banking industry of Korea and Taiwan Province of China, the 
changes of market concentration in all three measures are within a reasonable 
range by a very little fluctuation, smaller than 2%. Specifically, in Korea, all 
ܥܴଷ values are always above 51%. It is worthy noting that CR3 in terms of all 
aspects are greater than 60% in 2010 and 2011. Therefore, the banking sector 
in Korea could be characterized as moderately concentrated market in the end 
of sample period, which was highly concentrated in 2010 and 2011. In contrast, 
ܥܴଷ  values to measure the level of market concentration in the banking 
industry in Taiwan Province of China based on three terms are within the range 
from 26.9% to 30.6%, that is, all below 40%. In this case, the banking industry 
in Taiwan Province of China is in a low concentrated market. 
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Table 4.2 Concentration Index in Chinese Banking Sector during 2005-2012 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total Assets                 
CR3 0.596 0.575 0.646 0.621 0.617 0.502 0.482 0.467 
HHI 0.156 0.147 0.153 0.143 0.141 0.117 0.108 0.102 
Total Loans                 
CR3 0.596 0.574 0.618 0.597 0.596 0.506 0.496 0.487 
HHI 0.150 0.138 0.142 0.134 0.133 0.115 0.111 0.108 
Total Deposits               
CR3 0.596 0.580 0.637 0.612 0.609 0.502 0.480 0.464 
HHI 0.156 0.145 0.151 0.141 0.139 0.116 0.107 0.100 
Source: Bankscope and author’s calculation 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.3 Concentration Index in the Banking Sector in HK SAR during 
2005-2012 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total Assets                 
CR3 0.617 0.709 0.720 0.757 0.759 0.810 0.700 0.714 
HHI 0.157 0.260 0.281 0.312 0.310 0.397 0.264 0.275 
Total Loans                 
CR3 0.575 0.641 0.643 0.685 0.706 0.759 0.634 0.662 
HHI 0.140 0.203 0.206 0.226 0.238 0.320 0.205 0.221 
Total Deposits               
CR3 0.627 0.697 0.701 0.730 0.743 0.794 0.672 0.686 
HHI 0.160 0.248 0.258 0.275 0.290 0.367 0.236 0.247 
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Source: Bankscope and author’s calculation 
 
 
 
Table 4.4 Concentration Index in Indian Banking Sector during 2005-2012 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total Assets                 
CR3 0.454 0.427 0.463 0.437 0.408 0.390 0.367 0.365 
HHI 0.111 0.096 0.111 0.108 0.097 0.091 0.081 0.080 
Total Loans                 
CR3 0.452 0.427 0.453 0.425 0.395 0.379 0.357 0.359 
HHI 0.109 0.099 0.110 0.104 0.098 0.090 0.082 0.084 
Total Deposits               
CR3 0.440 0.419 0.446 0.421 0.387 0.369 0.351 0.350 
HHI 0.106 0.094 0.106 0.103 0.093 0.086 0.078 0.078 
Source: Bankscope and author’s calculation 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.5 Concentration Index in Indonesian Banking Sector during 2005-2012 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total Assets                 
CR3 0.503 0.454 0.457 0.446 0.457 0.449 0.435 0.430 
HHI 0.112 0.096 0.098 0.092 0.092 0.089 0.085 0.082 
Total Loans                 
CR3 0.469 0.408 0.391 0.399 0.419 0.411 0.404 0.407 
HHI 0.103 0.083 0.080 0.080 0.084 0.080 0.077 0.077 
Total Deposits                 
CR3 0.505 0.459 0.460 0.450 0.463 0.454 0.436 0.428 
HHI 0.113 0.097 0.099 0.094 0.094 0.090 0.084 0.081 
Source: Bankscope and author’s calculation 
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Table 4.6 Concentration Index in Korean Banking Sector during 2005-2012 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total Assets                 
CR3 0.517 0.523 0.554 0.558 0.529 0.591 0.657 0.535 
HHI 0.134 0.128 0.138 0.142 0.130 0.155 0.174 0.139 
Total Loans                 
CR3 0.545 0.540 0.566 0.580 0.547 0.610 0.689 0.541 
HHI 0.140 0.135 0.143 0.149 0.138 0.160 0.183 0.142 
Total Deposits               
CR3 0.523 0.521 0.553 0.561 0.538 0.607 0.676 0.538 
HHI 0.134 0.128 0.138 0.143 0.133 0.159 0.179 0.141 
Source: Bankscope and author’s calculation 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.7 Concentration Index in Malaysian Banking Sector during 2005-2012 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total Assets                 
CR3 0.483 0.509 0.518 0.542 0.547 0.547 0.547 0.551 
HHI 0.116 0.117 0.118 0.126 0.126 0.128 0.134 0.135 
Total Loans                 
CR3 0.497 0.521 0.521 0.553 0.557 0.556 0.556 0.562 
HHI 0.121 0.123 0.122 0.132 0.131 0.131 0.136 0.139 
Total Deposits               
CR3 0.479 0.503 0.512 0.539 0.542 0.544 0.544 0.546 
HHI 0.114 0.115 0.116 0.125 0.124 0.126 0.132 0.133 
Source: Bankscope and author’s calculation 
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Table 4.8 Concentration Index in the Banking Sector in Singapore during 
2005-2012 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total Assets                 
CR3 0.982 0.893 0.892 0.964 0.921 0.926 0.929 0.931 
HHI 0.338 0.276 0.276 0.319 0.292 0.292 0.296 0.296 
Total Loans                 
CR3 0.980 0.918 0.914 0.956 0.932 0.937 0.937 0.940 
HHI 0.329 0.289 0.288 0.316 0.302 0.302 0.303 0.305 
Total Deposits               
CR3 0.981 0.871 0.872 0.958 0.912 0.919 0.929 0.932 
HHI 0.339 0.273 0.273 0.321 0.294 0.292 0.297 0.299 
Source: Bankscope and author’s calculation 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.9 Concentration Index in the Banking Sector in Taiwan Province of 
China during 2005-2012 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total Assets                 
CR3 0.281 0.291 0.293 0.293 0.303 0.278 0.270 0.269 
HHI 0.061 0.062 0.061 0.061 0.064 0.057 0.055 0.055 
Total Loans                 
CR3 0.281 0.289 0.294 0.296 0.301 0.284 0.281 0.273 
HHI 0.059 0.059 0.060 0.061 0.062 0.058 0.057 0.056 
Total Deposits               
CR3 0.281 0.281 0.282 0.292 0.299 0.275 0.269 0.269 
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HHI 0.061 0.060 0.059 0.061 0.063 0.056 0.055 0.055 
Source: Bankscope and author’s calculation 
 
Table 4.10 Concentration Index in the Banking Sector in Thailand during 
2005-2012 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total Assets                 
CR3 0.582 0.514 0.526 0.500 0.553 0.495 0.479 0.522 
HHI 0.161 0.131 0.131 0.125 0.144 0.126 0.118 0.133 
Total Loans                 
CR3 0.597 0.514 0.528 0.520 0.549 0.492 0.487 0.517 
HHI 0.168 0.132 0.132 0.132 0.145 0.127 0.121 0.131 
Total Deposits               
CR3 0.583 0.514 0.532 0.514 0.563 0.502 0.487 0.531 
HHI 0.166 0.132 0.133 0.128 0.146 0.129 0.119 0.134 
Source: Bankscope and author’s calculation 
 
4.1.3.3 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
 
We employ the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure the market 
concentration. The HHI are also listed in Table 4.2 to Table 4.10. And the 
tendency and fluctuation of HHI provide further evidence to verify the 
classifications of the banking industry in individual country and region.  
 
For the banking industry in China, India, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand, 
the decreasing trend is apparently demonstrated in all terms, that is, total 
assets, total loans and total deposits. And the continuous decline in 
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concentration indicates that large banks have less market power and banking 
market is getting intense competitive than the beginning of the sample period. 
Considering the value of HHI in the end of the sample period and the 
classification from U.S. Department of Justice, the banking industries in China, 
India, Indonesia and Thailand could be sorted as unconcentrated markets. 
While, the value of HHI in Singapore in 2012 is around 0.3, greater than 0.25, 
which should be characterized as a highly concentrated market. 
 
What’s more, it is interesting that there is lasting increasing tendency in HHI of 
all three measures in the banking sector in HK SAR and Malaysia. For the 
banking market in HK SAR, according to the value of HHI in total loans and in 
total deposits in 2012, which are 0.221 and 0.247, respectively, it could be 
classified as a moderately concentrated market. Otherwise, the banks of HK 
SAR are in a highly concentrated market since the value of HHI in total assets 
in 2012 is 0.275. While the values of HHI are near to 0.14 in the end of the 
sample period, Malaysia has an unconcentrated banking market. 
 
Last but not least, the changes of HHI in terms of all three aspects are very 
slight (around 0.006) in both Korea and Taiwan Province of China. For the 
level of concentration in the banking industry in Korea, the HHI is close to 0.14 
in the end of the sample period, thus it could be characterized as an 
unconcentration market. Similarly, the value of HHI is around 0.055 in 2012 so 
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that the banking sector in Taiwan Province of China is classified as an 
unconcentrated market as well.  
4.1.4. Methodology 
 
4.1.4.1 Specification of SCP in the literature 
 
To test the traditional SCP and efficiency hypothesis, the following equation 
can be used (Weiss (1974), Simirlock (1985) and Lloyd-Williams et al. (1994)): 
݌௜ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܯ ௜ܵ௧ ൅ ߚଶܥܱ ௜ܰ௧ ൅ ∑ߚ௡ܼ௜௧+ߝ௜௧                              [4.3] 
where p is the measurement of performance, i.e. ROE or ROA, MS is market 
share of each bank, CON is a measure of market structure (generally a 
concentration ratio), Z presents a vector of control variables which influence 
the performance of banks and ߝ௜௧ is error term. 
 
The equation provides the straightforward discrimination between two 
hypotheses. The traditional SCP hypothesis is preferred if ߚଵ=0 and ߚଶ>0; 
which indicates that market share does not affect firm’s profitability and 
profitability is the result of concentrated market. While the efficiency 
hypothesis can be supported by finding ߚଵ>0 and ߚଶ=0，which implies that 
more efficient firms with larger market shares can obtain higher profits than 
their opponents. And a brief summary of empirical results of some 
representative studies of SCP approach is listed in the following Table 4.11. 
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Table 4.11 Summary of Empirical Results of Literature with SCP Approach	
Authors Country SCP  Efficiency 
Smirlock (1985) US   Yes 
Evanoff and Fortier (1988) US   Yes 
Lloyd-Williams and Molyneux (1994) Spain Yes   
Molyneux and Forbes (1995) European Yes   
Katib (1998) Malaysia Yes   
Tu and Chen (2000)  Taiwan   Yes 
Bos (2004) Netherland Yes   
Al-Karasneh and Fatheldin (2005) Saudi Arabia Yes   
  Kuwait and the UAE   Yes 
Athanasoglou et al. (2005) South Eastern European Yes   
Athanasoglou et al. (2008)  Greek No evidence found 
Samad (2008) Bangladesh   Yes 
Alexiou and Sofoklis (2009) Greek No evidence found 
Nurwati et al. (2014) Indonesia Yes   
Giorgis Sahile et al. (2015) Kenya   Yes 
Mohammed et al. (2015) Malaysia Yes   
 
4.1.4.2 Specification of SCP in this thesis 
 
The equation used to test the two hypotheses for the commercial banks in 
selected Asian banking sectors is shown as follows: 
ܴܱܣ௜௧	ሺܴܱܧ௜௧ሻ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܯ ௜ܵ௧ ൅ ߚଶܥܱ ௜ܰ௧ ൅ ߚଷܶܣ௜௧ ൅ ߚସሺܧ/ܶܣሻ௜௧ + ߚହሺܶܮ/ܶܣሻ௜௧ ൅
ߚ଺ሺܶܮ/ܶܦሻ௜௧+ߚ଻ሺܮܮܲ/ܶܮሻ௜௧+ߚ଼ሺܱܧ/ܴܶሻ௜௧+ߝ௜௧                          [4.4] 
ܴܱܣ	= Return on assets=net income/total assets 
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ܴܱܧ	= Return on equity=net income/equity 
ܯܵ= Market share of i-th bank based on total assets 
CON=HHI=∑ ܯ ௜ܵଶே௜ୀଵ  
TA= Total Assets 
E/TA= Equity/total assets 
TL/TA=Total loans/total assets 
TL/TD= Total loans/total deposits 
LLP/TL= Loan loss provisions/total loans 
OE/TR= Total operating expenses/total revenue 
ߝ௜௧= Error term 
 
4.1.4.3 Fixed effect model and random effect model 
 
The empirical equation can be estimated by fixed effect model and random 
effect model, two very widely used methods in estimating the panel data that 
combines both time series and cross sections. 
ݕ௜௧ ൌ ௜ܺ௧ᇱ ߚ ൅ ߝ௜௧  
ߝ௜௧ = ߭௜௧ ൅ ߤ௜                
[4.5] 
In the fixed effect model, the ߤ௜ are treated as n constants specific to each 
observation. The Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) estimator gives the 
fixed effect and ߚመிா is always consistent but not efficient. 
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ݕ௜௧  = ߙ௜௧ ൅ ௜ܺ௧ᇱ ߚ ൅ ߭௜௧                
[4.6] 
In the random effect model, the ߤ௜ are treated as independently distributed 
random variables with ߤ௜~ iid(ߤ,ߪఓଶ). The Feasible Generalized Least Square 
(FGLS) estimator gives the random effect and ߚመோா is consistent and efficient if 
E (ߤ௜| ௜ܺ௧ሻ ൌ 0. 
ݕ௜௧  = ௜ܺ௧ᇱ ߚ ൅ ሺ߭௜௧ ൅ ߤ௜ሻ                
[4.7] 
To test whether the random effect model is better than the fixed effect model, 
Hausman test will be used: 
ܪ଴:	ߚመிா-ߚመோா=0 
ܪଵ:	ߚመிா-ߚመோா ്0                                                    [4.8] 
If Hausman test rejects ܪ଴, fixed effect model remains consistent but random 
effect model is inconsistent, therefore, fixed effect model is preferred. While if 
ܪଵ is rejected, fixed effect model and random effect model are both consistent 
and random effect model is favored as a result of the efficiency of random 
effect model. 
 
4.1.5 Variables Specification and Data Collection 
 
4.1.5.1 Performance Measurement 
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According to pervious literature, there are numerous proxies of performance 
measurement. And referring to the studies of performance-concentration 
relationship with SCP approach, there are two most popular proxies, price and 
profit.  
 
Majority of earlier researches of SCP paradigm in banking industry (e.g. Stolz 
(1976), Heggestad and Mingo (1976,1977), Osborne (1977), Heggestad 
(1979), Osborne and Wendel (1982), Gilbert (1984), etc.) have selected prices 
as the measures of bank performance. These price proxies usually employ 
different interest rates of products, for example, average interest rates on 
loans or interest rates of deposits. Besides the interest ratio, other actual price 
measures such as service charges on demand deposits, interest on certificate 
of deposits, interest on time savings are widely used. However, the evidence 
from those studies indicates very little relationship between price and market 
share and suggests inconclusive link between price and concentration. As 
suggested by Molyneux and Forbes (1995), banks are often involved in cross 
subsidization among products and services. Therefore, if employed price as 
performance proxy, more information on prices would be indispensable as 
individual price of particular product or service might be fairly misleading. 
 
To mitigate the weaknesses of prices, more and more studies have chosen to 
employ profits as performance proxy since profit is regarded as one single 
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value appropriately integrating gains and losses of all products and services. 
According to recent literature, bank profitability measures, return on assets 
(ROA) and return on equity (ROE), are commonly used to represent bank 
performance. Since ROA reflects the ability of banks earning profits from total 
assets，it is always viewed as the most popular profitability measurement. 
However, as noted by Heggestad (1979) and Tu and Chen (2000), this proxy is 
far from ideal, total assets in most financial statements are inconsistent with 
their market value and partial assets included in total assets are unrelated with 
the profits. From the view of shareholders, the return on equity is more closely 
related to profit maximization. In this case, it is more appropriate to employ 
ROE as profitability measurement. However, banks with higher leverage would 
normally generate lower ROA but higher ROE. And generally, regulation 
authorities determine financial leverage of banks and ROE might overlook 
risks associated with high leverage, thus ROE is not appropriate for profitability 
measurement and this view is line with Athanasoglou et al. (2008). Given the 
merits and defects of ROA and ROE, we utilize both of them as measures of 
profitability.  
 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is opted to be a measure of market 
concentration and the market share of particular bank is used to measure bank 
efficiency. 
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4.1.5.2 Bank Specific Control Variables Specification  
 
To analyze the relationship between bank performance and 
concentration/efficiency, we need to include some bank specific control 
variables that represent the characteristics of banks such as size, risk and cost. 
With referring previous studies, we introduce the most prevalent bank specific 
control variables (Shown in Table 4.12). 
 
Table 4.12 Bank Specific Control Variables in Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) 
Variable Expected impact on ࢼ 
Total assets TA (ln TA) +/- 
Equity/total assets E/TA +/- 
Total loans/total assets TL/TA + 
Total loans/total deposits TL/TD - 
Loan loss provisions/total loans LLP/TL - 
Operating expenses/total revenue OE/TR +/- 
 
 
Bank size plays a crucial role in the performance of banks. Total asset is 
generally employed to measure bank size, which associates to product 
differentiation and risk diversification and implies the potential economies of 
scale (or diseconomies of scale) in the banking industry. According to Akhavin 
et al. (1997), Bourke (1989), Molyneux and Thornton (1992), Bikker and Hu 
(2002) and Goddard et al. (2004), there is a highly positive relationship 
between the size of bank and profitability due to the effect of significant 
economics of scale. However, in some literature studied by the authors such 
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as Berger et al. (1987), Boyd and Runkle (1993), Miller and Noulas (1997) and 
Athanasoglou et al. (2005), it concludes that with the development of banking 
market increase the size of banks has very limit effect to reduce the cost of 
banks. That is, the effect of raising the size of a developing bank on 
performance may be positive until reaching a limit (Eichengreen and Gibson, 
2001). Once beyond this highest point, the relationship between bank size and 
profitability could turn to be negative due to bureaucracy of large institutions 
and risk reduction of portfolio diversification. It is known that large banks more 
likely to diversify their financial products to lower risks and products with less 
risk normally produce less profit. Therefore, the relationship between bank size 
and profitability would be expected to be positive or negative. Taking into 
account of its importance, we prefer to introduce total assets of banks to be 
one of control variables to ascertain the bank size and performance 
relationship. 
 
Furthermore, given the impact of risk on performance of banks, we need to 
lead risks into profitability. After choosing ROA and ROE as proxies of 
profitability, we notice that both of them are not risk adjusted. In this case, 
some control variables embodying solvency risk, business risk, liquidity risk 
and credit risk should be introduced into the model. First of all, equity capital, 
well known as cushion of bank collapse, is one of the most important 
prerequisite dedicating to the performance of banks. Generally, the ratio of 
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equity to capital (E/TA) is employed to be the proxy of solvency risk to measure 
the capitalization of commercial banks. In spite of the critical role of equity 
capital, the effect of it on profitability of banks is indistinct. The effect is 
determined by the reason of holding the equity and the extent of capitalization. 
If equity capital were held due to prudential behavior of bank itself or regulatory 
policy of authorities, it would be applied to absorb losses to lower the risk so 
that it would promote the growth of profits. Therefore, it would be expected a 
positive relationship between equity capital and profitability of commercial 
banks. However, if equity capital exceeded the compulsory level required by 
regulatory policy, it would lead to higher cost of capital for banks. Hence, we 
would expect a negative relationship between equity capital and bank 
profitability. 
 
Secondly, the ratio of loans to total assets (TL/TA) seems to be another 
considerable determinant of bank performance because the major source of 
bank revenue is from interests. Explicitly, the loan market is more risky so 
leading to higher expected return than other assets of banks (e.g., government 
securities). Hence, the higher the ratio of loans to total assets, the more 
revenue banks would earn. Therefore, we would expect a positive relationship 
between the ratio of loans to total assets and bank profitability.  
 
Thirdly, the ratio of loans to total deposits (TL/TD) is considered to be one of 
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most significant factors of bank profitability. The reason for is that the profit of 
commercial banks is equal to the interests of loans minus the interest paid to 
depositors, which is the cost of raising funds. In this case, the higher TL/TD 
ratio, the more costs of funds and default risk associating with loans. Thus it 
would expect the TL/TD ratio to be negatively related with bank profitability. 
Fourthly, according to Duca and McLaughlin (1990) variations in assets quality 
greatly contributes to variations in bank profitability, as decrease of bank 
profitability would increase the exposure of credit risk. Thus assets quality 
does affect performance of commercial banks since it mirrors the extent of the 
health of loan portfolio. Therefore, it is very necessary to measure the assets 
quality. We could employ the percentage of loan loss provisions to total loans 
(LLP/TL). As a high LLP/TL ratio may be with more risk and lower profits, we 
would expect a negative relationship between the percentage of LLP/TL and 
bank profitability. 
 
Last but not least, cost differences among banks considerably impact the 
differences of profits of banks. We can include the ratio of the operating 
expenses to total revenue (OE/TR) to demonstrate cost differences. However, 
the impact of OE/TR ratio on bank profitability is ambiguous. Bourke (1989) 
concludes a negative relationship between OE/TR ratio and performance of 
banks. That is because improvement of banking efficiency would decrease 
operating expenses then increase profits of commercial banks. In contrast, 
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Molyneux and Thornton (1992) suggest an opposite way, they suggest that 
high OE/TR ratio normally caused by employing high quality staff (such as 
experienced managers and expertise) and these productive employees would 
earn higher profits for banks. That is why they find that OE/TR ratio is 
positively related to bank profitability.  
4.1.5.3 Data Collection 
 
In this research, we collect annual unconsolidated accounting data for living 
commercial banks from nine Asian countries and regions from 2005 to 2012. 
The majority of data are from financial statements (balance sheets and income 
statements) in Bankscope based on the generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP). For the missing data not reported in Bankscope, they are 
selected from other sources such as annual report of individual bank, the 
statistical yearbook and statistical department of each country. And these data 
are cautiously checked. Then we convert these data to US dollars using a 
purchase power parity exchange rate (PPP), adjusted for inflation as well. 
Table 4.13 summarizes the statistics of variables included in our estimation 
model. 
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Table 4.13 Summary Statistics of Variables during the Period 2005-2012 (mil US $) 
   ROA ROE MS HHI TA E/TA TL/TA TL/TD LLP/TL OE/TR
1  Mean 0.009 0.158 0.019 0.131 255662 0.058 0.481 0.523 0.007 0.148 
 Std.Dev. 0.004 0.072 0.047 0.020 638901 0.022 0.098 0.106 0.005 0.079 
Minimum -0.002 -0.195 0.000 0.102 1235 0.010 0.144 0.156 -0.002 0.033 
 Maximum 0.029 0.582 0.264 0.156 4145136 0.236 0.698 0.754 0.027 0.750 
2  Mean 0.011 0.124 0.058 0.279 87209 0.096 0.490 0.577 0.003 0.143 
 Std.Dev. 0.005 0.077 0.114 0.060 188972 0.033 0.114 0.134 0.004 0.081 
Minimum -0.008 -0.078 0.001 0.157 812 0.037 0.151 0.162 -0.008 0.045 
Maximum 0.028 0.389 0.608 0.397 1086003 0.253 0.760 0.969 0.021 0.614 
3  Mean 0.009 0.138 0.025 0.096 75768 0.066 0.592 0.665 0.007 0.094 
 Std.Dev. 0.005 0.078 0.043 0.012 129393 0.030 0.051 0.053 0.005 0.051 
Minimum -0.023 -0.519 0.000 0.080 667 0.033 0.342 0.473 -0.003 0.041 
 Maximum 0.036 0.512 0.282 0.111 1003839 0.336 0.682 0.929 0.046 0.385 
4  Mean 0.009 0.138 0.025 0.096 75768 0.066 0.592 0.665 0.007 0.094 
 Std.Dev. 0.005 0.078 0.043 0.012 129393 0.030 0.051 0.053 0.005 0.051 
Minimum -0.023 -0.519 0.000 0.080 667 0.033 0.342 0.473 -0.003 0.041 
Maximum 0.036 0.512 0.282 0.111 1003839 0.336 0.682 0.929 0.046 0.385 
5  Mean 0.008 0.115 0.082 0.141 111745 0.066 0.675 0.794 0.007 0.137 
 Std.Dev. 0.004 0.052 0.071 0.014 101357 0.014 0.060 0.061 0.003 0.031 
Minimum 0.000 0.010 0.002 0.128 2600 0.036 0.479 0.614 0.000 0.089 
 Maximum 0.029 0.340 0.264 0.174 347333 0.099 0.809 0.918 0.016 0.220 
6  Mean 0.011 0.141 0.059 0.125 41527 0.094 0.541 0.624 0.005 0.118 
 Std.Dev. 0.004 0.071 0.063 0.007 47364 0.052 0.163 0.180 0.006 0.043 
Minimum -0.009 -0.143 0.001 0.116 507 0.036 0.011 0.019 -0.007 0.034 
Maximum 0.024 0.383 0.264 0.135 260069 0.369 0.854 1.092 0.045 0.228 
7  Mean 0.011 0.105 0.211 0.313 131340 0.111 0.507 0.648 0.003 0.145 
 Std.Dev. 0.004 0.043 0.162 0.055 103129 0.029 0.135 0.161 0.004 0.060 
Minimum 0.002 0.023 0.008 0.283 5182 0.053 0.203 0.218 -0.011 0.060 
 Maximum 0.021 0.221 0.637 0.538 329991 0.186 0.807 1.026 0.017 0.298 
8  Mean 0.002 0.018 0.033 0.059 52697 0.066 0.620 0.686 0.009 0.168 
 Std.Dev. 0.008 0.153 0.030 0.003 48733 0.046 0.120 0.119 0.014 0.077 
Minimum -0.054 -1.157 0.001 0.055 2150 0.024 0.013 0.040 -0.016 0.064 
Maximum 0.022 0.456 0.144 0.064 258226 0.485 0.827 0.907 0.094 0.754 
9  Mean 0.009 0.068 0.075 0.133 40788 0.120 0.666 0.820 0.011 0.218 
 Std.Dev. 0.011 0.169 0.067 0.012 37439 0.072 0.121 0.179 0.011 0.078 
Minimum -0.070 -1.037 0.001 0.118 677 0.020 0.293 0.452 -0.022 0.096 
 Maximum 0.035 0.194 0.240 0.161 138868 0.376 0.899 1.514 0.074 0.656 
Note: Country 1-9 means China, HK SAR, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China, Thailand, respectively. 
 
	 206
4.1.6. Empirical Results 
 
The regression results for the sample of commercial banks in Asian during the 
period 2005 to 2012 are exhibited in Table 4.14 to Table 4.22, which include 
the estimated parameters and t-ratios with ROA and ROE as independent 
variable respectively. According to the results of Hausman test, the panel fixed 
effect model is preferred as the estimation model. And as we can see from 
tables, the R-square values are among 0.659 to 0.896 for ROA, among 0.560 
to 0.909 for ROE, respectively. It suggests that the estimated regressions fit 
the sample data relatively well compared with previous researches, the 
R-square values of which generally around 0.2 to 0.5, even extremely lower 
than 0.1 (see Gilbert (1984), Goddard et al (2001)). However, we cannot to 
choose ROA or ROE to be a better proxy of profitability given the goodness of 
fit. In the cases such as China, India, Taiwan Province of China and Thailand, 
ROA should be profitability measure as higher R-square values. While, 
empirical results of HK SAR, Malaysia and Singapore indicate another 
conclusion that ROE is a better profitability proxy. Most importantly, regarding 
to the estimation results of commercial banks in Indonesia and Korea, the 
R-square values for ROA and ROE are almost the same. And this conclusion 
is quite different with the studies by Athanasoglou et al. (2008) and Yang 
(2013), in which they believe that the estimations based on ROE produce 
inferior results for Greece and China, respectively. 
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Table 4.14 The SCP estimation results in Chinese Banking Sector  
Variables ROA   ROE   
  Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
MS -0.01769 -0.82 -0.62711 -1.33 
HHI -0.0123 -0.82 0.17186 0.52 
TA (ܔܖ܂ۯ) 0.00098 1.56 0.01454 1.05 
E/TA .05233*** 4.79  -1.08291*** -4.52 
TL/TA -0.00157 -0.11 -0.27011 -0.86 
TL/TD 0.00255 0.2 0.26305 0.93 
LLP/TL -.24314*** -8.62 -5.37110*** -8.68 
OE/TR -.01461*** -6.38 -.32710*** -6.51 
R-square 0.65944   0.56046 
F-statistics 9.28364   6.11344   
***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively 
	
	
Table 4.15 The SCP estimation results in the Banking Sector in HK SAR  
Variables ROA   ROE   
  Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
MS 0.01731 1.15 0.228 1.2 
HHI -0.00872 -1.61 -0.05877 -0.86 
TA (ܔܖ܂ۯ) -0.00129 -1.02 -0.02483 -1.57 
E/TA 0.01909 1.02 -1.25965*** -5.36 
TL/TA -.03998* -1.74 -.80002*** -2.77 
TL/TD .03981** 2.23 .73015*** 3.25 
LLP/TL -0.13834 -1.65 -1.31931 -1.25 
OE/TR -.02811*** -5.44 -.31225*** -4.81 
R-square 0.72722   0.78941 
F-statistics 10.96016   15.41088   
***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively 
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Table 4.16 The SCP estimation results in Indian Banking Sector  
Variables ROA   ROE   
  Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
MS 0.05084 1.21 1.41578* 1.94 
HHI -0.0154 -0.6 -0.12627 -0.28 
TA (ܔܖ܂ۯ) -0.00066 -0.77 -0.00696 -0.47 
E/TA .05324*** 2.6 -0.21672 -0.61 
TL/TA -0.01335 -0.6 -.77788** -2.01 
TL/TD -0.00154 -0.08 0.44039 1.29 
LLP/TL -.28439*** -7.4 -4.69350*** -7.03 
OE/TR -.03229*** -3.73 -.52619*** -3.5 
R-square 0.67173   0.61096 
F-statistics 10.84526   8.32314   
***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively 
	
	
Table 4.17 The SCP estimation results in Indonesian Banking Sector  
Variables ROA   ROE   
  Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
MS -.13093** -2.18 -0.78912 -1.34 
HHI .07576* 1.68 0.0503 0.11 
TA (ܔܖ܂ۯ) .49230D-04 0.04 -0.00543 -0.49 
E/TA .07088*** 4.88 -0.00309 -0.02 
TL/TA -0.00619 -0.52 0.09356 0.81 
TL/TD .01713* 1.67 -0.03268 -0.33 
LLP/TL -.04723** -1.98 -0.29487 -1.26 
OE/TR -.05810*** -6.1 -.40263*** -4.32 
R-square 0.81072   0.81971 
F-statistics 21.14797   22.44898   
***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively 
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Table 4.18 The SCP estimation results in Korean Banking Sector  
Variables ROA   ROE   
  Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
MS 0.01307 0.82 -0.03469 -0.16 
HHI .04100* 1.69 .75426** 2.27 
TA (ܔܖ܂ۯ) -.00686*** -4.7 -.09872*** -4.92 
E/TA .08637*** 3.04 -0.18784 -0.48 
TL/TA -0.00899 -0.79 -0.21192 -1.35 
TL/TD -0.0108 -1.17 -0.16431 -1.29 
LLP/TL -.46616*** -5.58 -6.84157*** -5.96 
OE/TR -.01760* -1.84 -0.14657 -1.11 
R-square 0.71324   0.72245 
F-statistics 8.47919   8.87392   
***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively 
	
Table 4.19 The SCP estimation results in Malaysian Banking Sector 
Variables ROA   ROE   
  Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
MS -.05656* -1.88 -0.00248 -0.01 
HHI 0.0513 0.87 -1.44577* -1.7 
TA (ܔܖ܂ۯ) -.00402** -2.22 -0.02217 -0.85 
E/TA 0.01474 1.2 -.81197*** -4.59 
TL/TA -0.00651 -0.7 -.28193** -2.1 
TL/TD 0.00874 1.17 .26765** 2.5 
LLP/TL -.43754*** -13.3  -6.40017*** -13.52 
OE/TR -.05324*** -7.11 -.73491*** -6.83 
R-square 0.84646   0.88029 
F-statistics 22.05231   29.41327   
***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively 
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Table 4.20 The SCP estimation results in the Banking Sector in Singapore 
Variables ROA   ROE   
  Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
MS -.05970* -1.86 0.05085 0.19 
HHI -0.0071 -0.21 -0.32442 -1.13 
TA (ܔܖ܂ۯ) 0.00319 1.24 -0.00571 -0.26 
E/TA .11854*** 3.37 -0.17289 -0.58 
TL/TA 0.01675 1.09 .24090* 1.85 
TL/TD -0.01688 -1.5 -.21003** -2.2 
LLP/TL -0.17621 -1.36 -2.98277** -2.71 
OE/TR -.03560** -2.51 -.29642** -2.47 
R-square 0.84333   0.90338 
F-statistics 9.93738   17.26142   
***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively 
	
Table 4.21 The SCP estimation results in the Banking Sector in Taiwan Province 
of China 
Variables ROA   ROE   
  Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
MS .41085*** 4.39 5.76203*** 3.09 
HHI  -.44694*** -4.25 -4.95611** -2.36 
TA (ܔܖ܂ۯ) -.00643*** -3.95 -.06592** -2.03 
E/TA .22063*** 6.72 2.74007*** 4.18 
TL/TA  .12936*** 6.23 .70516* 1.7 
TL/TD -.13201*** -7.2 -.82587** -2.25 
LLP/TL -.41736*** -19.82 -8.14704*** -19.37 
OE/TR -.02190*** -5.25 -.58108*** -6.98 
R-square 0.85757   0.83725 
F-statistics 27.86548   23.80715   
***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively 
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Table 4.22 The SCP estimation results in the Banking Sector in Thailand  
Variables ROA   ROE   
  Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
MS -0.03978 -1.11 -1.1129 -1.43 
HHI .11993** 2.37 2.91497*** 2.66 
TA (ܔܖ܂ۯ) -.00556*** -2.79 -0.059 -1.37 
E/TA 0.01941 0.87 -0.11501 -0.24 
TL/TA -0.00052 -0.04 .75169*** 2.99 
TL/TD 0.0046 0.57 -0.28501 -1.64 
LLP/TL -.45908*** -8.58 -5.68728*** -4.9 
OE/TR -.07756*** -9.6  -1.45843*** -8.32 
R-square 0.89607   0.79356 
F-statistics 32.52966   14.50242   
***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively 
 
The Table 4.23 demonstrates that there is no certain relationship between 
concentration and profitability in our sample data set during the period 
2005-2012. For the commercial banks in China, HK SAR, India, Malaysia and 
Singapore, both the coefficient on market shares and the coefficient on market 
concentration (HHI) are insignificant for either ROA or ROE as profitability 
measures. In this case, the results from these countries and regions do reject 
both the SCP hypothesis and the Efficiency hypothesis. For the banking sector 
in Indonesia, the coefficient on the HHI is insignificant for both independent 
variables, while the coefficient on market share is highly significant when ROA 
is the dependent variable. However, the sign of the parameter of market share 
is negative that is inconsistent with the efficiency hypothesis. Thus the results 
from the sample of Indonesia reject both hypotheses as well.  
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Moreover, for the commercial banks in Taiwan Province of China, the 
coefficient on the HHI is significant for both ROA and ROE except the sign of it 
is negative which is contrary with the SCP hypothesis. Therefore, the SCP 
hypothesis is rejected once again. And this situation is consistent with the 
empirical result of the recent studies. For example, Berger (1995) asserts that 
concentration is normally negatively related to profitability when other effects 
are controlled in the profitability regression equation. And according to 
Athanasoglou et al. (2008), there is a negative relationship between the 
market concentration and profitability in Greek banking sector although the 
effect is relatively insignificant. The same conclusion can be obtained from 
Chinese banking industry given the report of Yang (2013). However, the 
coefficient on market share is positive and highly significant when either ROA 
or ROE used as proxies of profitability. We can conclude that both efficiency 
and concentration highly affect profitability. 
 
Furthermore, the empirical results of commercial banks in Korea and Thailand 
support the SCP hypothesis. It is notable that the coefficient of market share is 
insignificant for both independent variables while the coefficient of the HHI is 
positive and highly significant with profitability measures (for Korean 
commercial banks, the HHI is only positive and significant with ROE). That is, 
in these two countries, high profits earned by larger banks are a consequence 
of their operating in concentrated markets and collusive pricing behavior. 
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Table 4.23 Estimation Results  
    ROA ROE 
Country   The sign The effect  Support The sign  The effect  Support 
China 
  
Efficiency Hypothesis - insignificant No - insignificant No 
SCP Hypothesis - insignificant No + insignificant No 
HK SAR 
  
Efficiency Hypothesis + insignificant No + insignificant No 
SCP Hypothesis - insignificant No - insignificant No 
India 
  
Efficiency Hypothesis + insignificant No + insignificant No 
SCP Hypothesis - insignificant No - insignificant No 
Indonesia 
  
Efficiency Hypothesis - significant No - insignificant No 
SCP Hypothesis + insignificant No + insignificant No 
Korea 
  
Efficiency Hypothesis + insignificant No - insignificant No 
SCP Hypothesis + insignificant No + significant Yes 
Malaysia 
  
Efficiency Hypothesis - insignificant No - insignificant No 
SCP Hypothesis + insignificant No - insignificant No 
Singapore 
  
Efficiency Hypothesis - insignificant No + insignificant No 
SCP Hypothesis - insignificant No - insignificant No 
Taiwan 
Province of 
China 
Efficiency Hypothesis + significant No + significant No 
SCP Hypothesis - significant No - significant No 
Thailand 
  
Efficiency Hypothesis - insignificant No - insignificant No 
SCP Hypothesis + significant Yes + significant Yes 
	
The effect of bank size (total assets, TA, ln ܶܣ) on profitability is positive and statistically 
significant. The significant positive relationship implies that large banks present economies of 
scale in the banking sector. The larger amounts of total assets for a bank, the greater 
advantages bank has, such as more branches and more experienced employees. This 
enables them to attract more customers and provide more services, so they can make more
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profits. Moreover, there may be “too big to fail” effect. If the size of the bank is 
too large, generally there is some complicit assumption that the government 
will not allow bankruptcy for large banks. The failure of large banks has serious 
impact on national economy. And the collapse of one large bank may cause 
public panic and bank run for other bank due to possible domino effects. 
Therefore, bank clients are more confident for larger banks than small banks, 
and large banks can generate more profits. 
 
The positive and significant coefficient on the ratio of equity to total assets 
(E/TA) variable suggests that banks hold equity capital for prudential reasons, 
because with a sound capital position bank is able to pursue business 
opportunities more effectively and has more time and flexible to deal with 
problems arising from unexpected losses, thus achieving increased profitability. 
It also implies that through stronger capitalization, banks can reduce the 
expected costs of financial distress and credibly transmit the expectation of 
better performance. 
 
The estimated coefficient of the equity to total assets (E/TA) is reported with 
the expected negative sign for all specifications. Gunalp and Celik (2006) also 
found significant negative relationship with the absolute level of revenue in 
Turkey. The negative sign reflects that the higher ratio of equity to total assets 
generate less revenue. This is because more equity bank reserve, less fund 
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they can lend out, thus smaller leverage effect reduces the bank revenue it can 
earn.  
 
The ratio of total loans to total assets (TL/TA) has the expected positive sign. 
The positive effect indicates that higher fraction of loans to total assets 
generate greater income. This is because more loans bank can make, more 
interest income bank can earn, so more revenue they can generate. An 
alternative explanation based on risk and return can also be provided. The 
greater uncertainty for the possibility of default make bank loan risky; the more 
loans reflect more risks associated with banks, so higher revenue should be 
compensated for the higher risk bear by bank. This result is consistent with the 
findings reported by Mamatzakis et al (2005), Gunalp and Celik (2006) and 
Trivieri (2007). If the effect of total loans to total assets on banks is insignificant, 
the substantial proportion of non-performing loans may explain it. 
 
The coefficients on ratio of loan loss provision to total loans (LLP/TL) are 
expected to be negative. It suggests that more provisions make for possible 
loan loss, the less revenue bank can earn. The same resulted are reported by 
Mamatzakis et al (2005), Al-Muharrami et al. (2006) and Matthews et al. 
(2007). Commercial banks should focus more on the credibility assessment, 
loans monitor and risk management, which has been proved problematic in 
the financial crisis. Serious bad loans problems have arisen from 
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policy-oriented loans and the failure of banks to recognize those impaired 
assets and create reserves for writing-off these assets. Thus, limiting the 
government intervention and improving the transparency of the financial 
system is quite essential, which will assist bank to evaluate credit risk more 
effectively and avoid problems associated with hazardous exposure. 
 
The operating expenses appear to be an important determinant of profitability. 
The ratio of other expenses to total revenue presents a negative and 
significant effect on banks profitability. This implies a lack of competence in 
expenses management for commercial banks, since banks pass part of 
increased costs to customers and the remaining part to profits, possibly due to 
the fact that competition does not allow them to “overcharge”. Clearly, efficient 
cost management is prerequisite for the improved profitability of the banking 
sector. 
 
The coefficients of the ratio of total loans to total deposits on profitability are 
expected to be negative. The higher the amount of loans as percentage of 
deposits, the greater costs associated with raising funds and risks associated 
with loan defaults, thus banks earn low profits.  
 
This section has provided a detailed study for two of the major traditional 
hypotheses for modeling competition and performance in banking systems. As 
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the results show these traditional models leave many issues unanswered and 
are unable to provide us with a clear conclusion about the nature of 
competition measurement in banking. Therefore it is necessary for the 
researcher to examine a wider range of models and applications to these 
important issues. This research now considers some of these further models.
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4.2 Lerner Index 
 
The Lerner index can be estimated as a proxy of market power to measure market 
competition (Lerner, 1934). The Lerner index measures the mark-up of price over 
marginal costs and is therefore an indicator of the degree of market power. Since 
low competition implies high market power and vice versa, a high value of Lerner 
index indicates low levels of competition. The bank-level Lerner Index is calculated 
as 
ܮ݁ݎ݊݁ݎ௜௧=( ௜ܲ௧ െ ܯܥ௜௧ሻ/	 ௜ܲ௧                                         [4.9] 
where ௜ܲ௧ is the price of total assets (proxied by the ratio of total revenues to total 
assets of bank i at time t), ܯܥ௜௧ is the marginal cost of bank i at time t. This is 
derived from a translog cost function as follows: 
ln ܥ݋ݏݐ௜௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ lnܳ + ఉమଶ ሺlnܳሻଶ +∑ ߛ௞ଶ௞ୀଵ lnݓ௞ +∑ ߶௞ଶ௞ୀଵ lnܳ lnݓ௞ +∑ ∑ lnݓ௞ lnݓ௝ଶ௝ୀଵଶ௞ୀଵ  + ߜଵ T+ 
ߜଶܶଶ+ߜଷTൈ lnܳ+ܶ ൈ lnݓ௞+ߝ                                               [4.10]   
                                           
where Cost represents total bank cost, calculated as total expenses over total 
assets; Q represents a proxy for bank output or total assets. ݓଵ,	ݓଶ and ݓଷ 
represent three input prices of funding, labor and fixed capital, respectively, and 
are calculated as the ratios of interest expenses to total deposits, personnel 
expenses to the number of employees, other operating and administrative 
expenses to fixed capital and, respectively. T represents yearly fixed effects to 
capture the changes of technologies over time. The summary statistics of these 
variables are calculated in Table 4.24. 
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Following Turk-Ariss (2010), we scale cost and input prices by ݓଷ to correct for 
heteroscedasticity and scale biases. The equation is estimated separately for each 
country. Finally marginally costs (MC) are then computed as  
MC=஼௢௦௧ொ ሺߚଵ ൅ ߚଶ lnܳ ൅ ∑ ߶݇2݇ൌ1 ln ݓ݇+ߜଷT)                                   [4.11] 
 
To measure country-specific bank competition (Lerner index), weighted average 
country-specific Lerner indices are estimated and listed as Table 4.25. However, 
there is one significant potential problem with this bank-level Lerner index 
indicated by Berger et al. (2009). In particular, the ratio of interest expenses to total 
deposits may embody market power only in the deposit market. According to Craig 
and Dinger (2009), to address this problem, we can weigh individual bank Lerner 
indices by the share of bank deposits over total deposits at regional level, as 
deposit markets are more local than loan markets. Then Table 4.26 provides the 
empirical results of Lerner index weighted by deposits during the period 
2005-2012. 
 
The main drawback of Lerner index is that it does not capture risk premia in prices 
of banks’ outputs (products and services, etc.). A higher value of Lerner index can 
be related with banks undertaking more risk for given marginal costs in a 
perfectively competitive market, this may be confused with its positive correlation 
with the size of monopoly rents. 
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Table 4.24 Summary Statistics of Variables during the Period 2005-2012 
  Variable TC TA  ER PF PL PK TR 
China 
 Mean 6707 255662 0.059 0.019 0.046 0.878 11368 
 Std.Dev. 16154 638901 0.040 0.008 0.028 0.636 28560 
Minimum 27 1235 0.010 0.005 0.002 0.174 44 
Maximum 108338 4145136 0.753 0.068 0.217 5.903 196625 
HK SAR 
  
 Mean 2001 87209 0.096 0.020 0.066 1.230 3312 
 Std.Dev. 4152 188972 0.033 0.012 0.021 2.056 7021 
Minimum 28 812 0.037 0.003 0.005 0.079 30 
Maximum 25039 1086003 0.253 0.054 0.115 15.292 38391 
India 
 Mean 5165 75768 0.066 0.057 0.030 1.148 6588 
 Std.Dev. 9289 129393 0.030 0.010 0.009 0.874 11788 
Minimum 43 667 0.033 0.030 0.015 0.180 52 
Maximum 75124 1003839 0.336 0.110 0.066 7.826 94374 
Indonesia 
  
 Mean 590 8169 0.127 0.052 0.031 2.057 855 
 Std.Dev. 1012 15312 0.066 0.018 0.035 2.065 1565 
Minimum 5 96 0.015 0.008 0.008 0.141 6 
Maximum 5231 92825 0.366 0.125 0.356 16.000 8466 
Korea 
 Mean 4448 111745 0.066 0.030 0.118 0.752 6166 
 Std.Dev. 4148 101357 0.014 0.008 0.034 0.374 5743 
Minimum 129 2600 0.036 0.014 0.067 0.315 160 
Maximum 18065 347333 0.099 0.049 0.225 2.407 23349 
Malaysia 
  
 Mean 1391 41527 0.094 0.024 0.055 2.541 2132 
 Std.Dev. 1515 47364 0.052 0.009 0.032 2.558 2307 
Minimum 17 507 0.036 0.008 0.019 0.462 25 
Maximum 8362 260069 0.369 0.094 0.220 14.417 12751 
Singapore 
 Mean 2928 131340 0.111 0.016 0.074 4.092 4770 
 Std.Dev. 2147 103129 0.029 0.009 0.023 7.530 3447 
Minimum 133 5182 0.053 0.005 0.040 0.402 172 
Maximum 6877 329991 0.186 0.037 0.125 36.000 10086 
Taiwan  
Province  
of China 
 Mean 1085 52697 0.066 0.013 0.071 0.449 1523 
 Std.Dev. 907 48733 0.046 0.006 0.029 0.523 1254 
Minimum 40 2150 0.024 0.002 0.032 0.058 55 
Maximum 4738 258226 0.485 0.033 0.343 5.427 5456 
Thailand 
  
 Mean 1588 40788 0.120 0.022 0.087 1.546 2405 
 Std.Dev. 1324 37439 0.072 0.009 0.148 1.523 2155 
Minimum 9 677 0.020 0.006 0.020 0.150 14 
Maximum 4801 138868 0.376 0.049 0.920 9.733 8221 
Source: author’s own estimation from sample data 
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Table 4.25 Empirical Results of Lerner Index for 9 Asian Countries and Regions (2005-2012) 
Year/Country China 
HK 
SAR 
India Indonesia Korea Malaysia Singapore 
Taiwan 
Province of 
China 
Thailand
2005 34.41 31.95 26.61 28.53 25.52 36.00 36.84 32.41 34.67 
2006 38.30 31.76 26.51 29.25 24.41 36.34 31.31 28.87 24.49 
2007 41.18 32.74 25.63 30.92 24.49 36.61 32.95 28.00 30.79 
2008 41.31 32.84 26.63 30.65 26.60 37.79 38.54 23.80 33.36 
2009 43.37 40.79 28.35 32.89 50.22 40.22 41.40 25.38 38.70 
2010 45.95 42.73 29.84 34.55 31.77 41.58 39.00 31.48 41.38 
2011 43.73 40.25 28.23 34.74 27.88 39.89 37.02 31.72 37.56 
2012 40.02 42.75 27.92 34.68 27.83 38.59 39.94 33.07 37.48 
Source: author’s own estimation from sample data 
 
 
 
Table 4.26 Empirical Results of Lerner Index Weighted by Deposits during the period 2005-2012 
Year/Country China HK SAR India Indonesia Korea Malaysia Singapore 
Taiwan 
Province of 
China 
Thailand
2005 34.23 37.70 26.82 30.08 25.79 37.27 36.87 32.46 36.84 
2006 39.04 35.89 25.23 29.80 25.69 35.90 31.61 29.56 29.39 
2007 42.74 36.70 24.25 32.50 25.71 35.63 33.89 29.15 31.52 
2008 43.84 41.07 26.74 34.78 27.20 36.02 37.58 27.15 35.60 
2009 43.35 47.84 27.65 36.54 51.94 38.13 48.39 29.17 39.02 
2010 46.83 44.53 30.00 39.76 31.31 40.14 42.92 32.99 41.53 
2011 45.93 45.39 29.48 39.13 28.44 38.91 44.10 32.31 39.35 
2012 44.09 47.12 28.76 40.87 27.79 38.36 44.83 34.42 40.12 
Source: author’s own estimation from sample data 
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It can be seen that these estimates are very high suggesting either that the 
degree of monopoly power in these banking systems is extremely strong or 
that there are measurement issues with this approach to the evaluation of 
competition. 
 
Although the estimation of the Lerner index has a long history in competition 
analysis, there must be considerable doubt about the use of this simple 
measure to address the issue when only the marginal cost side of the 
measurement is considered. The interaction of demand and marginal costs is 
likely to be important in assessing competition, and therefore a structural form 
approach to modeling is necessary before the Lerner analysis can become 
useful. 
 
Consequently, alternative approaches to competition measurement have been 
suggested which depend on reduced form approaches to the modeling. 
Notable amongst these is the work of Panzar and Rosse to which the thesis 
now turns. 
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Chapter 5 Market Competition in Asian Banking Industries: an 
application of the new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) 
Panzar-Rosse approach  
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
Asian banking markets have been undergoing dramatic changes due to 
deregulation of financial services, support by policy makers, quality 
improvement of products, developments in information technology and 
innovations in the industry. However, financial crisis occurred in 2008, since 
then, the entire financial system has encountered unparalleled changes and 
difficulties. These significant changes will have considerable implications for 
competition and concentration in the banking sector since the indispensable 
role of banks in financial system. The process of concentration caused by 
mergers, acquisitions, entry into the market, and exit the market may affect 
competition, particularly on local markets for retail banks. And increased 
concentration and the size and number of the new players may cause 
concerns about financial stability. Thus the competition in banking market 
inextricably associates with financial stability. Consequently the brunt of the 
mission for each individual country is maintaining the financial stability and 
preserving the sustainability of economic growth so that they can recover from 
the financial crisis as soon as possible. Therefore, market structure of the 
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banking industry and the degree of market competition haven been and will 
always be one of the most valuable topics for investors, policy makers and 
economists. In recent years, compared with banking markets in Europe, in the 
US and other developed countries, relatively few empirical studies have 
investigated competition and concentration in Asian banking industries. This 
chapter attempts to measure current market structure of individual banking 
sector, determine the degree of competition and investigate the effect of 
market concentration on competition in Asian banking systems. 
 
According to previous literature, the main empirical methodologies applied to 
measure the competition in banking markets may be divided into two 
mainstreams, the structural approach and the non-structural approach. The 
structural approach to determine competition includes the traditional 
Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm, the efficiency hypothesis and a few 
of formal approaches based in industrial organization theory. As stated in the 
last chapter, the SCP paradigm suggests that superior performance is the 
result of collusive behavior among larger banks in highly concentrated market; 
while the efficiency hypothesis indicates that superior efficiency in leading 
banks would result in advanced market performance. And in the structural 
approach, the N-firms concentration ratio and the Herfindhal-Hirschman Index 
(HHI) are widely employed as the measurements of market concentration. 
However, these market concentration indicators primarily focus on determining 
	 225
the competition conditions in market and little consider the behavior of market 
participants themselves. To remedy the theoretical and empirical deficits of the 
structural approach, New Empirical Industrial Organization approaches 
including the Iwata model, Bresnahan model and the Panzar-Rosse  (PR) 
model have been developed to investigate the essence and characteristics of 
competition. These non-structural models stress on analyzing the competitive 
conduct of banks without exploiting accurate information of the market 
structure. Different from the emphasis of the structural models is examining the 
market structure (concentration) and performance  (profitability) relationship, 
the Panzar-Rosse model is introduced to our empirical study to evaluate the 
competition conditions, estimate the degree of concentration and determine 
the impact of market concentration on competition.  
  
5.2  The Panzar-Rosse Approach 
 
Rosse and Panzar (1977) formulated simple models for different competition 
conditions. Then Panzar and Rosse (1987) developed them as the 
Panzar-Rosse (PR) approach, which is one of New Empirical Industrial 
Organization econometric methodologies to quantitatively evaluate the 
competition conditions of markets. That is, Panzar and Rosse (1987) 
expanded an empirical test to discriminate oligopolistic, competitive and 
monopolistic markets. 
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The PR model based on the theory that banks will set price in reaction to 
changes in input prices or changes in the other exogenous variables differently 
according to the market power of individual bank and the market structure of 
the banking industry. And different pricing polices will lead to different revenues. 
Thus changes in revenues can project the market structure of the banking 
sector. As we all know, variations in profits can reflect the market structure as 
well. In this chapter, we employ the PR model with revenues rather than profits 
because the data of revenues are more easily collected and more transparent 
than profits. Another reason is, exogenous variables can be modeled as a 
vertical shift in the cost curve and the impact of them can be inferred from 
revenues alone. Therefore, we can examine the competition conditions by 
evaluating variations in revenues to changes in input prices.  
 
The Panzar-Rosse test is derived from a reduced form revenue equation at 
bank level under certain assumptions and introduces a new statistic H to 
measure the competitive behavior of banks. Bikker and Haaf (2002) indicate 
“the PR competition test is derived from a general banking market model, 
which determines equilibrium output and the equilibrium number of banks, by 
maximizing profits at both the bank level and the industry level”. Thus because 
of the assumptions such as banks are seen as profit-maximising firms, 
long-term equilibrium conditions and profit maximization must be satisfied 
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before employing the PR competition test. And other authors approve these 
assumptions, for instance, De Bandt and Davis (2000) point out these 
assumptions besides “banks face homogeneous production function” and 
Molyneux et al. (1996) suggest “higher input prices are not associated with 
higher quality services that generate more revenues” as well as these 
assumptions. Specifically, one critical assumption, which must be examined, is 
that the competition test of H statistic is feasible only if the market is in the long 
run equilibrium. And when the market is in equilibrium, profit should not be 
significantly associated with input prices. That is because in long run 
equilibrium profits are affected by market structure rather than short run 
shocks.  
 
The reduced form revenue equation can be derived in the following: 
If we have technology T, 
T (x, y)=ሼݔ, ݕ	:	ݔ	ܿܽ݊	݉ܽ݇݁	ݕሽ                                        [5.1]               
P (x)=	ሼݕ	:	ݕ ∈ 	T	ሺx, yሻሽ                                             [5.2]                
Then we can choose y to maximize revenue, 
R (x, p)=max ሼ݌ݕ	:	ݕ ∈ 	p	ሺxሻሽ                
[5.3]                                                                    
This is the structural form that revenue depends on inputs x and output prices 
p. 
We choose x to minimize costs given input prices w and exogenous variables z 
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and output y: 
C (y, w, z)=min ሼݓݔ	:	ݔ, ݕ ∈ 	T	ሺx, y, zሻ	given	zሽ               
[5.4]                               
Now allow for market power: p=p (y), we can maximize profit: 
ߨ	ሺݓ, ݖሻ= max	ሼ݌ሺݕሻݕ െ ݓݔ	:	ݔ, ݕ ∈ 	T	ሺx, y, zሻሽ                          [5.5]                
Then we can re-arrange it, 
R (w, z)=	ߨ	ሺݓ, ݖሻ+ C ( , w, z), where is in the long run equilibrium      
[5.6]            
So the reduced form of revenue is a function of input prices w and exogenous 
variables z. 
 
Then the reduced form revenue equation can be written as follows, which 
generally states that at market equilibrium bank i earn its revenue R is a 
function of a set of input prices w and a vector of exogenous variables z that 
affect its revenue. 
ln ܴ௜௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ∑ ߚ௜ lnݓ௜௧ ൅௡௜ୀଵ ∑ ߜ௜ ln ݖ௜௧ ൅௠௜ୀଵ ߳௜௧                               [5.7]                   
The market power is measured by the extent to a change in input prices (߲ݓ௜ሻ 
with respect to the change in revenues ( ߲ܴ௜ሻ  earned by bank i. The 
Panzar-Rosse approach evaluates the market competition by statistic H, which 
is the sum of the elasticity of the bank revenue with respect to the bank’s input 
prices, H=∑ డோ೔డ௪೔
௡௜ୀଵ . Then, the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic can be written as 
y y
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H=∑ ߚ௜௡௜ୀଵ . 
 
As mentioned before, one critical assumption must be examined before testing 
the degree of market competition due to competition test of H statistic is 
feasible only if the market is in the long run equilibrium. And when the market 
is in equilibrium, profits (the rate of return) should not be significantly 
associated with input prices, which is because in long run equilibrium profits 
are affected by market structure rather than short run shocks. Hence the long 
run equilibrium condition can be tested by employing the same model used in 
competition test (equation [5.7]) and replace the revenues with the rate of 
return as dependent variable. Then we calculate E statistic, which is the sum 
of the elasticity of the bank’s profit with respect to the input prices. And if the 
value of E statistic is equal to zero, the long-term equilibrium condition is 
satisfied. Otherwise, other values suggest disequilibrium and reject the long 
run equilibrium assumption. 
ln ܴܱܣ௜௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ∑ ߚ௜ lnݓ௜௧ ൅௡௜ୀଵ ∑ ߜ௜ ln ݖ௜௧ ൅௠௜ୀଵ ߳௜௧                           [5.8]                   
E=∑ ߚ௜௡௜ୀଵ  
 
The Panzar-Rosse H statistic represents the percentage variation in revenues 
resulting from one percent aggregate change in the prices of input factors used 
by the bank. Table 5.1 enumerates the economic interpretations of H statistics. 
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Table 5.1 Interpretations of H statistics 
Estimated value Interpretations 
Competition test   
H≤0 
Monopoly, perfectly colluding oligopoly, conjectural variations short run 
oligopoly 
0<H<1 Monopolistic competition 
  H is a decreasing function of monopoly power. 
H=1 
Perfect competition, natural monopoly in perfectly contestable market, sales 
maximizing firm subject to a breakeven constraint 
Equilibrium Test   
E<0 Disequilibrium 
E=0 Equilibrium 
Source: summarized from previous researches 
 
The first market model PR model determined states monopoly. According to 
PR approach, if banks manipulate as a monopoly in the banking industry, H 
statistic will be zero or negative. That is because under monopoly, an increase 
in input prices will increase marginal costs, reduce equilibrium output and in 
returns reduce revenues. Hence, variation in revenues of monopolist is in the 
opposite direction with the change in input prices. Furthermore, in the 
extraordinary case of perfect collusion oligopoly and conjectural variations 
short run oligopoly, the value of H is non-positive, similar to monopoly model. 
 
	 231
Besides the monopoly model, there are three other commonly models 
employed by Panzar and Rosse to investigate monopolistic competition, 
perfect competition and conjectural variation oligopoly for an industrial market. 
And H statistics are positive in these three models. In addition, the revenue 
function of individual bank depends on the behavior such as decisions making 
and pricing of its rivals. If an industry market is characterized as perfectly 
competition, the value of H statistic will be equal to one. Under perfect 
competition, banks’ products are regarded as perfect substitutes of one 
another, and demand elasticity approaches infinity. Thus a proportional 
increase in all input prices will increase marginal costs and average costs by 
the same proportion without changing in equilibrium output (i.e., the optimal 
output of any individual firm). For the purpose of survival, banks will have to 
increase output prices until they could cover the increased costs. In the price 
adjusting process, inefficient banks might be driven out of the market by 
competition or via mergers and acquisitions of efficient leading banks. 
Meanwhile, exit of some banks in the market leads to reduce the supply of the 
industry and increase the demand of each of surviving banks, consequently 
resulting in increases of output prices and revenues by equivalent amount as 
rise in costs. Panzar and Rosse (1987) indicate that H statistic is unity as well 
for a sales-maximizing firm, which is subject to breakeven constraint and a 
natural monopoly in a perfectly contestable market. Under monopolistic 
competition, the value of H statistic is between zero and unity. It is known that 
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in monopolistic competitive market, the core business of banks is considerably 
homogeneous and product differentiation of banks normally emphases on 
product quality, services quality and advertising. Hence, in spite of behaving 
like monopolists, banks cannot perfectly substitute of one another so that they 
cannot earn superior profits as monopoly. Therefore, positive value of H 
statistic indicates that banks produce more and the price is less than would be 
maximized in each individual level. And rise in revenues will be less than 
proportionally increase in input prices in monopolistic competitive banking 
market.  
 
In the similar line with Panzar and Rosse (1987), Vesala (1995) proves that H 
statistic is non-positive for monopolistic competition with a fixed number of 
banks. And when banks are under monopoly, H statistic is a decreasing 
function of demand elasticity. While, when H statistic is positive, H is an 
increasing function of the demand elasticity, that is, the less market power is 
excised on the certain banks, the higher H statistic generates. In addition, the 
results of Vesala (1995) indicate a positive relationship between H statistic and 
the number of banks and a negative relationship between H statistic and 
banking concentration. Therefore, both the sign and the magnitude of H 
statistic are significantly important to serve as measures of competition. Bikker 
and Haaf (2002) agree with this conclusion as well. They suggest that the 
value of H statistic lies between zero and unity under monopolistic competition. 
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And H generally increases with the competitiveness of the banking market, 
which is a decreasing function of monopoly power. Hence higher value of H 
statistic implies stronger competition.  
5.3  Methodology 
 
5.3.1 Competition test  
 
Apply the Panzar-Rosse approach to the commercial banks in our empirical 
study with the following equation: 
ln ܴ௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅
ߚଵ ln ܲܨ௜௧+ߚଶ ln ܲܮ௜௧ ൅ߚଷ ln ܲܭ௜௧+ߛଵ lnሺܶܮ௜௧ ܶܣ௜௧⁄ ሻ+	ߛଶ lnሺܧ௜௧ ܶܣ௜௧⁄ ሻ+	ߛଷ lnሺܮܮ ௜ܲ௧ ܶܮ௜௧⁄ ሻ+ߜଵT+߳௜௧ 
[5.9]                     
where i denotes the i-th bank and t denotes the t-th year. 
R=bank revenue and ܴ௜௧ can be	ܫܴ௜௧,	ܴܶ௜௧,	ܫܴ௜௧/ܶܣ௜௧,	ܴܶ௜௧/ܶܣ௜௧.  
IR=interest revenue, that is, interest income from loans. 
TR=total revenue, that is, the sum of interest income and other operating 
income (fee income, commission income and other non-interest income) 
PF=price of fund, the ratio of interest expense to total deposits 
PL=price of labor, the ratio of personnel expense to the number of employees 
PK=price of capital, the ratio of other operating expense to fixed assets 
TL=total loans 
TA=total assets 
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E=equity capital 
LLP=loan loss provisions 
T=time trend 
߳௜௧ is the error term. 
In the estimation model of competition test, the dependent variable is bank 
revenue (IR, TR, IR/TA, TR/TA), which is explained by the prices of three input 
factors (PF, PL, PK), three bank specific control variables (TL, TA, E) and time 
trend (T). And the Panzar-Rosse H statistic is calculated as the sum of 
coefficients of three input price variables: H=ߚመଵ ൅ ߚመଶ ൅ ߚመଷ 
 
According to previous literature (Table 5.15), there are four different 
specifications for dependent variables, which include unscaled interest 
revenue (the absolute value of interest revenue), unscaled total revenue (the 
absolute value of total revenue), scaled interest revenue (the ratio of interest 
revenue to total assets) and scaled total revenue (the ratio of total revenue to 
total assets). Although these four alternative specifications of bank revenue 
are universally employed as dependent variables in empirical studies, there is 
no consensus on the best proxy of bank revenue. Given different 
specifications may provide different results of the same model for competition 
test, we use all four specifications to estimate the H statistic and investigate 
the respective impact of these specifications on the value of H. 
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Generally, researchers agree on applying intermediation approach, which 
regards banks as financial intermediaries providing financial services, to 
employ deposits, labor and physical capital as input factor variables in 
competition test. We use the similar proxies for input factors as previous 
empirical studies. Specifically, proxy for price of funds (PF) is the ratio of 
interest expense to total deposits; the ratio of personnel expenses to total 
number of employees is used as proxy for price of labor (PL) is; and the ratio of 
other operating expense to fixed assets represents price of capital (PK). 
However, as stated in different theories, there are contradictions on the expect 
signs of the coefficients of input factor variables. Hence we do not have certain 
expected signs in our empirical results. 
 
Beside three input factor variables, additional independent variables, in other 
words, bank specific control variables are included in competition test. With 
different directions and purposes of studies, the employed control variables will 
differ. The common intend of their selections is that bank specific variables can 
reflect differences in risk, size and cost of individual bank. Firstly, we employ 
the ratio of total loans to total assets (TL/TA) to reflect the risk associated with 
loans made by banks. Since the main source of revenue in banks is from 
interests of loans, the more loans banks can make, the more interest income 
banks can earn, in returns the more revenue banks can obtain. Hence, we 
expect a positive sign of coefficient of TL/TA. Secondly, the ratio of equity to 
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total assets (E/TA) is an important bank specific variable, which is a proxy for 
solvency risk to examine the capitalization and leverage effect of banks. The 
relationship between capital ratio (E/TA) and revenue is not straightforward 
due to the expected sign of the coefficient is ambiguous. This is because, 
higher capital ratio means more equity for reserve, thus less money could be 
loaned out, in returns less revenue banks can generate. In this case, the 
coefficient is expected to be negative. However, if equity capital were held for 
prudent reasons, it can be used to absorb losses and lower bankrupt risk so 
that it will increase the growth of revenue. And in this way, the coefficient is 
expected to be negative. In addition, the ratio of loan loss provision to total 
loans (LLP/TL), a third important variable have to be considered since it is 
another determinate of bank’s revenue. It is known that the provision of loan 
loss reserves is used to write off the bad debts. Hence, the more loan loss 
provision banks require to cover the bad loans, the less revenue banks can 
earn. Therefore, the sign of the coefficient of LLP/TA is expected to be 
negative. Moreover, we should take the effect of technology innovations and 
time trend into account, so the estimation model should include a time dummy 
(T). The expected signs of coefficients of control variable are listed in Table 
5.11. 
 
In this empirical study, we use the fixed effect model to estimate our panel data 
sample according to the result of Hausman test, which indicates that the fixed 
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effect model is more appropriate than the random effect model.  
 
 
5.3.2 Equilibrium Test 
 
The Panzar-Rosse model is feasible only if the market is in long run 
equilibrium, so equilibrium condition must be examined before competition test. 
And the equilibrium test is estimated by the following equations: 
ln ܴܱܣ௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅
ߚଵ lnܲܨ௜௧+ߚଶ ln ܲܮ௜௧ ൅ߚଷ lnܲܭ௜௧+ߛଵ lnሺܶܮ௜௧ ܶܣ௜௧⁄ ሻ+	ߛଶ lnሺܧ௜௧ ܶܣ௜௧⁄ ሻ+	ߛଷ lnሺܮܮ ௜ܲ௧ ܶܮ௜௧⁄ ሻ+ߜଵT+߳௜௧   [5.10]   
 
ln ܴܱܧ௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅
ߚଵ lnܲܨ௜௧+ߚଶ ln ܲܮ௜௧ ൅ߚଷ lnܲܭ௜௧+ߛଵ lnሺܶܮ௜௧ ܶܣ௜௧⁄ ሻ+	ߛଶ lnሺܧ௜௧ ܶܣ௜௧⁄ ሻ+	ߛଷ lnሺܮܮ ௜ܲ௧ ܶܮ௜௧⁄ ሻ+ߜଵT+߳௜௧    [5.11] 
 
E=ߚመଵ ൅ ߚመଶ ൅ ߚመଷ 
 
As mentioned in last section, the equilibrium test is conducted by the same 
reduced form revenue equation in the competition test and employ the rate of 
return (ROA and ROE) to instead revenues as dependent variable. ROA is the 
return on total assets and ROE is the return on equity, which are commonly 
used in the literature. ROE emphases the leverage effects of equity capital 
compared with the ROA, which measures the relative profitability. 
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The equilibrium test is to estimate the value of E statistic, the sum of 
coefficients on three input factor prices, is equal to zero or not. It indicates that 
the banking market is in long run equilibrium if E=0, otherwise, disequilibrium. 
In other words, ROA or ROE should be significantly uncorrelated with input 
prices in equilibrium. 
 
5.3.3 Data Collection 
 
In our empirical study, we collect annual unconsolidated accounting data 
based on the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) for living 
commercial banks from nine Asian countries and regions from 2005 to 2012. 
The majority of data are from financial statements including balance sheets 
and income statements in Bankscope. For the missing data not reported in 
Bankscope, they might be found from other sources such as annual report of 
individual bank, the statistical yearbook and statistical department of each 
country. And these data are cautiously checked. Then we convert these data 
to US dollars in millions using a purchase power parity exchange rate (PPP), 
which could adjust inflation as well. The summary statistics of the variables 
included in our estimation model in individual country and region are provided 
in Table 5.2 to Table 5.10, respectively.  
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Table 5.2 Summary Statistics of Variables in the Banking Sector in China 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. 
PF 0.019 0.008 0.005 0.068 424 
PL 0.046 0.028 0.002 0.217 424 
PK 0.878 0.636 0.174 5.903 424 
TL/TA 0.481 0.098 0.144 0.698 424 
E/TA 0.058 0.022 0.010 0.236 424 
LLP/TL 0.007 0.005 -0.002 0.027 424 
IR 5900 14970 26 98742 424 
TR 11368 28560 44 196625 424 
IR/TA 0.023 0.006 0.007 0.043 424 
TR/TA 0.045 0.009 0.013 0.090 424 
ROA 0.009 0.004 -0.002 0.029 424 
ROE 0.158 0.072 -0.195 0.582 424 
Source: author’s own estimation from sample data 
 
 
Table 5.3 Summary Statistics of Variables in the Banking Sector in HK SAR 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. 
PF 0.020 0.012 0.003 0.054 139 
PL 0.066 0.021 0.005 0.115 139 
PK 1.230 2.056 0.079 15.292 139 
TL/TA 0.490 0.114 0.151 0.760 139 
E/TA 0.096 0.033 0.037 0.253 139 
LLP/TL 0.003 0.004 -0.008 0.021 139 
IR 1363 2827 11 15801 139 
TR 3312 7021 30 38391 139 
IR/TA 0.017 0.005 0.010 0.038 139 
TR/TA 0.042 0.013 0.022 0.085 139 
ROA 0.011 0.005 -0.008 0.028 139 
ROE 0.124 0.077 -0.078 0.389 139 
Source: author’s own estimation from sample data 
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Table 5.4 Summary Statistics of Variables in the Banking Sector in India 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. 
PF 0.057 0.010 0.030 0.110 316 
PL 0.030 0.009 0.015 0.066 316 
PK 1.148 0.874 0.180 7.826 316 
TL/TA 0.592 0.051 0.342 0.682 316 
E/TA 0.066 0.030 0.033 0.336 316 
LLP/TL 0.067 0.005 0.056 0.105 316 
IR 1906 3464 18 28952 316 
TR 6588 11788 52 94374 316 
IR/TA 0.025 0.005 0.011 0.049 316 
TR/TA 0.087 0.011 0.064 0.141 316 
ROA 0.009 0.005 -0.023 0.036 316 
ROE 0.138 0.078 -0.519 0.512 316 
Source: author’s own estimation from sample data 
 
Table 5.5 Summary Statistics of Variables in the Banking Sector in Indonesia 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. 
PF 0.052 0.018 0.008 0.125 381 
PL 0.031 0.035 0.008 0.356 381 
PK 2.057 2.065 0.141 16.000 381 
TL/TA 0.597 0.134 0.145 0.893 381 
E/TA 0.127 0.066 0.015 0.366 381 
LLP/TL 0.008 0.015 -0.059 0.147 381 
IR 416 826 0 5232 381 
TR 855 1565 6 8466 381 
IR/TA 0.046 0.018 0.002 0.103 381 
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TR/TA 0.102 0.027 0.037 0.225 381 
ROA 0.015 0.011 -0.021 0.059 381 
ROE 0.126 0.112 -0.363 0.867 381 
Source: author’s own estimation from sample data 
 
 
Table 5.6 Summary Statistics of Variables in the Banking Sector in Korea 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. 
PF 0.030 0.008 0.014 0.049 98 
PL 0.118 0.034 0.067 0.225 98 
PK 0.752 0.374 0.315 2.407 98 
TL/TA 0.675 0.060 0.479 0.809 98 
E/TA 0.066 0.014 0.036 0.099 98 
LLP/TL 0.007 0.003 0.000 0.016 98 
IR 2599 2379 85 9561 98 
TR 6166 5743 160 23349 98 
IR/TA 0.024 0.004 0.015 0.035 98 
TR/TA 0.056 0.007 0.044 0.087 98 
ROA 0.008 0.004 0.000 0.029 98 
ROE 0.115 0.052 0.010 0.340 98 
Source: author’s own estimation from sample data 
 
Table 5.7 Summary Statistics of Variables in the Banking Sector in Malaysia 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. 
PF 0.024 0.009 0.008 0.094 136 
PL 0.055 0.032 0.019 0.220 136 
PK 2.541 2.558 0.462 14.417 136 
TL/TA 0.541 0.163 0.011 0.854 136 
E/TA 0.094 0.052 0.036 0.369 136 
LLP/TL 0.005 0.006 -0.007 0.045 136 
IR 913 1032 11 5737 136 
TR 2132 2307 25 12751 136 
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IR/TA 0.021 0.005 0.009 0.035 136 
TR/TA 0.052 0.009 0.026 0.093 136 
ROA 0.011 0.004 -0.009 0.024 136 
ROE 0.141 0.071 -0.143 0.383 136 
Source: author’s own estimation from sample data 
 
 
Table 5.8 Summary Statistics of Variables in the Banking Sector in Singapore 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. 
PF 0.016 0.009 0.005 0.037 38 
PL 0.074 0.023 0.040 0.125 38 
PK 4.092 7.530 0.402 36.000 38 
TL/TA 0.507 0.135 0.203 0.807 38 
E/TA 0.111 0.029 0.053 0.186 38 
LLP/TL 0.003 0.004 -0.011 0.017 38 
IR 2067 1590 39 4985 38 
TR 4770 3447 172 10086 38 
IR/TA 0.016 0.004 0.005 0.024 38 
TR/TA 0.038 0.010 0.021 0.061 38 
ROA 0.011 0.004 0.002 0.021 38 
ROE 0.105 0.043 0.023 0.221 38 
Source: author’s own estimation from sample data 
 
Table 5.9 Summary Statistics of Variables in the Banking Sector in Taiwan 
Province of China 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. 
PF 0.013 0.006 0.002 0.033 243 
PL 0.071 0.029 0.032 0.343 243 
PK 0.449 0.523 0.058 5.427 243 
TL/TA 0.620 0.120 0.013 0.827 243 
E/TA 0.066 0.046 0.024 0.485 243 
LLP/TL 0.009 0.014 -0.016 0.094 243 
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IR 625 512 3 2909 243 
TR 1523 1254 55 5456 243 
IR/TA 0.013 0.005 0.002 0.044 243 
TR/TA 0.031 0.009 0.013 0.069 243 
ROA 0.002 0.008 -0.054 0.022 243 
ROE 0.018 0.153 -1.157 0.456 243 
Source: author’s own estimation from sample data 
 
Table 5.10 Summary Statistics of Variables in the Banking Sector in Thailand 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. 
PF 0.022 0.009 0.006 0.049 106 
PL 0.087 0.148 0.020 0.920 106 
PK 1.546 1.523 0.150 9.733 106 
TL/TA 0.666 0.121 0.293 0.899 106 
E/TA 0.120 0.072 0.020 0.376 106 
LLP/TL 0.011 0.011 -0.022 0.074 106 
IR 1217 1109 9 3728 106 
TR 2410 2156 14 8221 106 
IR/TA 0.030 0.007 0.013 0.059 106 
TR/TA 0.061 0.014 0.020 0.092 106 
ROA 0.009 0.011 -0.070 0.035 106 
ROE 0.068 0.169 -1.037 0.194 106 
Source: author’s own estimation from sample data 
 
	
5.3.4 Empirical Results 
 
The empirical results for different specifications of the dependent variables (IR, 
TR, IT/TA and TR/TA) by estimated the model with unbalanced panel data for 
the period from 2005 to 2012 are demonstrated in the Table 5.11 to Table 5.19 
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as following. 
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Table 5.11 Estimation Results of Equilibrium Test and Competition Test in Chinese Banking Sector 
for 2005-2012  
 
Equilibrium Test              
ROA E=0.045 (4.76) 
ROE E=0.052 (4.04) 
Competition Test              
Unscaled Revenue Scaled Revenue 
IR TR IRTA TRTA 
Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio 
PF .17677*** 4.69 .52188*** 17.18 .13990***  4.56 .48501*** 29.31 
PL .16510*** 4.86 .05163* 1.88 .16453*** 5.93 .05106*** 3.42 
PK 0.06032 1.65 .08351*** 2.82 -0.00858 -0.29 0.01461 0.91 
TL/TA -.55972*** -6.11 -.75559*** -10.22 .45459*** 6.08 .25872*** 6.42 
E/TA 0.0551 1.24 -.06459* -1.81 .17843*** 4.94 .05874*** 3.02 
LLP/TL .80186*** 4.36 .40099*** 2.7 .66849*** 4.46 .26763*** 3.31 
T .19029*** 21.7 .19118*** 27.02 -0.00101 -0.14 -0.00011 -0.03 
R-square 0.98813 0.99218 0.64088 0.82521 
H  0.402 0.657 0.296 0.551 
H=0 0.40219*** -8.68 0.65702*** -6.17 0.29585*** -12.53 0.55068*** -14.84 
H=1 -0.59781*** 5.84 -0.34298*** 11.82 -0.70415*** 5.27 -0.44932*** 18.19 
***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively 
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Table 5.12 Estimation Results of Equilibrium Test and Competition Test in HK SAR Banking Sector 
for 2005-2012  
 
Equilibrium Test               
ROA E=0.033 (1.72) 
ROE E=0.029 (2.14) 
Competition Test               
Unscaled Revenue Scaled Revenue 
IR TR IRTA TRTA 
Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio 
PF .14921*** 4.48 .40099*** 13.48 .12403*** 4.73 .37581*** 19.79 
PL .23349*** 3.36 .15270** 2.46 .15708*** 2.87 .07628* 1.93 
PK .15916*** 4.90 .10751*** 3.71 .12342*** 4.82 .07177*** 3.88 
TL/TA -0.12783 -0.81 -0.10601 -0.75 .21536* 1.73 .23717*** 2.63 
E/TA -.18682* -1.94 -.41087*** -4.79 .25018*** 3.31 0.02613 0.48 
LLP/TL 1.53873*** 4.82 .55522* 1.95 1.41306*** 5.63 .42955** 2.36 
T .11101*** 10.89 .10547*** 11.59 -0.00948 -1.18 -.01501** -2.58 
R-square 0.98725 0.98918 0.78173 0.90644 
H  0.542 0.661 0.405 0.524 
H=0 0.54186*** -5.67 0.6612*** -4.70 0.40453*** -9.36 0.52386*** -10.34 
H=1 -0.45814*** 6.70 -0.3388*** 9.16 -0.59547*** 6.36 -0.47614*** 11.37 
***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively 
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Table 5.13 Estimation Results of Equilibrium Test and Competition Test in Indian Banking Sector 
for 2005-2012  
 
Equilibrium Test              
ROA E=-0.207 (-7.42) 
ROE E=-0.191 (-5.61) 
Competition Test              
Unscaled Revenue Scaled Revenue 
IR TR IRTA TRTA 
Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio 
PF -.32814*** -3.11 .69873*** 8.29 -.53672*** -6.74 .49015*** 20.08 
PL -0.00924 -0.13 .16470*** 2.80 -.12404** -2.23 .04990*** 2.93 
PK .17376*** 5.00 .12111*** 4.36 .09678*** 3.69 .04413*** 5.49 
TL/TA 0.02627 0.12 -0.04871 -0.27 0.112 0.66 0.03701 0.72 
E/TA .14395* 1.94 -.17213*** -2.91 .35904*** 6.42 .04297** 2.51 
LLP/TL 0.22776 1.34 -0.15025 -1.11 .56723*** 4.43 .18922*** 4.82 
T .14252*** 16.91 .12463*** 18.49 0.01047 1.65 -.00742*** -3.81 
R-square 0.982 0.98836 0.61634 0.88142 
H  -0.164 0.985 -0.564 0.584 
H=0 -0.16362*** -8.15 0.98454*** -0.14 -0.56398*** -14.51 0.58418*** -12.58 
H=1 -1.16362*** -1.15 -0.01546*** 8.62 -1.56398*** -5.23 -0.41582*** 17.67 
***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively 
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Table 5.14 Estimation Results of Equilibrium Test and Competition Test in Indonesian Banking 
Sector for 2005-2012  
 
Equilibrium Test              
ROA 0.086 3.31 
ROE 0.028 1.63 
Competition Test              
Unscaled Revenue Scaled Revenue 
IR TR IRTA TRTA 
Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio 
PF .48668*** 5.57 .70387*** 10.7 .22871*** 3.7 .44590*** 18.75 
PL .19717** 2.48 .15390** 2.57 0.04207 0.75 -0.0012 -0.06 
PK -0.03088 -0.81   -.06700** -2.33 .06456** 2.39 .02844*** 2.74 
TL/TA .26117** 2.51 .13051* 1.67 .34176*** 4.65 .21109*** 7.46 
E/TA -.49980*** -6.18   -.60453*** -9.94 .20381*** 3.56 .09908*** 4.5 
LLP/TL .06774** 2.27 0.03302 1.47 .05390** 2.55 .01918** 2.36 
T .13530*** 12.3 .13194*** 15.94 -0.00404 -0.52 -.00741** -2.47 
R-square 0.97082 0.98183 0.76729 0.9155 
H  0.653 0.791 0.335 0.473 
H=0 0.65297*** -2.75 0.79077*** -2.20 0.33534*** -7.45 0.47314*** -15.35 
H=1 -0.34703*** 5.18 -0.20923*** 8.33 -0.66466*** 3.76 -0.52686*** 13.79 
***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively 
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Table 5.15 Estimation Results of Equilibrium Test and Competition Test in Korean Banking Sector 
for 2005-2012  
 
Equilibrium Test              
ROA E=0.077 (2.36) 
ROE E=0.072 (2.52) 
Competition Test              
Unscaled Revenue Scaled Revenue 
IR TR IRTA TRTA 
Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio 
PF .19680*** 4.01 .30530*** 3.91 .11084*** 2.98 .21935*** 5.98 
PL 0.08123 0.98 -0.02616 -0.2 .22521*** 3.58 .11782* 1.9 
PK .20109*** 3.27 0.15507 1.59 .15030*** 3.23 .10427** 2.27 
TL/TA .58931** 2.18 1.08243** 2.52 0.31024 1.52 .80337*** 3.98 
E/TA 0.07653 0.62 -0.12623 -0.65 .38653*** 4.16 .18376** 2 
LLP/TL .89189*** 2.81 1.32685** 2.63 .87184*** 3.63 1.30680*** 5.52 
T .04540*** 5.81 .04454*** 3.58 -.03826*** -6.47 -.03913*** -6.7 
R-square 0.99452 0.98678 0.82576 0.64273 
H  0.479 0.434 0.486 0.441 
H=0 0.47912*** -4.08 0.43421*** -2.78 0.48635*** -5.31 0.44144*** -5.85 
H=1 -0.52088*** 3.75 -0.56579*** 2.14 -0.51365*** 5.03 -0.55856*** 4.62 
***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively 
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Table 5.16 Estimation Results of Equilibrium Test and Competition Test in Malaysian Banking 
Sector for 2005-2012  
 
Equilibrium Test              
ROA E=0.019 (0.86) 
ROE E=0.043 (2.23) 
Competition Test              
Unscaled Revenue Scaled Revenue 
IR TR IRTA TRTA 
Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio 
PF .10419** 2.06 .40248*** 10.02 .12808*** 3.17 .42638*** 16.32 
PL .19771** 2.28 -0.03677 -0.53 .35218*** 5.08 .11770*** 2.62 
PK 0.02846 0.63 -0.05614 -1.57 0.0474 1.32 -0.03719 -1.6 
TL/TA 0.11434 1.56 -0.01472 -0.25 .24287*** 4.15 .11381*** 3.01 
E/TA -.26443*** -3.37 -.33866*** -5.42 .29646*** 4.72 .22223*** 5.46 
LLP/TL -0.14357 -0.95 0.0358 0.3 -.21447* -1.78 -0.0351 -0.45 
T .06746*** 10.54 .08333*** 16.35 -.03256*** -6.36 -.01670*** -5.04 
R-square 0.99492 0.99638 0.87514 0.89537 
H  0.330 0.310 0.528 0.507 
H=0 0.33036** -6.88 0.30957*** -8.91 0.52766*** -6.07 0.50689*** -9.79 
H=1 -0.66964** 3.39 -0.69043*** 4.00 -0.47234*** 6.78 -0.49311*** 10.06 
***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively 
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Table 5.17 Estimation Results of Equilibrium Test and Competition Test in Singapore Banking Sector 
for 2005-2012  
 
Equilibrium Test               
ROA E=-0.076 (-1.08) 
ROE E=-0.016 (-0.40) 
Competition Test               
Unscaled Revenue Scaled Revenue 
IR TR IRTA TRTA 
Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio 
PF 0.17918 1.21 .39175*** 3.34 0.05546 0.42 .26804*** 4.21 
PL 0.15623 0.42 0.01852 0.06 0.21635 0.66 0.07865 0.49 
PK 0.02051 0.18 -0.03012 -0.33 0.03198 0.31 -0.01865 -0.38 
TL/TA -0.05707 -0.18 -0.20311 -0.79 0.32342 1.13 0.17738 1.27 
E/TA -0.13624 -0.54 -.43590** -2.18 .44097* 1.98 0.14131 1.3 
LLP/TL -0.25637 -0.4 -0.23665 -0.47 -0.10977 -0.19 -0.09004 -0.33 
T .10968** 2.59 .10966*** 3.27 -0.02892 -0.78 -0.02893 -1.59 
R-square 0.99058 0.99358 0.86221 0.94479 
H  0.356 0.380 0.304 0.328 
H=0 0.356 -1.43 0.38015*** -1.74 0.30 -1.76 0.32804*** -3.48 
H=1 -0.64408 0.79 -0.61985*** 1.07 -0.70 0.77 -0.67196*** 1.70 
***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively 
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Table 5.18 Estimation Results of Equilibrium Test and Competition Test in the Banking Sector of 
Taiwan Province of China for 2005-2012  
 
Equilibrium Test              
ROA E=-0.040 (-0.73) 
ROE E=-0.442 (-0.83) 
Competition Test              
Unscaled Revenue Scaled Revenue 
IR TR IRTA TRTA 
Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio 
PF 0.0615 1.17 .32432*** 10.1 .10459** 2.38 .36742*** 17.94 
PL -0.14484 -1.06 -0.05918 -0.7 -.20080* -1.75 -.11513** -2.15 
PK .32207*** 4.27 .27364*** 5.92 .16360** 2.59 .11516*** 3.9 
TL/TA 0.14805 0.97 -0.11518 -1.24 .22891* 1.8 -0.03431 -0.58 
E/TA 0.06694 0.51 .17874** 2.22 .21734** 1.98 .32914*** 6.42 
LLP/TL .66280*** 4.89 .39041*** 4.7 .55416*** 4.88 .28178*** 5.32 
T .05170*** 4.09 .05136*** 6.63 -.01935* -1.83 -.01969*** -3.98 
R-square 0.95864 0.98362 0.79187 0.91971 
H  0.239 0.539 0.067 0.367 
H=0 0.23873*** -5.03 0.53878*** -4.97 0.06739** -7.35 0.36745*** -10.69 
H=1 -0.76127*** 1.58 -0.46122*** 5.81 -0.93261** 0.53 -0.63255*** 6.21 
***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively 
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Table 5.19 Estimation Results of Equilibrium Test and Competition Test in the Banking Sector of 
Thailand for 2005-2012  
 
Equilibrium Test              
ROA E=0.017 (0.03) 
ROE E=-0.279 (-1.83) 
Competition Test              
Unscaled Revenue Scaled Revenue 
IR TR IRTA TRTA 
Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio 
PF 0.08712 1.34 .38365*** 6.7 .09431* 1.69 .39083*** 10.99 
PL -0.03522 -0.81 -0.02643 -0.69 0.02285 0.61 0.03163 1.33 
PK -.22621*** -3.95  -.13886*** -2.76 -0.00311 -0.06 .08424*** 2.69 
TL/TA .76210*** 3.28 .52122** 2.55 .49329** 2.48 .25241** 1.99 
E/TA -.48766*** -4.78 -.48081*** -5.36 .19463** 2.23 .20148*** 3.62 
LLP/TL .62084*** 3.26 .49538*** 2.96 .52053*** 3.19 .39508*** 3.8 
T .10282*** 10.45 .10205*** 11.79 -0.00497 -0.59 -0.00574 -1.07 
R-square 0.98528 0.98897 0.60333 0.86416 
H  -0.174 0.218 0.114 0.507 
H=0 -0.17431*** -9.92 0.21836*** -7.51 0.11405* -8.74 0.5067*** -7.63 
H=1 -1.17431*** -1.47 -0.78164*** 2.10 -0.88595* 1.13 -0.4933*** 7.83 
***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively 
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Table 5.20 Summary of Estimation Results of Equilibrium Test for 2005-2012 
  
  
China 
HK 
SAR 
India Indonesia Korea Malaysia Singapore 
Taiwan 
Province 
of China 
Thailand
ROA  
Significantly 
different 
yes no yes yes yes no no no no 
  Reject yes no yes yes yes no no no no 
  
Assumption 
Satisfied 
no yes no no no yes yes yes yes 
ROE 
Significantly 
different 
yes yes yes no  yes yes no no no 
  Reject yes yes yes no  yes yes no no no 
  
Assumption 
Satisfied 
no no no yes no no yes yes yes 
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Table 5.21 Empirical Results of Variables  
 
Country	 	 PF	 PL	 PK	
HK SAR  
	
IR + significant + significant + significant 
TR + significant + significant + significant 
IRTA + significant + significant + significant 
TRTA	
+ 
significant	 +	 moderately 
significant 
+	 significant	
Indonesia 
	
IR +	 significant +	 significant -	 insignificant	
TR +	 significant +	 significant -	 significant 
IRTA +	 significant +	 insignificant	 +	 significant 
TRTA	 +	 significant -	 insignificant	 +	 significant 
Malaysia	
IR 
+	 moderately 
significant	
+	
significant 
+	 insignificant	
TR +	 significant -	 insignificant	 -	 insignificant	
IRTA +	 significant +	 significant +	 insignificant	
TRTA	 +	 significant +	 significant -	 insignificant	
Singapore 
	
IR +	 insignificant	 +	 insignificant	 +	 insignificant	
TR +	 significant +	 insignificant	 -	 insignificant	
IRTA +	 insignificant	 +	 insignificant	 +	 insignificant	
TRTA	 +	 significant -	 insignificant	 -	 insignificant	
Taiwan Province of 
China 
	
IR +	 insignificant	 -	 insignificant	 +	 significant 
TR +	 significant -	 insignificant	 +	 significant 
IRTA +	 significant -	 insignificant	 +	 significant 
TRTA	 +	 significant -	 significant +	 significant 
Thailand 
	
IR +	 insignificant	 -	 insignificant	 -	 significant 
TR +	 significant -	 insignificant	 -	 significant 
IRTA +	 insignificant	 +	 insignificant	 -	 insignificant	
TRTA	 +	 significant +	 insignificant	 +	 significant 
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With regard to competition test, the first two columns of the tables 5.11-5.19 
report the estimations for unscaled revenue as endogenous variable. The 
other two columns give the results using scaled revenue as dependent 
variable. Thus, differences in estimated parameters between interest revenue 
and total revenue can be compared and analyzed. The first and the third 
column list the estimated figures when interest revenue is used, the regression 
results with total revenue are shown in the second and forth column. It is very 
interesting to find that there are differences of the sign, the magnitude and 
significance level of the estimated parameters when we compare estimation 
results of alternative specifications (scaled revenue, unscaled revenue, 
interest revenue and total revenue in Table 5.21) and then we conclude and 
make Table 5.20 and 5.21 to clarify the empirical results. 
 
As it can be seen from the Table 5.21, the estimated parameters for the price 
of fund (PF) are generally positive and significant for all specifications of the 
dependent variable (for the countries and regions that satisfy the long run 
equilibrium condition and undertake effective competition test, HK SAR, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China and Thailand). It is 
consistent with most studies that found positive and significant relationship 
between bank revenue and price of funds. And it implies that the higher price 
of funds, the more the bank revenue when other variables remain unchanged. 
More interest expenses paid by banks reflect more deposits they absorbed 
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encourage banks make more loans, thereby earn more revenue. In most case, 
the price of fund dedicates the most part to elaborate bank revenue among the 
three input factors given the fact that interest expense is the main element of 
bank revenue. Especially, for the countries, the percentage of traditional 
business in bank revenue is much greater than that of off-balance sheet 
activities. Moreover, the value of coefficients of the price of fund is larger for 
interest revenue than total revenue. It indicates that cost of funds contribute 
more to interest revenue than total revenue, due to total revenue contains 
traditional business and off-balance sheet activities such as financial 
guarantees, derivatives, and other fee-based services. The same conclusion 
could also be obtained in Italy by Coccorese (2004), by Trivieri (2007), and in 
Southern Eastern Europe by Mamatzakis et al. (2005). 
 
The effect of the price of labor (PL) on bank revenue of HK SAR in all 
specifications is positive and significant. And for Indonesia, the relationship 
between PL and IR/TR is significantly positive; for Malaysia, the significantly 
positive relationship exists between PL and IR/TR/IRTA, respectively. While for 
Taiwan Province of China, the relationship between PL and TRTA is 
significantly negative. In the other hand, for Indonesia, Malaysia and Taiwan 
Province of China, PL is insignificantly related to other specifications of 
revenues. However, for Singapore and Thailand, the correlation between PL 
and all specifications of revenues are insignificant in all specifications. The 
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positive relationship between the price of labor and bank revenue indicates 
that higher labor cost can facilitate bank to earn more revenue. The higher 
labor cost implies more experienced staff employed by bank, thus higher 
quality and better-specialized services would be provided to customers, thence 
banks would earn more revenue. 
 
The parameters of the price of capital (PK) are significantly positive for China 
and Taiwan Province of China. By contrast, PK is insignificantly associated 
with bank revenue for the case of Malaysia and Singapore. And more 
interestingly, for Indonesia, the relationship between PK and TR is significantly 
negative while the relationship between PK and bank revenue that is 
represented by IRTA or TRTA becomes significantly positive. What’s more, this 
situation happens when analysing the effect of PK on bank revenue in 
Thailand as well. The significantly negative correlation between PK and bank 
revenue IR or TR while the significantly positive relationship appears between 
PK and scaled bank revenue TRTA.  
 
All above empirical results are reasonable to some extent since there are 
contradictions on the expect signs of the coefficients of these three input factor 
variables according to different theories. Therefore, it is normal and acceptable 
that we do not have consistent signs of the effect of input variables on bank 
revenue in our empirical tests.
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Table 5.22 The Estimated Results of R-square for the period 2005-2012 
Dependent HK SAR Indonesia Malaysia Singapore Taiwan Thailand 
IR 0.987 0.971 0.995 0.991 0.959 0.985 
TR 0.989 0.982 0.996 0.994 0.984 0.989 
IR/TA 0.782 0.767 0.875 0.862 0.792 0.603 
TR/TA 0.906 0.916 0.895 0.945 0.920 0.864 
	
The value of R-square shows the good fit of models presented in Table 5.22. In 
the case of models with unscaled revenue, the estimated regression equations 
explain greater than 98% of the variability both in interest revenue and total 
revenue. While in the case of models with scaled revenue, the estimated 
regression equations explain only 60.3% to 87.5% of the variability in interest 
revenue compared with 86.4% to 94.5% of the variability in total revenue. It is 
worth noting that the values of R-square for total revenue no matter scaled or 
unscaled are higher than those for interest revenue. And this means that 
equations with total revenue have added more explanatory power and could fit 
the model more appropriately. Furthermore, the R-square values for unscaled 
revenue specifications are greater than those for scaled revenue specifications. 
And this result indicates that the change in absolute level of revenue is well 
explained compared with the ratio of revenue to total assets in my sample set. 
All in all, in spite of some differences in R-square for models with different 
specifications, the goodness of fit of our regressions is quite high. 
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Table 5.23 Empirical Results of H statistics and Market Interpretations for the 
period 2005-2012 
Country IR TR IR/TA TR/TA Market Interpretations 
HK SAR (ROA) 0.542 0.661 0.405 0.524 Monopolistic competition 
Indonesia (ROE) 0.653 0.791 0.335 0.473 Monopolistic competition 
Malaysia (ROA) 0.330 0.310 0.528 0.507 Monopolistic competition 
Singapore 0.356 0.380 0.304 0.328 Monopolistic competition 
Taiwan Province of China 0.239 0.539 0.067 0.367 Monopolistic competition 
Thailand -0.174 0.218 0.114 0.507 Monopolistic competition 
Note: Commercial banks in Thailand operate under the condition of monopoly during the period 
2005-2012 when we use Interest Revenue as dependent variable.  
	
A critical assumption of the Panzar-Rosse methodology is that the competition 
test of H statistic must be conducted under the long-run equilibrium. If the 
values of E statistic are significant different from zero, the null hypothesis of 
long-run equilibrium (E=0) cannot be rejected. The hypothesis of equilibrium is 
confirmed means that the sample data satisfy the long run equilibrium 
condition and then the Panzar-Rosse H statistic can be interpreted. In this 
case, competition tests for China, India and Korea commercial banks are not 
meaningful (see Table 5.20). And the long-run equilibrium test rejects the 
hypothesis (E=0) for ROA in HK SAR, ROE in Indonesia and ROA in Malaysia 
(see Table 5.20). Therefore, only the meaningful competition test estimation 
results are shown in Table 5.23. 
 
As mentioned before, the estimated values of the Panzar-Rosse H statistic is 
the sum of parameters on three input prices. Although the values of H statistic 
are qualitatively similar but only differ in the magnitude for different 
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specifications. As shown in Table 5.23, the estimated values of H statistic are 
significantly different from both zero and one except the sample data of the 
commercial banks in Thailand estimating with unscaled interest revenue, the 
estimated value of H statistic of which showing commercial banks are in the 
market with monopoly power. Therefore, in other cases, commercial banks in 
HK SAR, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China and 
Thailand are in the condition of monopolistic competition in the period 
2005-2012. And this market structure is the most common kind that could be 
found by the previous literature (shown in Table 5.24).  
 
Furthermore, for the sample data in HK SAR, Indonesia, Singapore, Taiwan 
Province of China and Thailand, higher values of H statistic can be obtained 
from the regressions with unscaled revenue as dependent variables than 
those with scaled revenue. Additionally, regressions with interest revenue 
present higher values of H statistic than those with total revenue in the sample 
set of Indonesia, Singapore and Taiwan Province of China. This indicates a 
higher degree of competition in traditional business. Although off-balance 
sheet activities grow fast and contribute substantially to total revenue in these 
countries and regions, traditional businesses maintain the dominated position 
for commercial banks. To keep these core businesses, every bank fiercely 
competes with each other for loans and deposits. Mamatzakis et al. (2005), 
Gunalp and Celik (2006), and Trivieri (2007) have come to the same 
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conclusion.  
 
In sum, all estimated parameters have the expected sign and are always 
significant. Although there are some differences in estimated parameters 
regarding magnitude and the level of significance by applying alternative 
specifications, the values of H statistic estimated through all these regressions 
draw the same conclusion that the banking markets of HK SAR, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China and Thailand (except using 
interest revenue as dependent variable) are in monopolistic competition during 
the period 2005-2012. 
 
5.4 Policy Recommendation from Competition Study with 
Traditional Modelling Approaches and NEIO Panzar-Rosse 
Approach 
The empirical findings of the competition study from Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 
not only fill the literature gap, but also have policy implications to the countries 
and regions whose banking industry experiencing structural reforms. The 
policy recommendations are summarised as follows. 
 
Firstly, we review the empirical results of the CR3, HHI and the Panzar-Rosse 
H statistics. It finds that the values of CR3 in China, India, Indonesia, 
Singapore and Thailand increased from 2005 to 2007 then declined from 2007 
	 263
to 2012. Meanwhile, the values of CR3 show an increasing tendency in the 
banking market of HK SAR and Malaysia. And the values of CR3 in the 
banking industry of Korea and Taiwan Province of China changed with a very 
little fluctuation. With the value of CR3 in each banking sector in 2012, we 
conclude that China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand are in a 
moderately concentrated market; HK SAR and Singapore are in a highly 
concentrated market; and the market of Taiwan Province of China is low 
concentrated. After calculating HHI for each banking industry, we find that 
there is a decreasing trend of the values of HHI in China, India, Indonesia, 
Singapore and Thailand. By contrast, there is an increasing tendency in the 
values of HHI in HK SAR and Malaysia. And the changes of values of HHI are 
very slight for Korea and Taiwan Province of China. Based the HHI value of 
individual banking system in 2012 and followed the classification from U.S. 
Department of Justice, we regard China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, 
Taiwan Province of China and Thailand are in unconcentrated market; HK SAR 
and Singapore are in highly concentrated market. Moreover, we know that the 
fundamental assumption of the Panzar-Rosse approach is that the competition 
test of H statistic must be conducted under the long-run equilibrium. In that 
case, competition test for China, India and Korea commercial banks are not 
meaningful since they fail to satisfy the long run equilibrium condition. While 
banks in HK SAR, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China 
and Thailand are in the condition of monopolistic competition in the period 
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2005-2012. These above empirical results indicate that the levels of 
competition are much lower than other countries, whose H statistics range 
from 0.6 to 0.8 (Claessens and Laeven, 2004), compared to the values of H 
statistics less than 0.6 in Table 5.24. And these empirical findings imply that 
there is still much room for improvement of competition conditions in sampling 
banking industries. Therefore, policy makers and regulators could make more 
efforts for improving competition of banks by technology upgrading, structural 
reforms, financial liberalization, relaxing of foreign and private capital and other 
incentives to create a more suitable environment for competition. For example, 
authorities can facilitate to increase the number of competitors in the financial 
market by motivating financial institutions to innovate and diversify the financial 
products and services. It is known that the more choices customers are offered, 
the more intense competition of the market becomes. Additionally, the number 
of banks could be increased by progressive liberalization of capital market 
such as effectively introducing foreign banks into the domestic banking market 
and encouraging private banks that are funded by strong reputable enterprises 
and individuals to take an active part in competition. Moreover, policy markers, 
central banks and regulators should deregulate and gradually reduce and 
abolish unnecessary intervention so that banks can truly focus on the core 
interests of shareholders rather than a compromise to government decrees 
and they can also fairly compete and improve their efficiency under market 
mechanism. 
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Table 5.24 Summary of Empirical Results of Literature with Panzar-Rosse Model 
Authors Sample Period Countries Considered Dependent Variables Results 
Shaffer (1982)   1979 US Unscaled Revenue MC 
Nathan and Neave (1989) 1982-1984 Canada Unscaled Revenue MC (1982 PC) 
Molyneux et al. (1994) 1986-1989 5 EU countries Scaled Revenue 
M:Italy; MC:France, Germany, 
Spain,UK.  
Vesala (1995) 1985-1992 Finland Unscaled Revenue MC (1989-90 PC) 
Molyneux et al. (1996b) 1986-1988 Japan Unscaled Revenue MC, 1988; M in 1986 
Coccorese (1998) 1988-1996 Italy Unscaled Revenue MC 
Hondroyiannis et al. (1999) 1993-1995 Greece Scaled Revenue MC 
Bikker and Groeneveld (2000) 1989-1996 15 EU countries Scaled Revenue MC 
De Bandt and Davis (2000) 1992-1996 France, Germany and Italy Scaled Revenue 
Large banks, MC; Small banks, M 
(Italy MC) 
Bikker and Haaf (2002)  1988-1998 23 developed countries Scaled Revenue MC 
Hempell (2002) 1993-1998 Germany Scaled Revenue MC 
Murjan and Ruza (2002) 1993-1997 9 Arab Middle Eastern Unscaled Revenue MC 
Shaffer (2002) 1984-1999 US Unscaled Revenue MC 
Yildirim and Philippatos (2002) 1993-2000 14 Central and Eastern Europe countries Scaled Revenue 
MC (M for the FYR of Macedonia 
and Slovakia) 
Yeyati and Micco (2003) 1993-2002 Latin Amercia Scaled Revenue MC (Chile, PC) 
Classens and Laeven (2004) 1994-2001 50 countries Unscaled Revenue MC 
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Coccorese (2004) 1997-1999 Italy Unscaled Revenue MC 
Gischer and Stiele (2004) 1993-2002 Germany Unscaled Revenue MC 
Gelos and Roldos (2004) 1994-1999 8 EU&Latin emerging countries 
Both scaled and unscaled 
revenue 
MC (Argentina and Hungary PC) 
Jiang et al. (2004) 1992-2002 HK 
Both scaled and unscaled 
revenue 
PC 
Shaffer (2004) 
1984-1994 
(Quarterly) 
US Unscaled Revenue MC 
Buchs and Mathisen (2005) 1998-2003 Ghana 
Both scaled and unscaled 
revenue 
MC 
Ducan and Langrin(2005) 1989-2002 Jamaica Scaled Revenue MC 
Lee and Lee (2005) 1992-2002 Korea 
Both scaled and unscaled 
revenue 
MC 
Mamatzakis et al. (2005) 1998-2002 7 South Eastern European countries Scaled Revenue MC 
Mkrtchyan (2005) 1988-2002 Armenia Scaled Revenue MC 
Al-Muharrani et al. (2006) 1993-2002 6 Arab GCC countries Scaled Revenue 
Undetermined: Oman; MC:Qatar, 
Bahrai; PC: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia 
and UAE 
Bikker et al. (2006) 1989-2004 101 countries 
Both scaled and unscaled 
revenue 
M: 28%; MC:34%; PC: 38% 
Casu and Girardone (2006) 1997-2003 15 EU countries Scaled Revenue MC 
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Chan et al. (2006) 1996-2005 New Zealand and Australia Unscaled Revenue MC: New Zealand; M: Australia 
Gunalp and Celik (2006) 1990-2000 Turkey Unscaled Revenue MC 
Laeven (2006) 1994 -2004 7 East Asian Countries Unscaled Revenue MC 
Majid and Sufian (2006) 1998-2005 Malaysia Scaled Revenue MC 
Staikouras and 
Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki (2006) 
1998-2002 25 EU countries Scaled Revenue MC 
Perera et al. (2006) 1995-2003 4 South Asian countries Scaled Revenue MC 
Yuan (2006) 1996-2000 China Unscaled Revenue MC 
Matthews et al. (2007) 1980-2004 Uk Scaled Revenue MC 
Trivieri (2007) 1996-2000 Italy 
Both scaled and unscaled 
revenue 
MC 
Yeyati and Micco (2007) 1993-2002 8 Latin Amercian Countries Scaled Revenue MC 
Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) 1993-2000 11 Latin Amercian Countries Scaled Revenue MC 
Coccorese (2009) 1988-2005 Italy Unscaled Revenue MC 
Delis (2010) 1999-2006 22 Countries in CEE Unscaled Revenue MC (most countries) 
Park (2009) 1992-2994 Korea Unscaled Revenue MC 
Turk-Ariss (2009) 2000-2006 
12 Countries in the middle East and 
North Africa 
Scaled Revenue MC (most countries) 
Liu et al. (2012) 1998-2008 4 South East Asian countries Unscaled Revenue MC 
Note: MC= Monopolistic Competition; PC= Perfect Competition; M= Monopoly 
	 268
Chapter 6 Market Competition Analysis in Asian Banking 
Industries: an application of Boone Indicator 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
There is a consensus among researchers, that is, more efficient firms will earn 
more profits than their less efficient counterparts, resulting in increasing 
efficiency of the whole industry, when the intensity of competition increases. As 
demonstrated by Olley and Pakes (1996), competition tends to be the trigger 
of profits reallocations from less efficient firms towards relatively more efficient 
firms. We can investigate the mechanism by using a new competition indicator 
firstly proposed by Boone (2000), applied by Boone (2004) and Boone et al. 
(2005) and further developed by Boone (2008), which measures the 
reallocation effect of competition on the performance of efficient banks.    
 
6.2 The Boone (2008) Indicator Approach 
 
Boone (2008) developed a new approach to capture the competition 
characteristics of markets based on the relationship between performance and 
efficiency. According to Boone (2008), in a more competitive industry, firms are 
punished more harshly for being inefficient. Thus, reallocation effect of profits 
increases in the intensity of competition when the bank market has more 
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liberalization, entry barriers are lowered (more suppliers) and banks interact 
more aggressively (shift from Cournot towards Bertrand competition). This is 
consistent with the efficiency hypothesis, that is, more efficient banks 
outperform to earn higher profits at the expense of their relatively inefficient 
counterparts and bring about an increase in industry-level competition given a 
certain level of efficiency of each individual firm. And it is line with the research 
of Stiroh (2000), in which find that increased competition compels considerable 
portions of assets transferring from low profit to high profit banks. Therefore, 
Boone (2008) indicates that competition associates profitability with different 
levels of efficiency conditional on the behavior of individual bank in the market. 
 
Due to the unique properties of the Boone (2008) indicator, it becomes a 
robust competition index compared with other traditional proxies for 
competition, for instance, concentration ratio (ܥܴଷ, the sum of market share of 
the three largest banks) and Herfindahl-Hirschman index. The main defect of 
these traditional competition proxies is that they measure the degree of 
competition by examining concentration indices. And more importantly, recent 
studies indicate that the correlation between concentration and competition is 
quite weak in banking industry (for a comprehensive literature review, see 
Berger et al. 2004). In addition, although concentration measures are merely 
able to capture the outcomes of competitive conduct, they cannot distinguish 
fall entry barriers with aggressive conduct of incumbents. While the Boone 
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(2008) indicator can capture interaction among banks and focuses on their 
behavior. For example, if a bank exited banking industry due to competition 
(failed or be acquired), concentration ratios increase. In this case, using 
concentration indices will mislead the conclusion as high concentration is 
regarded to be indicative of low competitive market. Therefore, concentration 
ratio is a poor proxy for competition, which is consistent with the conclusions of 
recent researches investigating the link between competition and 
concentration in banking industry (Claessens and Laeven, 2004) and in line 
with the empirical result of measuring market competition with concentration 
indices in our previous chapter. 
 
In addition, the Boone (2008) indicator has more appealing characteristics 
than competition measures introduced by new empirical industrial organization 
approaches, such as the Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-Statistics and Lerner 
index. It is well known that H-Statistics require very restrictive assumptions, 
and the most important one among them is that market must be in long-term 
equilibrium, whereas the Boone (2008) indicator does not assume long-run 
equilibrium condition. Furthermore, according to the finding of Vives (2008), 
Lerner index is widely criticized for not considering product substitutability. 
However, the Boone (2008) indicator does not have the problem with product 
substitutability. Moreover, Boone (2008) demonstrates that the relative profit 
difference (RPD) falls when competition becomes more intense (Duygun et al., 
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2015). Thus, it can conclude that the Boone (2008) indicator is a new 
competition measure developed based on the profit elasticity, i.e., the elasticity 
of profit towards marginal costs and it includes two forces when measuring 
competition, lower entry barriers and aggressive conduct of firms in the 
market.  
 
We use the methodology proposed by Schaeck and Cihak (2014), who 
followed the studies of Boone et al. (2005) and van Leuvensteijn et al. (2007) 
and wrote a demand function for banking industry. In that demand function, 
bank i produces a product or product portfolio ݍ௜	so that  
݌ሺݍ௜, ݍ௝ஷ௜ሻ=ܽ െ ܾݍ௜ െ ݀ ∑ ݍ௝௝ஷ௜ ,                                      [6.1] 
by which each bank has a constant marginal cost ܿ௜ . The parameter ݌ 
denotes the price, and ܽ	measures market size, while ܾ reflects the market 
elasticity of demand. And use d to evaluate the extent to which consumers 
know the different products in a market as close substitutes for each other. It is 
assumed that ܽ ൐ ܿ௜	and 0	 ൏ 	݀	 ൑ 	ܾ. To maximize variable profits, the bank i 
determines the optimal output level ݍ௜ so that  
ߨ௜ ൌ(݌௜ െ ܿ௜)ݍ௜                                                    [6.2]             
The first order condition for equilibrium is then given by  
ܽ	 െ 	2ܾݍ௜ െ 	݀	 ∑ ݍ௝௝ஷ௜ െ ܥ௜ 	ൌ	0  	                                   [6.3]                
For a banking market with N banks that produce positive levels of output, we 
can obtain N first-order conditions from Equation (3):  
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ݍ௜ሺܿ௜ሻ ൌ ቂቀଶ௕ௗ െ 1ቁ ܽ െ ሺ2ܾ/݀ ൅ ܰ െ 1ሻܿ௜ቃ /ሾሺ2ܾ ൅ ݀ሺܰ െ 1ሻሻሺ2ܾ/݀ െ 1ሻሿ    [6.4]  
Equation (6.4) indicates the link between output and marginal cost. Combining 
Equation (6.1) with Equation (6.2) and (6.4), we can find that there is a 
quadratic relationship between variable profits and marginal costs. It is noted 
that profits ߨ௜	is defined as variable profits, which exclude entry costs ߝ. Thus, 
a bank will enter the market only if ߨ௜ ൒ ߝ in equilibrium. As stated in previous 
section and given these properties of model, competition increases for two 
reasons. One is that competition increases when entry barriers of banking 
market fall, i.e. entry costs ߝ	decline. The other one is, competition is more 
intense when close substitutes exist for bank products and when interaction 
among banks is more aggressive (i.e., ݀	increases and assume that ݀	 ൏ 	ܾ). 
Under these two regimes, performance of more efficient firms will be improved 
(Boone, 2008). It is well known that for a given price, higher marginal costs 
suggests lower margins per output, which results in a downward relationship 
between variable profits ߨ௜	 and marginal costs ܿ௜ . Additionally, if higher 
marginal costs leading to higher prices, the number of output will be 
decreased. 
 
6.3 Estimating the Boone (2008) Indicator  
 
In line with the theoretical exposition by Boone (2008) and the existing 
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empirical work by Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2007), which both start at the 
microlevel, but then move to the aggregate level, we estimate the Boone (2008) 
indicators from microlevel data to gauge the magnitude of the reallocation 
effect at the aggregate banking system (i.e., country) level. For the empirical 
implementation, we characterize the Boone (2008) model for bank i as 
ߨ௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚ lnሺܿ௜௧ሻ                                                 [6.5]  
where ߨ௜௧ measures profits of bank i at time t, ߚ	is the Boone (2008) indicator, 
and ܿ௜௧ denotes marginal costs. The empirical prediction is that the coefficient 
ߚ is negative and rises in absolute value when competition becomes stronger. 
However, we find that marginal costs cannot be observed directly and we 
notice that Boone et al. (2005), Boone (2008) and Schaeck and Cihak (2014) 
all employ average costs be a proxy for marginal costs. They assume constant 
marginal costs, that is, average costs are neither rising nor declining when 
output levels increase or decrease. And this assumption leads to a weakness 
of this new competition indicator. To overcome this shortcoming of constant 
marginal costs, we estimate marginal cost ܿ௜௧ by employing a translog short 
run cost function with stochastic frontier analysis (as we estimate cost 
efficiency that derived from the inefficiency component of the random error in 
the “cost efficiency chapter” earlier in this thesis) , which is line with Van 
Leuvensteijn et al. (2007) and Duygun et al. (2015). The estimated Boone 
(2008) indicators for our sample data are listed in Table 6.1. In addition, since 
competition and the definition for reporting profits in the bank loan market 
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differs considerably across countries and regions, we use market shares of 
individual bank as dependent variable instead of profits, which is consistent 
with Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2007). And we demonstrate the estimated results 
of the Boone (2008) indicator of Asian banking industry in Table 6.2. 
 
In the Boone (2008) indicator approach, there is no reference about 
intermediation theory. According to the previous discussion of comparison 
between intermediation approach and production approach (see previous 
chapter), we follow the intermediation approach. Under the intermediation 
approach, we use labor, physical capital, and deposits and other borrowed 
funds as inputs, and employ loans and other earning assets as outputs. 
Therefore, the Boone (2008) indicator can be used to investigate how profits 
from loans and other earning assets vary with the marginal costs of labor, 
physical assets, and deposits and other borrowings.  
 
It is known that an increase in costs reduces profits in the market, however, the 
same percentage increase in costs in a more intense competitive market leads 
to a greater decrease in profits because banks are punished more harshly for 
being inefficient (Boone, 2008). Thus the Boone (2008) indicator utilizes this 
feature to measure the extent to which differences in efficiency are reflected in 
performance differences. In other words, the Boone (2008) indicator examines 
the decline of profits that derived from cost inefficiencies. Since cost 
	 275
inefficiencies reflect poor competence of banks such as ability to make 
decisions, technologies and product quality, the indicator expresses 
competition as a function of efficiency in banking. In addition, we introduce the 
bank-specific effects to evaluate heterogeneity within in the sample. And to 
investigate of the transmission mechanism, it is significantly important to 
consider time effect of competition on stability. We estimate the Boone (2008) 
model as follows:  
ߨ௜௧ 	ൌ 	ߙ௜ 	൅	∑ ߚ௞ଵ݀௞௧	݈݊	ሺܿ௜௧ሻ௄்ୀଵ 	൅ ∑ ߚ௞ଶ݀௞௧	்ିଵ௄ୀଵ 	൅	ߤ௜௧,                 [6.6]	
where ߨ௜௧	are the profits ( or market shares) of bank i at time t, the ratio of 
revenue to total assets, T is the total number of periods (years), ݀௞௧is a time 
dummy where ݀௞௧ = 1 if ݇	 ൌ 	ݐ and zero otherwise, ܿ௜௧	are marginal costs, 
and ߤ௜௧	is the error term. Profits are higher for banks with lower marginal costs 
(ߚ	 ൏ 	0). Increases in competition enhance profits of more efficient banks 
relative to less efficient ones. Therefore, the larger the ߚ in absolute value, 
the stronger is competition. In this specification the time dummy variables ݀௞௧ 
play the role of time fixed effects in the composed error term while the intercept 
terms which vary across the banks play the role of the fixed effects. Then the 
ߚ௞ଵ coefficients reflect the change in the slope of the relationship between 
profit or market share and the marginal cost term in different time periods, so 
that the different ߚ௞ଵ coefficient reflect the changes over time in the intensity 
of competition. Consequently if these coefficients change for different time 
periods it is possible to argue that the relative strength of competition changes 
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in these different time periods. 
 
Although there are many advantages of the Boone (2008) indicator comparing 
with other competition measures, two limitation of Boone (2008) approach 
cannot be treated as negligible. First, the Boone (2008) indicator model has 
some requirements for the data of input factors and output factors. Some of 
them are not available and the proxy for marginal costs is not directly observed. 
Additionally, the Boone (2008) approach does not consider service quality of 
banks. For instance, if a bank encountered the threat of entry, it may decide to 
improve service quality and employ more experienced staff. And this raises the 
bank’s costs and customers may compensate the cost increase proportion if 
they are willing to pay extra fees or fees for better service quality profitability. 
And profits may increase if the compensated commissions were higher than 
the rise in cost. In other words, theoretically, this effect would turn the 
prediction of the Boone (2008) approach upside down. However, in empirical 
studies, there is no solid evidence that competition on service quality will 
improve profitability. For example, Dick (2006) examines the impact of lifting 
branching restrictions and improving service quality on performance of banks. 
And she observes that banks react to competition by investing in branch 
networks and experienced staff to improve service quality. Thus these 
investments increase costs and banks charge higher service fees since some 
customers are willing to pay for service. However, she finds no sign of 
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increasing profitability, which indicating this limitation of the Boone (2008) 
model may be not serious as the expectation. Therefore, more empirical 
evidence needed to identify and address the shortcomings of Boone indicator, 
which is potential direction of future research, that is, to find out whether the 
Boone indicator is an appropriate measure of competition given its limitations 
and other uncontrollable factors.  
 
The results of this approach are shown in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 below. The results 
are reported for the different years in the sample and for each of the nine 
countries and regions in the sample. Two measures of the dependent variables 
are used: the ROA to measure profit rates and the market share. In these tables, 
the estimation has been done by panel data fixed effects which produces 
consistent estimates. 
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Table 6.1 Empirical Result of Boone Indicator (࣊ ൌ ROA) 
	
 2005   2006   2007   2008   2009   2010   2011   2012   
Boone t-value Boone t-value Boone t-value Boone t-value Boone t-value Boone t-value Boone t-value Boone t-value 
1 -0.00196 -1.35  -0.00143 -.92   .00078     .40   .00099     .35   -.00138     -.77   -.00296**   -2.41  -.00286***  -3.34  -.00114     -1.13   
2 -.00996***  -3.37  -.00337     -.82    .00514     .87   -.00030     -.05   -.00379     -1.47  -.00385     -1.52  -.00263     -1.07  -.00716***  -3.60   
3 -.02821***  -4.72  -.01003***  -3.61   -.00661**   -2.32  -.01754***  -5.17  -.00573     -1.57  -.00021     -.09   -.00390     -1.30  .00235     .88   
4 -.01611***  -4.21  -.02160***  -6.09   -.01577***  -2.97  -.01614***  -4.18  -.01361***  -3.74  -.00881**   -2.61  -.00882***  -3.09  -.00514*    -1.68   
5 -.00467     -.34   -.01249**   -2.93   -.01223***  -3.27  .00748     1.35   .00396     1.60   .00570     1.12   -.00621     -.76   -.00091     -.22   
6 .00219     .69   .00149     .91   .00096     .66   .00464***  3.45   -.00085     -.31   -.00533     -1.52  .00621**   2.79   -.00201***  -3.40   
7     -.00186     -.97   .00209     1.57   .01288     2.44   .00700     1.72   .00400     .60   .00296     .47   .00127     .25 
8 0.01221 1.46   -.01228     -1.14   -.01637**   -2.48  -.01370***  -3.20  -.00960**   -2.26  .00492***  3.07   .00395*    1.77   .00071     .69   
9 .01659*    1.97   -.01790     -1.68   -.04458*    -2.13  -.01621***  -3.45  -.00702*    -1.86  .00220     .52   .00127     .26   -.00300     -.57   
Source: author’s own estimation from sample data,  
***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively 
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Table 6.2 Empirical Result of Boone Indicator (࣊ ൌMarket Share) 
	
 2005   2006   2007   2008   2009   2010   2011   2012   
Boone t-value Boone t-value Boone t-value Boone t-value Boone t-value Boone t-value Boone t-value Boone t-value 
1 -.09825***  -3.85 -.06549***  -3.14 -.05478**   -2.36 -.11895*** -4.88 -.12847***  -4.81 -.11686***  -6.07 -.06275***  -5.20 -.06810***  -5.65 
2 -.10415**   -2.14 -.13772*    -1.95 -0.074 -0.96 -0.079 -1.08 -0.051 -0.76 -0.027 -0.25 -0.050 -0.70 -0.100 -1.27 
3 -.06932*    -1.72 -0.06366 -1.56 -0.05923 -1.32 -.09807**   -2.60 -.06150*    -1.97 -.06030**   -2.20 -.06701***  -2.93 -.06883***  -3.07 
4 -0.01264 -0.67 -0.00391 -0.29 -0.01059 -0.68 -0.01465 -1.07 -0.01327 -0.99 -0.01330 -1.03 -0.00978 -0.90 -0.01700 -1.54 
5 -.38703***  -4.69 -.37255***  -4.97 -.36778***  -3.39 -.43237***  -4.62 -.20887***  -3.50 -.27887*    -2.19 -.58504***  -6.25 -.42337***  -5.89 
6 -.06370*    -2.03 -.02867*    -1.96 -.05041*    -2.00 -0.03609 -1.67 -0.05805 -1.20 -0.11221 -1.31 -.21447***  -4.96 -0.02898 -1.40 
7 -.06370*    -2.04 -0.07705 -0.46 -0.26312 -2.90 1.25015 1.38 -0.23668 -1.78 -0.26151 -1.35 -.36152**   -3.81 -0.22446 -1.38 
8 -.05172*    -1.89 -.04697*    -2.00 -.07419***  -3.23 -.08593***  -5.63 -.07788***  -6.37 -.04916***  -4.31 -.05139***  -4.58 -.01928***  -3.06 
9 -0.06464 -0.87 -.16318***  -4.15 -.13815**   -2.20 -.10964*    -2.03 -0.09983 -1.58 -0.04559 -0.68 -0.09411 -1.60 -0.11035 -1.70 
Source: author’s own estimation from sample data,  
***, **, * represent significance at 1%, 5%, 10% level, respectively 
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What can be concluded from these results? In general, the ߚ coefficients are 
negative in sign and are frequently significant, and this confirms that the panel 
data does reflect the imperfectly competitive behavior that is the basis for the 
Boone model. The market share regressions appear to perform better than 
those where ROA is the dependent variable and this reflects a general finding 
in the literature that ROA is often a weak measure of profitability in banking 
systems. 
 
Concentrating on the market share regressions, there are several interesting 
findings. The Boone model is confirmed 41 out of the 72 countries and 
time-series results with significant and negative ߚ  coefficients. In three 
banking markets, China, Korea and Taiwan Province of China, the Boone profit 
elasticity model is confirmed in each year of the sample. In a fourth market, 
India, it is confirmed in six out of the eight sample years. Banking markets 
where the model does not show the expected profit elasticity relationship are 
HK SAR and Singapore, which is surprising and Indonesia where the presence 
of the alternative tradition of Islamic banking may play a role. 
 
The profit elasticity model works most effectively in China, Korea and Taiwan 
Province of China. A striking result in these three economies is that the largest 
increase in the strength of competition i.e. the greatest increase in the absolute 
value of the ߚ coefficients coincides with the onset of the global crisis in 
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2008-2009. This suggests that increased competitive rivalry may be the most 
important response of banks to balance sheet shocks. As all banks deleverage 
in response to a financial shock, it is the most efficient banks which are able to 
maintain market share and to avoid reductions in the level of lending to 
customers. Finally, it can be noted that although the global financial crisis 
produced a major stimulus to the strength of competitive rivalry, that was not 
maintained as the crisis reduced over the succeeding years. 
 
6.4 Examining the Intensity of Competition for Different 
Competition Regimes 
 
6.4.1 Definitions and Fundamental Theory 
 
Boone (2008) has promoted a theoretical test of the reallocation effect of the 
competition on the relationship of performance and efficiency and Duygun et al. 
(2015) conducted the test by applying it to a panel data sample of banking 
industries in different emerging economies. As the suggested operational 
method in their articles, I implement the test of the reallocation effect of the 
intense of competition to a panel data sample of banks in the 9 Asian countries 
and regions and mainly focus on the change of competitive environment after 
the financial crisis (year 2009 to 2012 V.S. year 2005 to 2008) and the relative 
intensity of competition of individual regulation regime in comparison and the 
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whole sample banking industries.  
 
According to Boone (2008), notate the profit level of a bank with efficiency 
level E as ߨ(E) and label three banks with different efficiency levels as: 
݉ܽݔሺܧሻ ൒ ܧᇱ ൒ ݉݅݊ሺܧሻ. And as suggested by Duygun et al. (2015), define the 
relative profit difference (RPD) and symbolize it as ߩ，  the ratio of the 
difference between the profit level of the representative bank and the profit 
level of bank with the least efficiency level relative to the difference between 
the profit level of the most efficient and the profit level of the least efficient 
bank: 
 ߩ= ൣగሺாᇲሻିగሺ௠௜௡ாሻ൧ሾగሺ௠௔௫ሻିగሺ௠௜௡ாሻሿ                                              [6.7]                 
And ߩ rises when competition of bank becomes less intense. We conduct the 
measurement of competition based on the critical assumption of Boone (2008) 
test that there is a positive relationship between profits and efficiency, i.e. 
ߨᇱሺܧሻ ൐ 0. According to Boone (2008), the normalized efficiency is noted as ߟ 
and ߟ ൌ ൣாᇲି௠௜௡ா൧ሾ௠௔௫ாି௠௜௡ாሿ. Then he has pointed out that the relationship between 
normalized profits ߩ, that is, the relative profits difference and normalized 
efficiency ߟ definitely shifts down for every value of the efficiency difference 
when the intensity of competition increases. In order to facilitate intuitive 
understanding, Boone plotted the normalized profits against the corresponding 
normalized efficiency and drew a diagram similar as Figure 6.1 to present the 
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theoretical relationship between them in curves over time year t to year t+1 
(Figure 6.2, p.1252, Boone (2008)). According to this paper, we believe that 
competition has become more intense in year t+1 if the area under the curve in 
year t+1 is smaller than the area under the curve in year t. Therefore, the 
increase in the intensity of competition can be calculated by the difference of 
the value of the integral under the curves ߩሺߟሻ, i.e. ׬ ߩሺߟሻ݀ߟଵ଴ . However, in 
reality, it is hard to figure theoretical curves, we have to measure and compare 
the area under scatters of points rather than curves. To analyze competitive 
condition for the panel data sample, we have to consider different competitive 
regimes and time periods. To simplify the implement procedure, we use 
different 
 countries and regions to represent different regimes. And following Boone 
(2008) and Duygun et al. (2015), we use ܧ௜௧ as the cost efficiency of bank i at 
time t, and rank these cost efficiency scores from the highest score maxܧ௜௧ to 
the lowest score minܧ௜௧. Thus the normalized efficiency can be calculated from 
the following formula: 
 ߟ௜௧ ൌ ሾா೟
ᇲ ି௠௜௡ா೔೟ሿ
ሾ௠௔௫ா೔೟ି௠௜௡ா೔೟ሿ, i=1…N, t=1…T,                                 [6.8]               
which measures the difference between the relative cost efficiency for bank i at 
time t and the least efficient bank related to the range of cost efficiency scores. 
Meanwhile, for each sample observation, the corresponding normalized profit 
against normalized efficiency can be derived by 
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ߩ௜௧ ൌ ሾగሺா೔೟
ᇲ ሻିగሺ௠௜௡ா೔೟ሻሿ
ሾగሺ௠௔௫ா೔೟ሻିగሺ௜௡୉౟౪ሻሿ, i=1…ܰ, t=1…ܶ.                             [6.9]                 
                                                  
As Boone (2008) states, the sign of the difference in the definite integrals is 
adequate to determine the intensity of competition. Therefore, the intensity of 
competition under different competition regimes, A and B, is tested by  
Δ෡=׬ ߩప௧஺෢ଵ଴ ሺߟ௜௧ሻ݀ߟ-׬ ߩప௧஻෢
ଵ
଴ ሺߟ௜௧ሻ݀ߟ=0                                    [6.10]                
	
Figure 6.1 The Relationship between normalized profits (the relative profit difference) 
and normalized efficiency 
	
6.4.2 Methodology 
 
The cost efficiency scores ܧ௜௧	applied here for computing the normalized 
efficiency are obtained from the stochastic frontier analysis of the cost function 
in the last chapter and the profit of each observation ߨ௜௧	for computing the 
1
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normalized profit is represented by the shadow return on equity capital, which 
is estimated from the short run cost function. Then we plot all the sample 
points with relative normalized efficiency and normalized profit (ߟ௜௧, ߩ௜௧ሻ. After 
observing the distribution of sample points, it is clear to find that only ߟ௜௧ lies in 
the unit interval while for some observations ߩ௜௧ does lie outside the unit 
interval since the profits of these banks might be negative. Therefore, it is very 
important to make sure the satisfaction of the prerequisite of the Boone (2008) 
test, i.e. the profitability is positively related to the corresponding efficiency 
ߨᇱሺܧሻ ൐ 0. To solve this problem，we implement the Boone (2008) test of the 
intensity of competition under different competition regimes by following the 
suggested method of Duygun et al.(2015), that is, polynomial quantile 
regression analysis. In particular, the polynomial quantile regression used to 
measure the relationship between the inverse relative profit difference ߩ௜௧	and 
the normalized efficiency	ߟ௜௧ is as the following functional form: 
௥ܲሺߩ௜௧ ൑ ߩሺߟ௜௧ሻ ൌ ∑ ߙ௠௠ୀெ௠ୀଵ ሺߟ௜௧ሻ௠ିଵ)=ݍ,                             [6.11]                
where q is the probability of isolating the percentage of the sample points lying 
on or below the quantile regression line and the value of q determines the 
extent of the outlier impact. In order to simply and intuitively analyze the 
empirical relationship between ߩ௜௧ and ߟ௜௧ based on the panel data sample of 
mine, we let the value of q equal 0.75 and let the value of M equal 2. Then we 
fit a quadratic quantile regression at the third quartile to isolate each 
competition regime. Moreover, we can compute the proportion of the area that 
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lies on or below the theoretical relationship between ߩ௜௧  and ߟ௜௧  by 
measuring the integral of the quadratic quantile regression over the unit 
interval: 
׬ ሾଵ଴ ∑ ߙ௠௠ୀெ௠ୀଵ ሺߟ௜௧ሻ௠ିଵሿ݀ߟ ൌ ∑ ሺఈ೘
ෞ
௠
௠ୀெ௠ୀଵ ሻ ൌ ݄ᇱߙො                         [6.12]                
where ߙ௠ෞ  are the estimated coefficients from the quantile regression and the 
vector	݄ᇱ is (1,ଵଶ,…,
ଵ
ெ). Additionally, we can calculate the standard error of the 
integral: 
 SE(׬ ሾଵ଴ ∑ ߙ௠௠ୀெ௠ୀଵ ሺߟ௜௧ሻ௠ିଵሿ݀ߟሻ ൌ ሺ݄ᇱݒܽݎሺߙොሻ݄ሻ
భ
మ                       [6.13]                
Furthermore, we can evaluate the Boone measures for two different 
competition regimes A and B with one assumption that the functional forms of 
quantile regression for the A and B competition regimes have the same degree 
of polynomial by testing the following hypotheses: 
ܪ଴: Δ ൌ ׬ ሾଵ଴ ∑ ߙ௠஺௠ୀெ௠ୀଵ ሺߟ௜௧ሻ௠ିଵሿ݀ߟ െ ׬ ሾ
ଵ
଴ ∑ ߙ௠஻௠ୀெ௠ୀଵ ሺߟ௜௧ሻ௠ିଵሿ݀ߟ=0 
against ܪଵ: Δ ് 0                                                [6.14]                
And A means after or alternative while B means before or benchmark. To test 
these hypotheses more concisely, it is reasonable to introduce dummy 
variables to represent intercept and slope: 
ܦ௜௧ ൌ ൜ 0: ݅, ݐ ∈ ܤ ⟹ ߙ
஻ ൌ ߙ
1: ݅, ݐ ∈ ܣ ⟹ ߙ஺ ൌ ߚ ൅ ߙ                                    [6.15]               
The polynomial quantile regression including these dummy variables is: 
௥ܲሺߩ௜௧ ൑ ∑ ߙ௠௠ୀெ௠ୀଵ ሺߟ௜௧ሻ௠ିଵ ൅ ∑ ߚ௠௠ୀெ௠ୀଵ ሺሺߟ௜ሻ௠ିଵ ൈ ܦ௜௧ሻ )= ݍ              
[6.16]                 
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Therefore, for analysis the intensity of competition with the benchmark and the 
alternative competition regimes, we only need to test the null hypothesis 
ܪ଴: Δ ൌ ݄ᇱߚ ൌ 0	against the alternative hypothesis ܪଵ: Δ ് 0. And this test is 
transformed to testing the restriction of the coefficients of the quadratic 
quantile regression ߚመ௠. Besides, we estimate the Wald statistic from the 
regression with dummy variables that represents the alternative regime:  
W=ሺhᇱߚመሻ‘ሺ݄ᇱݒܽݎ൫ߚመ൯݄ሻభమ(݄ᇱߚመሻ                                       [6.17]                 
And under the null hypothesis	ܪ଴, ଵ௥ܹ ∼ ܨሺݎ, ܰܶ െ ܭሻ,               [6.18]                 
where r is the number of the restrictions and in this case the value of r is equal 
to one. 
 
6.4.3 Profitability, Cost Efficiency and the Shadow Price of 
Capital 
 
There are usually four different measures of profitability in the previous 
researches and I will use them in the analysis of the relationship between 
efficiency and profitability. Two traditional measures Return on Assets (ROA) 
and Return on Equity (ROE) are widely used to represent profitability. And Net 
Interest Margin (NIM, net interest income/interest bearing assets) and Shadow 
Return on Equity (SROE) are adopted as profitability in recent studies. In this 
chapter, reduced form profit regression with robust standard errors is 
employed and can be written as: 
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ߨ௜௧=ߙ+ߚܧ௜௧+ߜܼ௜௧+ߝ௜௧                                             [6.19]   
               
The dependent variable ߨ௜௧ is one the above profitability measures, ܧ௜௧ is a 
measure of cost efficiency obtained from the inefficiency component of the 
random error in the stochastic frontier analysis of the cost function with Battese 
and Coelli RE model as follows: 
ln ܥ௜௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ∑ ߚ௝ ln ݕ௝௜௧ସ௝ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ߜ௠ lnݓ௠௜௧ଷ௠ୀଵ ൅ ∅ଵ ln ܧ ൅
ଵ
ଶ∑ ∑ ߚ௝௞ ln ݕ௝௜௧ସ௞ୀଵ ln ݕ௞௜௧ସ௝ୀଵ ൅
ଵ
ଶ∑ ∑ ߜ௠௡ lnݓ௠௜௧ଷ௡ୀଵଷ௠ୀଵ lnݓ௡௜௧ ൅
∑ ∑ ߛ௝௠ ln ݕ௝௜௧ଷ௠ୀଵସ௝ୀଵ lnݓ௠௜௧ ൅ ߠଵݐ ൅ ଵଶ ߠଶݐଶ ൅ ∑ ߦ௝ ln ݕ௝௜௧ସ௝ୀଵ ݐ ൅
∑ ߞ௠ lnݓ௠௜௧ଷ௠ୀଵ ݐ ൅ ଵଶ ∅ଶ 	ln ܧ ln ܧ ൅ ∑ ߩ௝ ln ݕ௝௜௧ସୀଵ ln ܧ 	൅ ∑ ߮௠ lnݓ௠௜௧ଷ௠ୀଵ ln ܧ ൅
߰ݐ ln ܧ ൅ ߭௜௧ ൅ ߤ௜௧	                            [6.20] 
where ܼ௜௧  represents variables include bank-specific variables and 
macroeconomic variables for each country and region.  
ߨ ---- ROA/ROE/NIM/SROE; 
E ----- CE: Cost Efficiency; 
Z1 ----TL/TA: Loans/Assets=୘୭୲ୟ୪	୐୭ୟ୬ୱ		୘୭୲ୟ୪	୅ୱୱୣ୲ୱ; 
Z2 -----TL/TD: Loans/Deposits= ்௢௧௔௟	௅௢௔௡௦்௢௧௔௟	஽௘௣௢௦௜௧௦; 
Z3 -----DIV: Diversification Index=ே௢௡ି௜௡௧௘௥௘௦௧	ூ௡௖௢௠௘்௢௧௔௟	஺௦௦௘௧௦ ; 
Z4 -----CI: Cost to income ratio= ை௩௘௥௛௘௔ௗ௦ை௣௘௥௔௧௜௡௚	௉௥௢௙௜௧௦	௕௘௙௢௥௘	௉௥௢௩௜௦௜௢௡௦; 
Z5 -----CR: Capital relative to each country or region; 
Z6 -----INF: Inflation Rate, average CPI (Consumer Price Index), the base year 
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is 2000; 
Z7 -----UNEMP: Unemployment Rate, the ratio of unemployed inhabitants over 
the whole population; 
Z8 ------NIE/TA: ே௢௡ି௜௡௧௘௥௘௦௧	ா௫௣௘௡௦௘
௢௧௔௟	஺௦௦௘௧௦ ; 
Z9 -----GDPGPC: Per-Capita-GDP Growth, the percentage change of GDP 
over inhabitants. 
 
The basic assumption of this reduced form profit regression is that efficiency of 
banks is positively related to profitability even through banking industries might 
be in different competitive regime and regulatory mechanism. Thus the 
coefficient of cost efficient ߚ will be tested by the hypothesis ܪ଴: ߚ=0 against 
ܪଵ: ߚ ൐0. After estimating ߚ with four different measures, Table 6.3 shows 
that efficiency is negatively related with profitability when using ROA and ROE 
as profitability measures and this empirical result is agreed by Gilberto Turati, 
that is, contrary to Berger (1995) who concludes that efficiency is positively 
related to profits although it is not statistically significant. However, a 
significantly positive relationship between efficiency and profitability can be 
found when Net Interest Margin and the Shadow Return on Equity adopted as 
profitability measures. And most importantly, profitability with measured SROE 
indicates a strongest significant effect on cost efficiency. As mentioned above, 
the prerequisite of the Boone (2008) test ߨᇱሺܧሻ ൐ 0	has to be satisfied to 
implement the remaining procedure to compute the intensity of competition in 
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different competition regimes. Therefore, we use the shadow return on equity 
capital as the profitability measure for calculating the relative profit differences. 
	
Table 6.3 The Relationship between Profitability Measures and Cost Efficiency 
Variable ROE ROA NIM  SROE 
CE -0.179 -0.0127 0.0510*** 1.357*** 
(-0.89)   (-1.01)   (-3.67) (-16.62) 
TL/TA 0.0667 -0.0266*** -0.0226*** 0.0522 
(-0.98) (-6.26)   (-4.82)   (-1.9) 
TL/TD -0.104 0.0229*** 0.0198*** 0.114*** 
(-1.84)   (-6.44) (-5.05) (-4.95) 
DIV 0.00659 -0.00102*  -0.00740*** -0.0332*** 
(-1.02) (-2.53)   (-16.55)   (-12.67)   
CI -0.268*** -0.0272*** -0.0407*** -0.110*** 
(-10.04)  (-16.21)   (-21.96)   (-10.16)   
LLP/TA -8.204*** -0.515*** 0.0958*** -0.307*  
(-22.69)  (-22.69)   (-3.83) (-2.09)   
CR 0.0645 0.0142*  0.0219** 0.00929 
(-0.57) (-1.99) (-2.78) (-0.2) 
INF  -0.0117 0.00176 0.00314 -0.179*** 
(-0.43)   (1.04)   (-1.68) (-16.32)   
UNEMP 0.164 0.0550** 0.0532** -0.139 
(-0.58) (-3.11) (-2.72) (-1.21)   
NIE/TA -1.635*** -0.0297 0.750*** 1.646*** 
(-3.55)   (-1.03)   (-23.52) (-8.79) 
GDPGPC 0.0895 0.00837*  0.00216 0.0523*  
(-1.42) (-2.12) (-0.5) (-2.05) 
_cons 0.511*** 0.0381*** 0.00931 -1.022*** 
(-3.5) (-4.16) (-0.92) (-17.22)   
R-square  0.3274 0.3753 0.4495 0.7249 
F value 7.06 6.28 10.68 28.99 
T statistics in parentheses,* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, N=1881 
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6.4.4 Empirical Result 
 
After evaluating the relationship between profitability and efficiency, we find 
that the shadow return on equity capital is the most appropriate measure to 
represent profitability. Thus we calculate the normalized efficiency ߟ௜௧ and the 
relative profit difference for ߩ௜௧	through the equations [6.8] and [6.9] with cost 
efficiency ܧ௜௧  and the shadow return on equity ߨ௜௧,	 respectively. After 
computing ߟ௜௧	and ߩ௜௧ for the entire sample, it is time to get the difference in 
the integrals with equation [6.10] by applying Stata software. However, values 
of the shadow return on equity capital for some observations are negative so 
that some computed relative profit difference lie outside the unit interval. We 
need to use the quadratic quantile regression with dummy variables and 
compute the Wald statistic as the equations [6.16] and [6.17] to test the 
hypotheses shown in equation [6.14].  
 
One application of Boone (2008) test is to compare the intensity of competition 
over different time periods. In my case, we do a comparison of the first half 
period (2005-2008) with the second half (2009-2012) for the whole sample, 
which is called pre-crisis period and pro-crisis period. According to the findings 
of the experiments of Duygun et al. (2015), the degree of polynomial quantile 
regression M used here is 2 and the quantile value is 0.75, which are 
statistically significant fitting and most appropriate to compromise between 
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inclusivity and avoidance of outliers. In Figure 6.2, we construct the diagram of 
the curves of the relative profit difference against normalized efficiency for the 
upper bound on 75 percent of the sample points over the time period 2005 to 
2008 (the blue line) and 2009 to 2012 (the red line). And the diagram shows 
the different integral areas and it is obvious that the integral area under the 
quadratic regression line for the period from 2009 to 2012 is smaller than that 
for the period from 2005 to 2008. Meanwhile, the results of estimations of the 
quadratic quantile regression employed for Boone (2008) test are listed in the 
Table 6.4. It is worth noting that the estimated difference of the integrals 
between the period 2009-2012 and 2005-2008, 	Δ෡  is 0.2357 and the null 
hypothesis ܪ଴ is reject with p-value of Wald test equal to 0. And this result 
indicates that competition of banks in the sample during the period 2009-2012 
is stronger and intensified than that during the period 2005-2008. Therefore 
these empirical results clearly confirm that the global financial crisis has a 
significant impact on the intensity of competition of Asian banking industry. 
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Figure 6.2 The Whole Sample of 9 Asian Countries and Regions 
Boone (2008) Relative Profit Difference: 2009-2012 VS 2005-2008 
 
Note: The curves are based on the whole sample and the smaller area under the curve, the 
stronger competitive condition banks in. The blue line represents normalized profits against 
normalized efficiency of banks during the period from 2005 to 2008 and the red line 
represents the curve in year 2009 to 2012. 
 
Table 6.4 Boone (2008) Test Applied to Different Time Periods 
Relative Profit Difference (RPD) ߩ 
quadratic quantile regression at the third quartile 
Estimates 2005-2008 2009-2012 
Constant 0.464 0.105 
Normalised efficiency ߟ -1.431 -1.014 
Normalised efficiency squared ߟଶ 1.566 1.311 
Boone relative profit difference integral 0.271 0.035 
SE (Boone integral) 0.023 0.020 
Estimated difference of 2009-2012 integral and 2005-2008, Δ෡: 0.2357, test ܪ଴:	Δ ൌ
N 898 983 
 
The other significant application of Boone (2008) test is to analyze the 
differences of competition intensity among different competitive regimes, in 
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particular, different countries and regions in my sample. The empirical results 
of the visual test or the sign of the difference in the integrals Δ෡ and Wald test 
for comparison of competition intensity of each country or region and the 
remaining countries and regions in the sample over the entire sample period 
are displayed in Table 6.5. To compute the difference in the integrals	Δ෡ and 
examine the Wald test of no difference in the integrals, we use quadratic 
quantile regressions at the third quartile for the comparison of each country or 
region and the remaining countries and regions as the method mentioned in 
the last section. If the sign of the difference in the integrals Δ෡ is negative, it 
indicates that the value of the relative profit difference integral of the compared 
country or region is lower than that of the remaining countries and regions so 
that banks in this country have stronger competition in the banking industry. 
While if the sign of Δ෡ is positive, the conclusion is in an opposite way, that is, 
banks in the comparison are less competitive than the rest of the sample. 
 
In Table 6.5, it shows that countries and regions with stronger competitive 
banking sectors than the remaining countries and regions in the sample are 
China, India, Singapore and Taiwan Province of China. It is known that China 
and India are emerging market and developing economies while Singapore 
and Taiwan Province of China are advanced economies. On the contrary, 
banks in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand are less intensely competitive in 
the banking industry of the whole sample. In this group, all of these three 
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countries are emerging economies. Moreover, it is quite complicated to 
characterize the competition intensity of the banking sectors in HK SAR and 
Korea. The sign of Boone (2008) test for HK SAR and the remaining 
economies is positive which indicates that HK SAR is less competitive in the 
sample period than other countries, however, the result of Wald test for the null 
hypothesis that no difference in relative profit integrals exempts HK SAR from 
the group of the less intensely competitive economies. Similarly, due to failing 
to reject the null hypothesis, Korea is excluded from the group of relatively 
strong competitive economies, even though it has a positive sign of Boone 
(2008) test. It is notable that Korea is excluded from the group of more 
intensely competitive countries based on the same reason as Duygun et al. 
(2015) suggests. 
 
The empirical result, China and India are in the group of the more intensely 
competitive countries in the sample period, is very reasonable and consistent 
with our expectation. China is known to be a very strong emerging market and 
developing economy in East Asia and there are some significantly systematic 
reforms and recapitalization in the banking system to join the WTO and 
minimize the harm of the global financial crisis. In the meantime, as a big 
developing country and being in a remarkable transitional market-oriented 
reform period like China, India represents strong emerging economies in 
South Asia and the banking industry has pursued a continuously expanding 
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and deepening reform during the sample period. Moreover, Singapore and 
Taiwan Province of China are known to be advanced economies and it is fair 
that banks are more intensely competitive than others in the sample since they 
have sounder banking systems, more diversified financial products and more 
elaborate services. Therefore, during the period of the global financial crisis, 
the banking sectors in Singapore and Taiwan Province of China are still 
relatively more competitive than others in the sample. 
 
Table 6.5 The Test of the Relative Intensity of Competition ઢ෡ 
No. Country 
Number of 
Observations
Visual test: 
sign of Δ෡ 
Wald test: p-value 
for ܪ଴: Δ ൌ 0  
1 China 424 - 0.0077 
2 HK SAR 139 + 0.3085 
3 India 316 - 0.0005 
4 Indonesia 381 + 0 
5 Korea 98 - 0.7566 
6 Malaysia 136 + 0.0037 
7 Singapore 38 - 0.0224 
8 Taiwan Province of China 243 - 0 
9 Thailand 106 + 0 
  Total 1881   P<0.025 
Note: the relative intensity of competition Δ෡ ൌ ׬ ߩప௧஺෢ଵ଴ ሺߟ௜௧ሻ݀ߟ-׬ ߩప௧஻෢
ଵ
଴ ሺߟ௜௧ሻ݀ߟ=0 A: country or region in 
comparison; B: the whole sample, i.e. 9 selected Asian countries and regions. 
 
The integrals of the relative profit difference of a country or region in 
comparison and the remaining economies in the sample are portrayed in the 
graphs that are labeled as Figure 6.3 to Figure 6.11. The country or region in 
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comparison is represented as the red curve and the Boone integral of all 
economies in the whole sample is shown as the blue curve. Thus, we will have 
an intuitive view of the Boone test.  
 
In the case of China, HK SAR, India, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand, the 
red curve overlaps the blue curve, that is, the quadratic quantile regression 
lines of the integrals of the relative profit difference overlap so that it is hard to 
find out the sign of Boone test from the diagrams. After calculations of the 
difference in the Boone integrals for each country or regions in comparison 
and the rest of the sample, the sign of Δ෡ is positive for China, India and 
Singapore while it is negative for HK SAR, Indonesia and Thailand.  
 
In contrast, in the case of Korea, Malaysia and Taiwan Province of China, the 
curves are apparently different so that they directly demonstrate the sign of the 
Boone test. The sign of Δ෡ is negative for Korea and Taiwan Province of China 
since the area under the red curve is smaller than the area under the blue 
curve while the sign is positive for Malaysia since the red curve is above the 
blue curve. If Δ෡ is smaller than zero, it suggested that the compared country 
or region is relatively more intense competitive in the sample. The opposite 
conclusion is found in the case when Δ෡	> 0. Most noticeable is that HK SAR 
and Korea fail to reject null hypothesis after examining the Wald test, that is, 
no difference in the integrals. However, the empirical results of Wald test of the 
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rest of the sample further confirm the findings of competition comparisons.  
 
If we change the value of the degree of the polynomial quantile regression and 
quantile value, the empirical result of the sign of the Boone test and Wald test 
of no difference in the definite integrals might be different. It needs to test more 
validated experiments. For now, based on the empirical result of my sample 
data, it suggests that the quadratic quantile regression do make the theoretical 
possibility of estimating the intensity of competition come true by applying the 
quadratic quantile regression for calculation of the relative profit difference 
integrals and implementing Wald test of no difference in the integrals. 
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Figure 6.3 China VS The Whole Sample 
Boone (2008) Relative Profit Difference: China VS the whole sample 
 
Note: The smaller area under the curve, the stronger competitive condition banks in. The red 
line represents China, while the blue line represents the whole sample. 
  
 
 
Figure 6.4 HK SAR VS The Whole Sample 
Boone (2008) Relative Profit Difference: HK SAR VS the whole sample 
 
Note: The smaller area under the curve, the stronger competitive condition banks in. The red 
line represents HK SAR, while the blue line represents the whole sample. 
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Figure 6.5 India VS The Whole Sample 
Boone (2008) Relative Profit Difference: India VS the whole sample 
 
Note: The smaller area under the curve, the stronger competitive condition banks in. The red 
line represents India, while the blue line represents the whole sample. 
 
Figure 6.6 Indonesia VS The Whole Sample 
Boone (2008) Relative Profit Difference: Indonesia VS the whole sample 
 
Note: The smaller area under the curve, the stronger competitive condition banks in. The red 
line represents Indonesia, while the blue line represents the whole sample. 
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Figure 6.7 Korea VS The Whole Sample 
Boone (2008) Relative Profit Difference: Korea VS the whole sample 
 
Note: The smaller area under the curve, the stronger competitive condition banks in. The red 
line represents Korea, while the blue line represents the whole sample. 
 
 
Figure 6.8 Malaysia VS The Whole Sample 
Boone (2008) Relative Profit Difference: Malaysia VS the whole sample 
 
Note: The smaller area under the curve, the stronger competitive condition banks in. The red 
line represents Malaysia, while the blue line represents the whole sample. 
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Figure 6.9 Singapore VS The Whole Sample 
Boone (2008) Relative Profit Difference: Singapore VS the whole sample 
 
Note: The smaller area under the curve, the stronger competitive condition banks in. The red 
line represents Singapore, while the blue line represents the whole sample. 
 
Figure 6.10 Taiwan Province of China VS The Whole Sample 
Boone (2008) Relative Profit Difference: Taiwan Province of China VS the whole 
sample 
 
Note: The smaller area under the curve, the stronger competitive condition banks in. The red 
line represents Taiwan Province of China, while the blue line represents the whole sample. 
 
	 303
Figure 6.11 Thailand VS The Whole Sample 
Boone (2008) Relative Profit Difference: Thailand VS the whole sample 
 
Note: The smaller area under the curve, the stronger competitive condition banks in. The red 
line represents Thailand, while the blue line represents the whole sample. 
 
 
6.4.5 Conclusion 
 
Boone believes that when competition becomes more intense, less efficient 
firms are punished more harshly than more efficient firms, and based on this 
core idea, he introduces the Boone indicator to measure competition in 
different industries on a basis of the relationship between profitability and 
efficiency. As a new measure of competition, the Boone indicator is more 
appropriate and precise than other competition measures such as the 
traditional competition proxies, i.e. concentration index and HHI, new empirical 
industrial organization approach (Panzar-Rosse H statistic) and Lerner Index. 
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According to the suggestion of Boone (2008), we compute the normalized 
efficiency against normalized profit from the firm level over the sample period 
2005 to 2012 by sorting and normalizing measured cost efficiency ܧ௜௧ and 
measured profitability ߨ௜௧, then we can measure the intensity of competition by 
using the relative profit difference. It is notable that the proxy of efficiency is 
cost efficiency score that is estimated from the panel data by using stochastic 
frontier analysis of the firm’s cost function and the proxy of profitability is 
shadow return on equity capital that is calculated by the negative derivative of 
cost with respect to equity capital ratio from the firm’s cost function including 
equity capital ratio as quasi-fixed input.  
 
To determine the relative intensity of competition for different competitive 
environments over time, a comparison of the areas under the curves of the 
relative profit difference is necessary. In this case, Boone (2008) suggests a 
visual test of the difference in the relative profit difference integrals for different 
competition regimes. However, it is different at some extent because the 
possibility of implementing the theoretical Boone’s suggest test is based on the 
assumption that measured profitability is positively related to cost efficiency. 
For sufficing the validity of this assumption to compute the integrals of the 
Boone test, Duygun et al. (2015) introduce a polynomial quantile regression. 
As suggested by them, we apply a quadratic quantile regression to carry out 
the Boone test for a panel data sample of banking sectors in the selected 9 
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Asian countries and regions during the period 2005 to 2012. On the one hand, 
we apply the Boone’s sign test and a Wald test of no difference in relative profit 
difference integrals to compare the intensity of competition of the whole 
sample over two different periods, 2005 to 2008 and 2009 to 2012. On the 
other hand, we apply both of the Boone test and Wald test for evaluating the 
intensity of competition of each country or region in comparison and the 
remaining economies from the sample over the whole sample. 
 
Arising from the empirical work done in the section 6.4.4, we have two critical 
findings. Competition of banking systems in the sample becomes more intense 
in the wake of the global financial crisis. And a group of countries and regions 
plays a significant role in intensifying competition including two advanced 
economies: Singapore and Taiwan Province of China and two remarkable 
emerging economies: China and India.  
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
 
7.1 Findings and Contributions of this Thesis 
 
There are three major contributions of this thesis. These are the study of the 
cost minimizing behavior of banking systems in emerging economies, 
particularly in Asia; the analysis of traditional models of banking competition 
based on the SCP and Lerner approaches; the analysis of the modern profit 
elasticity and relative profit difference measurement model of Boone. 
 
In the third chapter, which is on the cost minimizing behavior of the banking 
systems in the panel, the research results showed the importance of including 
the equity capital basis of the banks’ balance sheets as a fixed input. This is 
permitted the calculation of the shadow cost of equity capital from the negative 
of the regression coefficients representing the elasticity function for equity 
capital. In the period covered by this sample the global financial system 
experienced a major shock as many countries went through systemic financial 
crisis. In these circumstances, the deleveraging of the banks as they tried to 
rebuild their loss-absorbing equity capital has a major impact on the shadow 
price of equity capital. Consequently this form of cost function specification 
was shown to be critically important in the period covered by this sample. 
Moreover, we test the robustness of the functional form under the 
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intermediation approach, production approach and dual approach individually 
for specifying inputs and outputs variables. And regarding to the empirical 
result of the statistical properties such as monotonicity and concavity 
conditions of these approaches, we find that intermediation approach is most 
appropriate among them if only the data of the value of total deposits is 
available. Furthermore, with reference to the empirical evidence of the impact 
of bank size and the exogenous cross-country heterogeneities on cost 
efficiency, we conclude that bank size and cross-country differences are 
important determinants of banking efficiency even though the relationship 
between the level of efficiency and bank size diverge under different panel 
data stochastic frontier analysis models. 
 
In the fourth chapter that is on the traditional analysis of competition 
measurement the research investigated in depth a range of models linked to 
the structure-conduct-performance approach. This in turn is related to the 
Lerner approach to measuring competition that relies heavily on measures of 
concentration. The research showed that the SCP-Lerner approach is not 
always successful in identifying the strength of competition and may not 
always unambiguously distinguish between the market power and the 
efficiency explanations of market concentration, which have played a major 
role in previous banking market analysis. 
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The final empirical chapter therefore turned to a different approach to the 
problem of measuring the strength of competition. This approach was derived 
by Boone in a series of papers which concentrated on the impact of market 
shocks in shifting profitability and market share in the direction of the more 
efficient banks. Boone derived two measures of the impact of efficiency on 
shifting profit and market share towards more competitive banks when 
exogenous shocks occurred. These measures are the profit elasticity 
(elasticity of profit or market share with respect to marginal cost) and the 
relative profit difference (the difference between the profitability of the typical 
bank relative to the profit of the most efficient bank compared with the 
difference between the efficiency of the typical bank relative to the most 
efficient bank). Empirical analysis using both measures, based on work by the 
ECB and Duygun et al. (2015) showed how the global financial crisis led to 
stronger competition in 2008-2009. These Boone measures may therefore be 
important indicators of the impact of exogenous shocks to the banking system, 
and are a useful direction for further research in this field. 
 
7.2 Limitations of the Study and Direction of Future Research 
 
Based on the empirical results in this thesis and the limitations of the study, we 
can propose some potential directions of future study. 
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The first shortcoming of the thesis is that we only measure the cost efficiency 
of the sampling banks. As suggested by Berger and Mester (1997), a relatively 
cost efficient bank may not be cost efficient at optimal output levels. However, 
profit efficiency can identify the inefficiencies on the output side and input side 
since the fundamental objective of a bank is profit maximization. Besides, a 
bank with low cost efficiency could be more profit efficient than those banks 
that are relative more cost efficient due to the higher sales revenue and a cost 
efficient bank might be profit inefficient if it produces wrong output portfolio. 
Therefore, profit efficiency might be a more intuitive, effective and precise 
proxy of bank’s efficiency than cost efficiency. If the data of output prices are 
available in future or more appropriate proxies of output prices are introduced, 
we can investigate profit efficiency. The comparison of cost efficiency and 
profit efficiency is very valuable for the operations of banks since the ultimate 
aim of firms is to maximize the profit. For example, the management of banks 
has to focus on reducing expenditure if it is very difficult to broaden the 
sources of income to increase the revenue and optimizing the sales portfolios 
if the expenditure is inevitably increased. Moreover, profit efficiency can be 
used as a dependent variable to estimate the relationship between competition 
and efficiency, and the result is of more practical significance to economists 
and policymakers. Furthermore, with the information of output prices, 
researchers can determine the source of productivity growth, which indicates 
economic growth by considering the effect of output mix allocative inefficiency 
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when estimating the Total Factor Productivity change and its decomposition. 
 
Secondly, it is generally agreed that cross-country differences influence the 
frontier technology in the international comparison of banks’ performance in 
two ways: as additional external explanatory variables or as a measure of 
determinants or heteroscedasticity to be a part of inefficiency or random noise 
error term. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a full and 
comprehensive comparison by adopting these two methods. In this thesis, 
cross-country differences are considered as additional environmental variables, 
and then I implement the international comparison of unbalanced panel data 
sample under different stochastic frontier analysis models with and without 
incorporating these cross-country heterogeneities. And from the empirical 
results, it finds that cross-country heterogeneities are crucial sources to 
measure banks’ cost efficiency and evaluate banks’ performance. It is highly 
possible that the estimates of the inefficiency scores are biased since the 
heterogeneity variables are not completely employed in our regression. In the 
future research, we can construct a model by accommodating cross-country 
differences both in inefficiency term and random noise error term. Then based 
on this proposed model, we can estimate cost efficiency and total factor 
productivity, and compare them under different specifications as well.  
	
Finally, current work only focus on the relationship between efficiency and 
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competition of banking industry. In the future, the research can be extended to 
investigate the relationship among efficiency, competition and stability. There 
is considerable interest in examining what specific transmission mechanism 
drives competition to contribute to stability in different industries (both financial 
sectors and non-financial sectors) and more and more empirical studies have 
followed with interest. In particular, bank stability has been at the top of policy 
makers’ agenda across advanced and developing economies since the 
financial crisis hit the world in 2008. The 2008-2009 global financial crisis has 
impacted the fundamental relationship between bank soundness and 
competition. Therefore, the relationship between competition and bank stability 
is significantly important for policy makers and regulation authorities, however, 
the transmission mechanism how competition contributes to stability is still an 
underexplored area.  
 
Does competition matter in practice for financial crisis? Among the first authors 
to investigate this issue were Beck et al. (2006). These authors raised the 
question in these terms. Concentration-stability theory could suggest that more 
concentrated banking systems are less likely to suffer systemic financial crisis. 
On the other hand, concentration-fragility theory could suggest that a policy of 
entry prevention and resistance to increased competition could reduce the 
fragility of the banking system. Their findings based a large panel data 
empirically study are mixed. They find that concentrated banking systems are 
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less liable to systemic crisis that supports the concentration-stability 
hypothesis but they also find that thwarting competition worsens the fragility of 
the banking system. Therefore this important question is more difficult to 
resolve than it appears. 
 
Future research can fill the gap to investigate the transmission mechanism in 
major Asian economies, according to the previous industrial organization 
literature and suggested by Schaeck and Cih ܽ́k (2014), we can expect 
efficiency to be transmission channel between market competition and bank 
stability and examine the nexus between efficiency, competition and stability 
by the following model: 
ܼ௜௝௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚܤ௝௧ ൅ ߛ ௜ܺ௝௧ ൅ ߜܥ௝௧ ൅ ߝ௜௝௧, 
where ܼ௜௧ is a measure of bank stability for bank i in country j at time t, ܤ௝௧ is 
the Boone (2008) indicator in country j at time t, X represents bank-specific 
variables and C represents country-specific variables. 
 
To measure stability of individual bank, we use the Z-score, which has been 
widely used in the previous literature (e.g., Boyd et al., 2006; Hesse and Cihܽ́k, 
2007; Iannotta et al., 2007; Garcia-Marco and Robles-Fernܽ́ndez, 2008; Beck 
et al., 2009; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; 
Houston et al., 2010; Jim݁́nez et al., 2010; Liu and Wilson, 2011; Liu et al., 
2013; Fiordelisi and Mare, 2014; Schaeck and Cih ܽ́k, 2014). Z-score is 
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calculated as 
 Z=ሺோை஺ାா/஺ሻఙ	ሺோை஺ሻ ,  
where ROA is the bank’s return on assets, E/A represents the bank’s equity 
capital to total assets ratio, and ߪሺܴܱܣሻ denotes the standard deviation of 
return on assets. A three-year rolling time window for ߪሺܴܱܣሻ is extensively 
used in banking empirical literature to capture the variation pattern of the 
bank’s return volatility. However, we suggest that ߪሺܴܱܣሻ can be the standard 
deviation of return on assets in country at current year t. In this way, it avoids 
the situation that some banks are lack of data in consecutive years. Besides, 
According to Fiordelisi and Mare (2014), we estimate the Z-score by using the 
following form: 
Z_robust=ሺఓሺோை஺ሻାா/஺ሻఙ	ሺோை஺ሻ  ,  
where ߤሺܴܱܣሻ is the mean of the bank’s return on asset in country j at time t. 
Both of these two alternative measures of Z-score can be used to get a more 
robust result. In addition, we use the natural logarithm of the Z score to 
eliminate the extreme value of the Z score and let it be normally distributed 
since it is highly skewed. To test the persistence of bank stability, the lagged 
variable ܼ௜௝,௧ିଵis included as a dependent variable.  
 
We include bank size (the natural logarithm of bank’s total asset, lnTA), cost 
inefficiency (cost to income ratio), lending ability (total loans to total assets 
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ratio, total loans to total deposits), diversification index (the rate of non-interest 
income to total revenue), and bad loans allowance (loss loan provision to total 
assets ratio) as the bank-specific variables. And we use concentration ratio 
(the rate of assets of the largest banks to the assets of all banks in one country 
CR3, HHI on country-level assets), regional GDP per capita, regional 
unemployment rate and inflation rate (average CPI for each year) as the 
country-specific variables. Besides the bank-specific and country-specific 
dependent variables, we include depth of credit information index, strength of 
legal rights index, deposit insurance, stock market turnover, property rights 
and financial freedom as instrumental variables. In addition, one-year or 
two-years lagged factors of the dependent variables, with which we expect the 
long-run influence of competition on banking stability, are included in the right 
hand side of the function. Finally, we follow the findings of Martinez-Miera and 
Repullo (2010) and Liu, et al. (2013), include a quadratic term ܤ݋݋݊݁ଶ to test 
the possibility of non-linear relationship between competition and stability. 
 
We estimate the coefficient of the Boone indicator to evaluate the relationship 
between stability and competition and check the robustness by applying 
different panel data models such as Pitt and Lee Fixed Effect model, 
two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) model and Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) model. If the sign of the coefficient ߚ is negative, it indicates that the 
reallocation effect that handing out profits from inefficient banks to efficient 
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ones strengthen stability. Based on the findings, we can empirically analyze 
and testify the nexus between competition, efficiency and stability for the 
policymaking and regulation. There are some important implications. For 
example, finding out the methods of intensifying competition that would be 
more beneficial for efficient banks if it drives inefficient bank out of the industry, 
measuring the effects of promoting competition on stability of the banking 
system and determining the extent of restricting banks activities and regulation 
since the significantly tight regulation policy has potential harm on the 
motivation of banks being more efficient.  
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